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Schoolbooks, School Boards, and the Constitution 
The books our children read in public schools and the subjects they -are 
taught are increasingly becoming the focus of heated courtroom controversies .1 
School boards claim absolute discretion; teachers, parents, and students challenge 
the boards' decisionmaking authority on first amendment grounds. The courts are 
grappling with these conflicting interests and with the underlying tension be-
tween individual rights and majoritarian decisionmaking in the public schools. 
This Note suggests that the public school student 's first amendment right to 
receive infonnation, and the teacher's right to communicate are substantial rights 
warranting protection through judicial review of school board decisionmaking . 
After examining the leading cases in this area, the Note discusses the state's 
interest in retaining control of public education. In Part III, the Note suggests 
that the first amendment is generally applicable to the public schools, despite the 
difficulty of applying traditional first amendment analysis in this context. It then 
considers the student's right to know, the teacher's right to free expression, and 
the justifiable limits on those rights imposed by the exigencies of public educa-
tion. Building upon these competing interests, the Note proposes a standard for 
judicial review that would sustain school board decisions when justified by 
reasonable educational policy, and concludes by applying this standard to seven 
illustrative cases . 
I. THE CASES 
Within the last decade, the Courts of Appeals for the Second, Sixth, and 
Tenth Circuits have all considered how, if at all, the Constitution limits a school 
board ' s authority to select, remove, or prohibit the assignment of textbooks, 
library books, and other printed materials for classroom use . The courts so far 
have reached uneven and contradictory conclusions based upon incomplete and 
unsatisfactory reasoning. 
In Presidents Council, District 25 v. Community School Board, 2 the board, 
responding to parental complaints about junior high school students' access in 
school to Piri Thomas's Down These Mean Streets, a graphic novel about life in 
Spanish Harlem, placed the book on a limited access shelf where students could 
obtain it only if their parents borrowed the book for them. 3 An association of 
presidents of parent-teacher organizations, parents, teachers, and students chal-
lenged this action in federal district court, asserting a violation of the first 
I. See, e.g .. Cary v. Board of Educ., 598 F.2d 535 ( 10th Cir. 1979); Minarcini v. Strongsville 
City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976); Presidents Council, Dist. 25 v. Community School 
Bd. 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972); Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High 
School Bd. of Directors, 475 F. Supp. 615 (D. Vt. 1979), appeal pending, No. 79-7676 (2d Cir. 
Feb. 6, 1980); Pico v. Board of Educ., 474 F. Supp. 387 (E.D.N.Y . 1979), appeal pending, No . 
79-7690 (2d Cir. .Feb. 6, 1980); Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269 (D.N.H. 1979). 
2. 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cert . denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972). 
3. This was a compromise solution, reached after the board's initial decision to remove the 
book altogether. Id. at 290. 
• 
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amendment rights of the parents, children, and teachers. 4 The district court 
dismissed the complaint, and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit af-
firmed . Since the board had not prohibited the book's discussion in class or 
assignment as outside reading, and parents could borrow the book for their chil-
dren, the court found only a "minuscule" intrusion on any first amendment 
constitutional rights. 5 It reasoned that a book, having once been shelved in a 
school library, could "be removed by the same authority which was empowered 
[by statute] to make the selection in the first place" without raising a constitu-
tional issue . 6 
Two years later, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected this 
reasoning in Minarcini v . Strongsville City School District . 7 In Minarcini, the 
plaintiff high school students, through their parents , claimed that the school 
board's schoolbook decisionmaking had violated their first and fourteenth 
amendment rights. The board had removed Kurt Vonnegut ' s Cat's Cradle and 
Joseph Heller's Catch-22 from the school library, rejected faculty recommenda-
tions that it authorize Catch-22 and Vonnegut's God Bless You, Mr. Rosewater 
as library books or textbooks, and passed resolutions limiting discussion of all 
three in class and their use as supplementary reading. 8 The district court found 
these actions constitutional. 9 
The court of appeals, noting that the removal had been ordered because 
individual board members found the books "objectionable in content," found no 
"explanation of the Board's action which is neutral in First Amendment 
terms." 10 It reasoned that neither the state nor the school board, once having 
created for students the privilege of a high school library, ''could place condi-
tions on [its use] which were related solely to the social or political tastes of 
school board members." 11 Although the books could be removed for a variety 
of practical reasons, such as lack of shelf space or wear and tear , their removal 
because their content "occasioned . .. displeasure or disapproval" 12 impermis-
sibly infringed the student's first amendment "right to know." 13 The court 
4. The plaintiffs brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). Id . at 289. 
5. Id. at 292. 
6. Id. at 293 . Judge Mulligan stopped shon of aniculating a standard of absolute school board 
discretion over book removal : "To suggest that the shelving or unshelving of books presents a 
constitutional issue , particularly where there is no showing of a curtailment of freedom of speech or 
thought , is a proposition we cannot accept. " Id. (emphasis added) . It is reasonable to assume , then , 
that the coun envisioned some circumstances that would constitute such cunailment. Unfonunately , it 
made no attempt to analyze what the elements of unconstitutional school board decisionmaking would 
be, and what standard couns should apply in evaluating the decisionmaking process itself. 
7. 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976). 
8. Id. at 579. 
9. 384 F. Supp. 698 (N.D. Ohio 1974), rev 'd, 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976). 
10. 541 F.2d at 582. 
11. Id. The coun was troubled by the potential burden upon classroom discussion and not 
reassured by the books' availability elsewhere. It referred to the library as a " forum for silent 
speech ," and a " mighty resource in the free marketplace of ideas," id. at 582-83, concepts of 
traditional first amendment analysis that are of limited applicability in the public school context. 
12 . Id . at 581 . 
13 . Id. at 583. See also notes 74-113 and accompanying text infra. 
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accordingly remanded to the district court with directions to order the reshelving 
of the books . 14 
In a 1979 decision , Cary v. Board of Education, 15 the Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit attempted to establish the limits of school board authority to 
override high school teachers' selection of literature for their reading lists. The 
plaintiffs, teachers of eleventh and twelfth grade elective language arts classes, 
had submitted for approval a list of 1,285 books, ten of which the school board 
ordered removed . 16 The teachers admitted that the school board had the power 
to change the curriculum and presumably to cancel the course itself. 17 They 
argued, however, that the board, having approved the course, could not impose 
restrictions " 'based upon the personal predilections of members of the school 
board' " without violating teachers ' rights of academic freedom. 18 The court 
disagreed, upholding the school board's act ion. 1 ~ It recognized that first 
amendment protection of freedom of expression had some ''carryover . . . to 
teachers' expressions in the context of course work and classroom teaching," 20 
but found that the school board, as the legitimate transmitter of community val-
ues and as the guardian of "the collective will of those whose children are being 
educated and who are paying the costs, ... was acting within its rights in 
omitting the books, even though the decision was a political one influenced by 
the personal views of the members." 21 The court thus concluded in effect that 
the school board members were within their rights in excluding schoolbooks 
according to " 'personal predilections. ' " 22 
In all three of these cases the courts confronted the same dilemma: by estab-
lishing public schools and authorizing school boards to prescribe curricula and 
select schoolbooks, the states require their delegates to engage in the type of 
content-based regulation of expression that the first amendment seems to pro-
hibit. 23 Although according to traditional firs t amendment principles "govern-
14. Id. at 584. The court affirmed the district court ' s finding that procedural due process re-
quirements had been satisfied, and that the actions of the board were not "arbitrary and capricious. " 
15. 598 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1979). 
I 6. The banned volumes, all of which had been used in previous years , were: A. Burgess , A 
Clockwork Orange; W. Blatty, The Exorcist; M. Ehrlich , The Reincarnation of Peter Proud; D. 
Allen, New American Poetry; L. Ferlinghetti, Starting from San Francisco; W. Burroughs & A. 
Ginsberg, The Yage Letters; L. Ferlinghetti , Coney Island of the Mind; A. Ginsberg, Kaddish and 
Other Poems; F. O ' Hara , Lunch Poems; I. Levin , Rosemary's Baby. 
The board, which gave no reasons for its decision, made no effort to prohibit discussion of the 
books. The parties stipulated that " the books were not obscene, no systematic effort had been made 
to exclude any particular system of thought or philosophy, and a ' constitutionally proper decision-
maker' could decide these books were proper for high school language arts classes." Id. at 538 . 
17. Id. at 542. 
18. Id. at 542-43. 
19 . While the court affirmed the judgment of the district court, it rejected the lower court's 
conclusion that the teachers had waived their constitutional rights concerning book assignments by 
the terms of their collective bargaining agreement. 427 F . Supp. 945 (D. Colo. 1977) , aff'd, 598 
F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1979). 
20. 598 F.2d at 543. 
21. Id. at 543-44. 
22. Id. at 544. 
23. See, e.g., Police Dep ' t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 , 95-96 (1972). For a fuller discussion of 
the impact of educational decisionmaking on first amendment analysis , see section IV .A . infra. 
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ment has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its 
subject matter, or its content," 24 school boards must base their decisions to 
acquire or reject schoolbooks on precisely those criteria. Schools cannot teach all 
there is to learn; school boards must choose the subjects they wish to transmit 
and select those books which will accomplish this purpose. None of the courts 
addressed this paradox directly. The Minarcini court, in holding the school 
board's action unconstitutional merely because it was content-based, failed to 
recognize the legitimacy and necessity of making educational decisions on the 
basis of what is being taught. In contrast, the Cary and Presidents Council 
courts concluded that the need for content-based regulation makes the first 
amendment inapplicable in the classroom, overlooking the first amendment in-
terests of students and teachers. Neither approach appropriately reconciles the 
values of education and free expression with state regulation of public education. 
II. THE NATURE OF STATE REGULATION OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
Public schooling in the United States has traditionally been the responsibil-
ity of the states, 25 typically provided for in their constitutions 26 and administered 
through complex and comprehensive laws. 27 School systems are by nature 
majoritarian, directed by school boards either directly or indirectly chosen by 
democratic process, and answerable to the people they represent. 28 In this way 
the community theoretically is able to maintain a school system that reflects its 
values and particular needs. 2 ~ 
The states have compelling reasons to exercise substantial control over the 
school systems, and over their curricula in particular. These interests are closely 
related to perhaps the most basic first amendment value: the protection of "the 
freedom of those activities of thought and communication by which we 'gov-
ern.' " 30 To protect that freedom, the states attempt to ensure that their citi-
24. Id. at 95. 
25. The provision of public education has been fairly described as "perhaps the most important 
function of state and local governments . . required in the performance of our most basic public 
responsibilities." Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S . 483, 493 (1954). 
26. State constitutions may require the establishment and maintenance of the public schools 
themselves. See , e.g., N.J. Const. art. 8 , § 4 , 11 I; N.Y. Const. art. XI , § I. Some states make more 
general constitutional provision for the encouragement of education. See, e.g . , Mich. Const. art. 8, § 
I; Mass. Const. pt. 2, ch. V, § 2. 
27. See , e.g., N. Y. Educ. Law (McKinney 1969). See also Project, Education and the Law: 
State Interests and Individual Rights, 74 Mich. L. Rev. I 374, I 375-81 ( 1976) [hereinafter cited as 
Project). 
28. For comprehensive discussions of school board structure and the delegation of educational 
authority , see Goldstein, The Scope and Sources of School Board Authority to Regulate Student 
Conduct and Status: A Nonconstitutional Analysis , I 17 U. Pa. L. Rev. 373 (1969) [hereinafter cited 
as Goldstein, School Board Authority]; Project , supra note 27 , at 1375-81. 
29. For a critique of government control of history schoolbook selection in the primary and 
secondary schools , arguing that school boards traditionally have opted for texts depicting a distorted, 
homogenized view of American society, see F. FitzGerald, America Revised: History Schoolbooks in 
the Twentieth Century ( 1979). 
30. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 S. Ct. Rev. 245, 255 [hereinafter 
cited as Meiklejohn, First Amendment]. In a sense, then, by deferring to first amendment values, the 
state is pursuing its own long-term best interests. 
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zens will be at least minimally equipped to fu nction as autonomous, productive 
adults in a self-governing society, 31 and to defend the welfare of their chil-
dren. 32 They thus require that children be educated for a certain number of 
years, 33 that instruction be provided by qualified, licensed teachers, 34 and that 
the curriculum include whatever courses of study each state deems essential for 
the students' "intellectual, moral, and social development." 35 
Although state and local school boards generally have broad discretion to 
administer the schools and to establish curricula, 36 parents frequently can bring 
about changes in schoolbook policies through the exertion of political force 
within the community. 37 This is not surprising, since the authority of the 
boards, whether elected or legislatively created, ultimately depends upon their 
31. See Garvey , Children and the First Amendment, 57 Tex. L. Rev . 321 , 344-45 (1979) 
[hereinafter cited as Garvey, First Amendment]. 
32. It has long been established that the state may restrict even constitutionally protected ex-
pression in order to prevent harm to minor children. See, e .g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 
(1968); Prince v. Massachusetls, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); notes 78-87 and accompanying text infra. 
33. See Project , supra note 27, at 1386-99. 
The state may not compel parents to use the public as opposed to private schools. See Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). Indeed, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), suggests 
that states may not always compel "in school" attendance. In that case the Court held that Amish 
parents who withdrew their children from public school after eighth grade to insure free exercise of 
their religion could not be punished for violating a state compulsory education law. Yoder may, in 
fact, stand for the same parental right of choice regarding education upheld in Pierce, since the Court 
in effect recognized the Amish lifestyle as " learning-by-doing" -a form of bona fide home instruc-
tion. See Hirschoff, Parents and the Public School Curriculum: ls There a Right to Have One ' s Child 
Excused from Objectionable Instruction? 50 S. Cal. L. Rev. 871 , 902 ( I 977); Moskowitz, Parental 
Rights and State Education, 50 Wash. L. Rev. 623, 630 36 (1975). 
34. Project, supra note 27, at 1378-79. 
35. Note, Academic Freedom in the Public Schools: The Right to Teach, 48 N.Y.U . L. Rev. 
I I 76, 1186-87 ( 1973) [hereinafter cited as Right to Teach]. See also Project, supra note 27 , at 
I 378-80; Note, First Amendment Limitations on the Power of School Boards to Select and Remove 
High School Text and Library Books, 52 St. John's L. Rev. 457, 459 n.13 (1978) [hereinafter cited 
as First Amendment Limitations]. 
Some elements of indoctrination by the school system are permissible. Many states require by 
statute that students be taught American history and government. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev . Stat. Ann. § 
15-1021 (West 1975); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 340.361-.362 (West 1976). Some also require 
instruction concerning capitalism. See , e.g. , Fla. Stat. Ann. § 233.064 (Harrison 1977); Utah Code 
Ann. § 53-14-7.5 (Supp. 1979); First Amendment Limitations, supra, at 459 n.13. See also Kamen-
shine, The First Amendment's Implied Political Establishment Clause, 67 Calif. L. Rev. I 104, 
1135-36 & nn.106-10 (1979). There is ample evidence that the reasonable implementation of the 
educational goals reflected in these statutes-i.e., the fostering of good citizenship and patriotism-
is not inconsistent with the Supreme Court's view of freedom of thought and expression in the public 
schools. See e.g. , West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnetle, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); cf. Palmer v. 
Board of Educ. , 603 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied , 404 U.S. 1026 (1980). But it is 
equally clear from Barnette that the schools may not go too far and attempt the " coercive elimination 
of dissent." 319 U.S. at 641. 
36. See sources collected in notes 27-28 supra. 
37. Parental complaints to school board officials often succeed in effecting the removal of 
books. See, e.g. , Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High School Bd. of Directors, 475 F. Supp. 615 (D. 
Vt. I 979) (parents successfully used school board procedure to request review of book they wished 
removed), appeal pending, No. 79-7676 (2d Cir. Feb. 6 1980); Right to Read Defense Comm. v. 
School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978) (parent's complaint about language in a poem 
caused anthology to be withdrawn from school library); Brubaker v. Board of Educ., 502 F.2d 973 
(7th Cir. 1974) (teacher dismissed after parental complaints about brochures distributed to class con-
taining poem advocating free love and drugs), cert. den ied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975). 
t 
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responsiveness to local needs. At a more immediate level, board members, being 
citizens, taxpayers, and often parents themselves, 38 are likely to share the con-
cerns and attitudes of the community they represent, and may therefore be espe-
cially sensitive to matters generating controversy among local parents. 39 
When a parent, or local board member, protests the use of a book, or 
asserts that "a particular viewpoint conflicts with accepted community val-
ues," 40 the board as a whole may act as the representative of that community 
interest. In this way, responsive majoritarian public education helps to retain a 
region's local character, maintain national diversity, and pass along to the young 
the values and beliefs of their society. It is only when this agency of the state 
seeks by majority rule to abridge interests that the Constitution puts above the 
vote that the courts may intervene in school board decisionmaking. In the next 
section this Note examines the impact of individual first amendment rights on 
public school schoolbook controversies. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRAINTS ON STATE REGULATION 
OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
A . The First Amendment in the Schools 
When parents, teachers, and students challenge the schoolbook policies of 
the public school system, they invariably invoke the first amendment as one 
source of their rights. 41 The plain language of the amendment 42 is sufficiently 
unambiguous to create a strong presumption against any state regulation of ex-
38. See Goldstein , The Asserted Constitutional Right of Public School Teachers to Determine 
What They Teach , 124 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1293 , 1356 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Goldstein, Asserted 
Right); Goldstein , School Board Authority , supra note 28, at 384-86; Van Alstyne , The Constitu-
tional Rights of Teachers and Professors, 1970 Duke L. J. 841, 855-58; Milliken v. Green, 389 
Mich. I, 203 N. W.2d 457, 483 ( 1972) (Brennan, J ., dissenting). 
39. The desirability of this state of affairs depends on one's view of the primary role of public 
elementary and secondary education. If public education is simply a passive transmitter to the child 
of the collected, valued knowledge and mores of the community, this " parochial" attitude is entirely 
appropriate-restrained by whatever limitations the Constitution places on state action. 
40. Developments in the Law: Academic Freedom, 81 Harv. L. Rev . 1045 , 1054 (1968) [here-
inafter cited as Developments). 
41. See, e.g., Cary v. Board of Educ., 598 F .2d 535 (10th Cir. 1979); Minarcini v. 
Strongsville City School Dist. , 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976); Presidents Council, District 25 v. 
Community School Bd., 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.) , cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972); Bicknell v. 
Vergennes Union High School Bd. of Directors, 475 F. Supp. 6 I 5 (D. Vt. I 979), appeal pending, 
No. 79-7676 (2d Cir. Feb. 6, 1980); Pico v. Board of Educ. , 474 F. Supp. 387 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), 
appeal pending , No. 79-7690 (2d Cir. Feb. 6 , 1980); Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School 
Comm., 454 F. Supp . 703 (D. Mass. 1978) . 
Although the first amendment seems a logical source of protection for academic freedom, see 
Developments , supra note 40 at I 053, one commentator has suggested that academic freedom may 
· · [m)ore properly " be derived · ' from the ·emanations' of a series of constitutional provisions," 
including first amendment freedom of expression and freedom of religion, and the fourteenth 
amendment guarantees of due process and equal protection. T. Emerson, The System of Freedom of 
Expression 612-13 (1970). See also Emerson & Haber , The Scopes Case in Modern Dress, 27 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 522, 524-26 (1960). 
42. "Congress shall make no law . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . 
U.S. Const., amend. I. 
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pression. 43 However, the first amendment does not protect all expression; 44 it 
safeguards the expressions that are necessary for the survival of basic first 
amendment values. 45 To determine whether the first amendment is applicable to 
schoolbook controversies, then, one must first identify these core values and 
detem1ine whether and to what extent their preservation requires the protection of 
expression within the public schools. 
Although there is no consensus concern ing the core values of the first 
amendment, 46 there are two major schools of thought on the subject. The first, 
notably advocated by Professor Alexander Meiklejohn, 47 views the first amend-
ment as a limit only upon government regulation of "public speech." Public 
speech as a classification is itself susceptible to several interpretations, ranging 
from the narrowest concept of purely political speech 48 to a broader definition 
embracing all expression that informs political judgments. 49 This view of free-
dom of expression under the first amendment is essentially utilitarian, justifying 
restraints on government regulation to protect the process of democratic govern-
ment. 50 
The second approach identifies as a core value of the first amendment 
this political concern for self-government and at the same time emphasizes a 
43. The first amendment is made applicable to action by the states by virtue of the fourteenth 
amendment. See Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, 88 Yale L.J. 1105, 1109 (1979). 
44. There are, of course, forms of "expression' ' that lie outside the protective sphere of the 
first amendment. This Note is not concerned with attempts to incorporate into the public school 
curriculum or libraries "fighting words," see, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson , 405 U.S. 518 , 522 (1972); 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942); "obscenity," see Miller v. California, 
413 U.S. 15 (1973); Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966); or speech that "i ncit[es] or 
produc[es] imminent lawless action," Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). When the 
state may legitimately restrict adults with regard to such forms of expression, a fortiori it may 
prohibit children's exposure to them. Indeed , the Supreme Court has upheld state regulation of even 
constitutionally protected conduct or expression when motivated by the state's interest in safeguarding 
the welfare of minor children. See , e.g. , FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978); 
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Prince v. Massachusetts , 321 U.S. 158 (1944) . 
45 . Jackson & Jeffries , Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 
65 Ya. L. Rev. I , 5, 9 ( 1979) [hereinafter cited as Commercial Speech]. 
46. See, e.g., T. Emerson, supra note 4 I, at 6-7; A. Meikle john, Free Speech and Its Relation 
to Self-Government 88-89, 106-07 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Meiklejohn , Free Speech]; BeYier, 
The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry Into the Substance and Limits of Principle , 
30 Stan. L. Rev . 299, 302-03 ( I 978); Bork , Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Prob-
lems , 47 Ind. L.J. I , 26-28 (1971); Meiklejohn , First Amendment, supra note 30, at 255-57, 263. 
47 . See sources cited in notes 30 & 46 supra. 
48. See Bork, supra note 46 , at 26-27. Bork argues that "[f]reedom of non-political speech 
rests , as does freedom for other valuable forms of behavior, upon the enlightenment of society and 
its elected representatives." Id. at 28. 
49. See BeYier, supra note 46, at 302-03; Meiklejohn , First Amendment, supra note 30, at 263. 
50. Professor Wellington has criticized this view for overlooking the inherent difficulty in mak-
ing nice distinctions between " public " and " nonpublic" speech. Wellington , supra note 43, at 1111. 
Indeed , Professor Meiklejohn himself had difficulty maintaining a narrow definition of political 
speech, as can be seen by comparing his narrow ambit of public speech protection in Free Speech, 
supra note 46, written in I 948, and his I 96 I views in First Amendment, supra note 30, which 
concluded that " the people do need novels and dramas and paintings and poems , ' because they will 
be called upon to vote.'" Id. at 263 (quoting Kalven , Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, I 960 
Sup. Ct. Rev . I, 16). Professor Meiklejohn 's "public ~peech" protection ultimately embraced 
"[e]ducation, in all its phases ... [t]he achievements of philosophy and the sciences . .. [l]iterature 
and the arts . [and] [p]ublic discussions of public issues, together with the spreading of information 
and opinion bearing on those issues .... " Id . at 257. 
t 
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broader concern for individual fulfillment through free expression. This view, 
which has been elaborated principally by Professor Thomas Emerson, stresses 
the essential role played by free expression in advancing knowledge, in permit-
ting participation in political and cultural decisionmaking, and in "achieving a 
more adaptable and hence a more stable community, [and] maintaining the pre-
carious balance between healthy cleavage and necessary consensus.'' 5 1 It thus 
looks not only to utilitarian values of benefit to society at large, but also to 
overtly individualistic values of personal development. 52 
Taken together, these different values can be seen as embodying a funda-
mental first amendment concern with the development and preservation of an 
"educated citizenry," 53 a core value different from Professor Meiklejohn 's "in-
formed electorate" but its necessary antecedent. Thus, when public school stu-
dents, teachers, and parents assert the "right to know" against school board 
restrictions of educational expression, the basis of their claims lies in the con-
stitutional value of an educated citizenry. 
The protection of this core value requires that courts recognize the public 
school student's right to receive educational information and the teacher's cor-
relative right to impart such information. Neither of these first amendment rights 
is absolute, as suggested later in this Note, but both must be accorded judicial 
protection against abuses by school board authorities. 
Although Supreme Court decisions have not yet recognized the rights to 
receive and impart educational information, the Court has long acknowledged the 
first amendment's protection of "academic freedom." 54 In Keyishian v. Board 
of Regents, 55 the Court invalidated a New York statute imposing a loyalty pro-
gram on public employees, including teachers in the public schools and univer-
sities. Although the statute was invalidated on grounds of vagueness and over-
51. T. Emerson, supra note 41, at 6-7. See also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 
(1927) (Brandeis, J. , concurring); Note, The Right to Know in First Amendment Analysis, 57 Tex. 
L. Rev. 505 , 5 I 2- I 5 ( I 979) [hereinafter cited as Right to Know]. 
52. See Rehnquist , The First Amendment: Freedom , Philosophy and the Law, I 2 Gonz. L. 
Rev. I, 3-8 (1976). 
53. See Right to Know , supra note 5 I, at 514; Meiklejohn, First Amendment, supra note 30, at 
263 . See also Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumers Council, Inc ., 425 
U.S. 748, 765 (1976). 
54. See University of California Regents v. Bakke , 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (Powell, J.) 
(" Academic freedom , though not a specifically enumerated constitutional right, long has been viewed 
as a special concern of the First Amendment."). For an excellent analysis of the legal implications 
and scope of academic freedom in higher education in the United States, see T. Emerson, supra note 
41, at 593-626. 
Academic freedom as commonly understood means freedom from government intervention in the 
schools. Even judicial intervention at the instance of parents and teachers sets troubling precedents 
for a "governmental presence in the academic world [that] would be repressive and destructive rather 
than liberating ." T. Emerson, supra note 41 , at 615. Cf. Presidents Council, District 25 v. Commu-
nity School Bd. , 457 F.2d 289, 292 (2d Cir.) ("Academic freedom is scarcely fostered by the 
intrusion of three or even nine federal jurists making curriculum or library choices for the community 
of scholars."), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972). 
Whatever the risk of inviting the courts into the academic world, they serve as an essential 
check on arbitrary state regulation of public education and may strike down policies that infringe the 
constitutional rights of children, parents , and teachers . 
55 . 385 U.S. 589 (1967). 
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breadth, Justice Brennan, speaking for the majority, observed that "[o]ur Nation 
is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom,[ 56] which is of tran-
scendent value to all of us .... That freedom is . . . a special concern of the 
First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over 
the classroom." 57 The Court was concerned that laws inhibiting the extracur-
ricular expressions of faculty members would also chill the free exercise of the 
intellectual skills for which they were hired, and lead finally to state-imposed 
intellectual and ideological conformity. 58 The K eyishian majority anticipated 
that the chilling of a teacher's expression outside the classroom might lead to the 
inhibition of discussion within the classroom itself. This inhibition, with its at-
tendant constraint on the free exchange of ideas, might eventually result in the 
coercion of uniform beliefs within the public education system, disapproved 
twenty-five years earlier in West Virginia State Board of Education v . Bar-
nette. 59 
In its most recent statement on the role of the first amendment in the public 
school system, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 60 
the Supreme Court addressed for the first time the minor student's first amend-
ment right to freedom of expression in the classroom . The student petitioners 
filed complaints, through their fathers, seeking to enjoin the school and district 
administrator from disciplining students who wore black armbands to protest the 
Vietnam War. 61 The Court found that the school's regulation unconstitutionally 
infringed the students' right to "silent speech," because there was no showing 
either that their conduct ''materially disrupt[ed] classwork or involve[d] substan-
56. See notes 54 supra & 88 infra. 
57. 385 U.S. at 603 . 
On the classroom as a marketplace of ideas, see text accompanying notes 88-90 infra. 
58. Justice Brennan explained: "It would be a bold teacher who would not stay as far as 
possible from utterances or acts which might jeopardize his living by enmeshing him in this intricate 
machinery . ... The result must be to stifle ' that free pla} of the spirit which all teachers ought 
especially to cultivate and practice. "' 385 U.S. 589, 601 (1967) (citing Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 
U.S. 183, 195 (1952) (Frankfurter, J ., concurring)). 
59. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). Although the claim in Barnette was one of infringement of religious 
belief by compelling salute of the flag in violation of the proscription of worship of "graven im-
ages, "an element of the faith of Jehovah 's Witnesses, the Court's opinion went beyond the religious 
claim and held that state compulsion to declare any belief " invade[d] the sphere of intellect and spirit 
which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official 
control." Id. at 642. Cf. Russo v. Central School Dist., 469 F.2d 623, 631-32 (2d Cir. 1972) 
(teacher cannot be compelled to take part in flag salute}, cert. denied, 41 I U.S. 932 (1973). 
The danger of coerced conformity of belief is equally serious when the teacher, rather than the 
school authorities, is the source of indoctrination: 
[T]eachers cannot be allowed to patrol the precincts of radical thought with the unrelenting 
goal of indoctrination .... When a teacher is only content if he persuades his students that 
his values and only his values ought to be their values, then it is not unreasonable to expect 
the state to protect impressionable children from such dogmatism. 
James v. Board of Educ ., 461 F.2d 566, 573 (2d Cir.) , cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972). See 
notes 125-31 and accompanying text infra. 
60. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
61. The school had adopted a policy forbidding any student wearing an armband to attend 
school. The district court had dismissed the complaint, holding the regulation to be a " reasonable" 
measure aimed at maintenance of school discipline. 258 F. Supp. 971 (S.D. Iowa 1966). The court 
of appeals, en bane, divided evenly and affirmed without opinion. 383 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1967). 
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tial disorder or invasion of the rights of others" or that the school administration 
could "reasonably have [been] led ... to forecast substantial disruption of or 
material interference with school activities." 62 Justice Fortas declared: 
[S]tate operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism. School 
officials do not possess absolute authority over their students. Students 
in school as well as out of school are persons under our Constitution. 
They are possessed of fundamental rights which the State must respect, 
just as they themselves must respect their obligations to the State. In 
our system, students may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients 
of only that which the State chooses to communicate. They may not be 
confined to the expression of those sentiments that are officially ap-
proved . 63 
Students, then, retain some constitutional rights within the public schools 
that the state may not suppress without inviting judicial intervention . Tinker, 
Barnette, and Keyishian illustrate the Court's willingness to review state regula-
tion of public education when it trenches upon important first amendment rights 
of academic freedom and extracurricular freedom of expression and belief. They 
shed little light, however, on the limitations, if any, that the right to free ex-
pression and the right to receive information place on state control of school 
curricula or materials. Although the Court has not yet addressed this question 
directly, Epperson v. Arkansas provides glimmerings of one possible answer. 64 
in Epperson, the Court struck down a statute prohibiting the teaching of evolu-
tion in Arkansas public schools 65 as violative of the establishment clause 66 of 
the first amendment. The trial court had invalidated the statute on first amend-
ment academic freedom grounds, 67 but its judgment was reversed by the Arkan-
sas Supreme Court, which found the statute to be a "valid exercise of the state's 
power to specify the curriculum in its public schools.'' 68 The United States 
Supreme Court again reversed, basing its decision on religious, not academic, 
freedom. Nonetheless, Justice Fortas , writing for the majority, observed more 
broadly that "[o]ur courts ... have not failed to apply the First Amendment's 
62. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District , 393 U.S . 503, 513 , 514 
(I 969). 
63. Id . at 5 I I. This passage has been c ited in support of the proposition that the " marketplace 
of ideas" model, prohibiting · 'arbitrary indoctrination," is constitutionally required in the public 
school system as well as in institutions of higher education. See Van Alstyne, supra note 38, at 857; 
notes 89-90 infra . 
64. 393 U.S. 97 (1968). 
65. The statute made it unlawful: 
for any teacher ... in any ... [educational] institution of the State , which is supported in 
whole or in part from public funds ... to teach the theory or doctrine that mankind as-
cended or descended from a lower order of animals and also it shall be unlawful for any 
teacher, textbook commission or other authority exercising the power to select textbooks for 
above mentioned educational institutions to adopt or use in any such instiiution a textbook 
that teaches [that] doctrine . 
Initiated Act No. I, Ark. Acts 1929; Ark. Stat. Ann.§ 80-1627 (1960 Repl. Vol.). 
66. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion .... " U.S. Const., 
amend. I. 
67. T. Emerson, supra note 41, at 605. 
68. State v. Epperson, 242 Ark. 922, 416 S.W.2d 322 (1967). 
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mandate in our educational system where essential to safeguard the fundamental 
values of freedom of speech and inquiry and of belief.'' 6~ 
Some indication of the nature of this first amendment limit on state control 
over the content of public education may be gleaned from the somewhat enig-
matic concurring opinion of Justice Black. Although he believed the Arkansas 
statute to be unconstitutionally vague, Justice Black could imagine "no reason 
... why a State is without power to withdraw from its curriculum any subject 
deemed too emotional and controversial for its public schools ." 70 Even he 
conceded, however, that there are some restrictions that no state can impose on 
its teachers. 71 Once the state decides to include a particular subject in its cur-
riculum, the teacher cannot be compelled to endorse or present one particular 
viewpoint to the exclusion of all others. 72 Justice Stewart reached a similar 
conclusion, stating that the criminal punishment of the teaching of certain points 
of view ''would clearly impinge upon the guarantees of free communication con-
tained in the First Amendment." 73 
Thus, for Justices Stewart and Black at least, some degree of first amend-
ment protection extends to the expression of teachers at work in public school 
classrooms. Unfortunately, neither undertook any deeper exploration of the ex-
tent to which the first amendment restrains the state ' s power to control what its 
teachers teach . In the sections that follow, this Note seeks to show that the 
teacher's right to speak in the classroom is the necessary complement of the 
public school student's right to receive educat ional information. 
69. 393 U.S. at 104. The majority's partial reliance on traditional principles of academic free-
dom led Justice Black to protest the Court ' s headlong leap "into the middle of the very broad 
problems involved in federal intrusion into state powers to decide what subjects and schoolbooks it 
may wish to use in teaching state pupils. " Id. at I IO (Black, J. , concurring). 
70. Id. at I 13. 
71. One commentator has suggested that the state may not engage in -- arbitrary restrictions on 
alternative sources of information or opinion." Van Alstyne, supra note 38, at 857. Arbitrary restric-
tions would be those not based on budgetary , time , or space considerations . Thus, any deliberate 
attempt to indoctrinate through book selection would be unconstitutional. This analysis is flawed 
because such "nonarbitrary" restrictions do not dictate final selection of materials, they merely com-
pel someone to make choices with regard to which books to purchase or retain. Final selection 
decisions will be prompted by other considerations, such as content, relevance, timeliness , and need. 
See Goldstein, Asserted Right, supra note 38, at 1349 n. 183; Garvey , First Amendment, supra note 
31, at 327. 
72. · ·1t is plain that a state law prohibiting all teaching of human development or biology is 
constitutionally quite different from a law that compels a teacher to teach as true only one theory of a 
given doctrine." 393 U.S. at 111 (Black , J., concurring) 
One commentator has suggested that when the school board wants no presentation of certain 
materials, e.g., certain language or ideas in class assignments , the avoidance of apparent .. legitimiza-
tion" of such language or ideas is itself a valid educational interest that justifies book restrictions. 
See Goldstein, Asserted Right, supra note 38 , at I 345. However, this Note suggests that when no 
prior valid prohibitive policy has been established and a teacher assigns a particular book for a 
reasonable educational purpose, the state must prove a reasonable educational policy for prohibiting 
its use. See Section IV infra. 
73. 393 U.S. at I 16 (Stewart. J., concurring). 
v 
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B. The Student's Right to Receive Educational Information 
The right of public school students to receive educational information 74-to 
hear, to read, and to learn-has only recently begun to be defined by the 
courts. 75 The right derives from the first amendment right to receive informa-
tion, 76 which itself is a corollary to the right of free expression,7 7 and is critical 
to the promotion of an educated citizenry in a free society. While the extent to 
which a child, or his or her parents or teachers, can assert the child's right to 
receive information in the public schools is at best unclear, courts have generally 
concluded that the minor's right to know is more circumscribed than the adult's. 
In Ginsberg v. New York , 78 for example, the Supreme Court upheld a state 
statute that made it illegal to sell constitutionally protected salacious materials to 
74. The right to receive information furthers both the personal and utilitarian purposes of the 
first amendment. See notes 46-53 and accompanying text supra. However, in view of the immaturity 
and relative incapacity of children, their right to receive information may be viewed principally as a 
means to an end: their development into adults capable of the "effective exercise of First Amend-
ment freedoms and ... intelligent utilization of the right to vote." San Antonio lndep. School Dist. 
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 35 (1973) . 
75. It is unclear whether a child may assert a right to receive information that neither the state 
nor her parent wishes her to receive; but where parent and child act in unison, a number of courts 
have recognized such a right under the first amendment. See, e .g . , Minarcini v. Strongsville City 
School Dist. , 541 F.2d 577 , 582 (6th Cir. 1976) (student ras right to hear teacher's discussion of 
controversial library book and then to "find and read" the book); Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 
469 F. Supp. 1269, 1273-75 (D.N .H. 1979) (infringement of student's right to receive information 
valid only where authorities show substantial interest served by restriction); Right to Read Defense 
Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703, 714 (D. Mass. 1978) ("What is at stake here is the 
right to read and be exposed to controversial thoughts and language-a valuable right subject to First 
Amendment protection."). See also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 , 40 I ( 1923) (statute interfered 
with "the calling of modern language teachers, with the opportunities of pupils to acquire knowl-
edge. and with the power of parents to control" the education of their child) (emphasis added). 
76. See generally Right to Know, supra note 51. The Supreme Court typically has referred to 
the right to receive information in the context of challenges to restrictions on speech. See , e .g., 
Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943); Right to Know , supra , at 507-10. However, 
several decisions have recognized that this right can also be asserted by the listener, whether or not a 
willing speaker is able to assert her right to speak. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 
100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Red Lion Broadcasting 
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). See also Virginia State 
Bd. of Pharmacy v . Virginia Citizens Consumer Council , Inc., 425 U.S. 748 , 756 (1976) (" [W]here 
a speaker exists , ... the protection afforded is to the communication, to its source and to its reci-
pients both."). Thus, even when the speaker does not or cannot assert a right to free expression, the 
listener may attempt to vindicate the opportunity for reciprocal "communication" between them. 
See , e.g. , Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (scope of speaker-prisoner's rights did not 
have to be determined because of clear infringement of recipient's rights). 
77. As Justice Brennan, concurring in Lamo/11 v. Posrmasrer General, pointed out: 
[T]he protection of the Bill of Rights goes beyond the specific guarantees to protect from 
congressional abridgment those equally fundamental personal rights necessary to make the 
express guarantees fully meaningful. .. . [T]he right to receive publications is such a funda-
mental right. The dissemination of ideas can accomplish nothing if otherwise willing ad-
dressees are not free to receive and consider them. It would be a barren marketplace of 
ideas that had only sellers and no buyers. 
381 U.S. 30 I, 308 ( 1965) (Congress may not require addressees to request in writing delivery of 
mail from communist countries). 
78. 390 U.S. 629 ( 1968). Ginsberg established "variable obscenity" analysis concerning 
minors' access to sexually explicit material that would not be obscene as to adults. Note, Regulation 
of Programming Content to Protect Children After Pacifica, 32 Vand. L. Rev. 1377, 1389 (1979) 
[hereinafter cited as Program Content] . 
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minors. The Court concluded that the statute did not invade "the area of free-
dom of expression constitutionally secured to minors," 79 and was within the 
state's authority to proscribe conduct affecting children that it would be power-
less to prohibit in the case of adults. 80 The <;tatute was not unconstitutional 
because it acknowledged the primacy of parental control over childrearing while 
it reasonably reflected the legislature ' s concern for the potential harm that uncon-
trolled exposure to erotica might inflict on children. 81 
The same concern about unsupervised children gaining access to constitu-
tionally protected but controversial adult material took the Court one step beyond 
Ginsberg in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation. 82 Pacifica upheld the FCC's author-
ity to regulate the airing of "patently offens ive" 83 material that was "not 
obscene in the constitutional sense" 84 at times when children are likely to be 
listening. Only a plurality concluded that this was a regulation of "form, rather 
than . .. content." 85 A majority, however , argued that "broadcasting is 
uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to read," 86 and invoked the 
protection-of-minors rationale articulated in Ginsberg, to justify the regulation of 
expression that is not even variably obscene. 87 
It would seem, then, that a child does have a right to receive certain kinds 
of information, although that right is limited by parental prerogatives and by the 
state's interest in protecting unsupervised children from uncontrolled exposure to 
sexually explicit or offensive materials intended for adult consumption. Recogni-
tion of this basic right is a key factor in the analysis of schoolbook controver-
79 . 390 U.S. at 637. 
80. Id. at 638. See also id. at 708 (Harlan, J. , concurring). 
8 I. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority , explained that the statute did not affect parental 
prerogatives: parents were not prohibited from purchasing the magazines and giving them to their 
own children if they desired. Moreover, the statute aided objecting parents in preventing their chil-
dren from coming in contact with such erotic materials. Id at 639-40. 
82. 438 U.S. 726 (1978) . 
83 . Id. at 743. 
84. Id. at 756 (Powell , J. , concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). The majority in 
Pacifica for the first time approved the restriction of children ' s access to expression that was not 
adjudged obscene even as to minors by the variable obscenity test established in Ginsberg. Id. at 767 
(Brennan , J. , dissenting). Indeed, it did not even refer to this theory in reaching its decision. See 
Program Content, note 78 supra , at 1395. 
85. Id. at 743 n. 18. 
86. Id. at 749. This rationale tacitly endorsed Judge Leventhal's dissent on the same grounds in 
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 556 F.2d 9 , 30 (D.C. Cir. 1977) , rev'd , 438 U.S. 726 (1978) . Judge 
Leventhal ' s opinion , which Justice Powell cited with approval, 438 U.S. 757 n. I, clearly enunciated 
a protectionist rationale and would have sustained the FCC ruling " 'that the language as broadcast 
was indecent' " and could be restricted with regard to the time of broadcast. 556 F.2d at 3 I (em-
phasis in original). See also note 87 infra. 
87. Justice Powell joined the judgment on this ground only. Id. at 755-62 (Powell, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in the judgment). He rejected the plurality's views that regulation of 
nonobscene but "patently offensive references to excretory ,rnd sexual organs and activities," id. at 
743, was control of "form, rather than ... content, " id. at 743 n. 18, and that such expression was 
less valuable to society and less deserving of first amendment protection than other expressions. Id. 
at 747. This approach was first articulated by Justice Stevens in Young v. American Mini Theatres , 
Inc. , 427 U.S. 50, 61 (1976) , when a plurality of the Court recognized a category of expression 
outside the sphere of "ideas of social and political signi fi cance." See Program Content, note 78 
supra, at I 384-85. 
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sies, although somewhat different limits on the right may be found where educa-
tional rather than sexual material is concerned . 
Courts dealing with the right to receive information in the context of higher 
education have evolved a "marketplace of ideas" model as the best means of 
protecting the first amendment value of an educated citizenry as well as the 
traditional ideal of academic freedom. 88 This model is particularly apt within 
the college or university community, where young adults attempt through critical 
and creative analysis to increase the universe of what is known . It may be of 
questionable applicability in primary and secondary public schools, where attend-
ance is compulsory and students have little control over their exposure to course 
content. 89 Some sources suggest that this marketplace of ideas model should 
also obtain in the public schools; 90 minor students, however, lack the capacity to 
participate fully as buyers in that marketplace . Moreover, the public school is 
not a traditional public forum. Hl Thus, the state may seek to persuade, even 
reasonably to indoctrinate, its young people to conform to societal values and 
norms, although it must stop short of imposing totalitarian control. 92 
The state's power to regulate expression is most severely limited when that 
expression takes place in a "public forum." 93 Aside from traditional public 
88. See , e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589,603 (1967). The popular concep-
tion in the United States of "academic freedom, " see also note 54 supra, thought to emerge from the 
first amendment guarantees of free speech, inaccurately reflects the reality of public education. 
89. " The secondary school more clearly than the college or university acts in loco parentis with 
respect to minors Most parents , students, school boards , and members of the community 
usually expect the secondary school to concentrate on transmitting basic information , teaching the 
best that is known and thought in the world, tn,1ining by established techniques and, to some extent at 
least, indoctrinating in the .mores of the surrounding society." Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387, 
1392 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1971) . See Developments, supra note 40, at 1051; 
Right to Teach, supra note 35, at 1179-80 , I 184; Nahmod, Controversy in the Classroom: The High 
School Teacher and Freedom of Expression, 39 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1032, 1032-33 (1971) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Nahmod, Controversy); Goldstein, Asserted Right , supra note 38, at 1350-51; Note, 
Academic Freedom in the High School Classroom. 15 J . Fam. L. 706, 724 (1977) [hereinafter cited 
as Academic Freedom]. 
90. But see Right to Teach , supra note 35 at 1180-82 , where the author suggests that the 
"marketplace of ideas" model may now be applicable to lower education, having been given impetus 
by the "open classroom " movement. Several court decisions appear to recognize this possibility. 
See, e.g., Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 54 I F.2d 577, 582-83 (6th Cir. 1976); Par-
ducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352,355 (M.D. Ala. 1970). Whether or not this interpretation would 
be desirable, these decisions seem to reflect a misconception that originated in Tinker. The Court in 
Tinker quoted with approval Justice Brennan 's forceful statement that "[t)he classroom is peculiarly 
the 'marketplace of ideas' " in Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 , 603 (1967). See also 
text accompanying notes 55-58 supra. Keyishian , however, concerned the right of a state university 
teacher not to be subjected to a loyalty program. Both the facts that Keyishian was a university 
teacher and that the first amendment claim did not relate to conduct in the classroom call into 
question the Tinker Court's invocation of the " marketplace of ideas" model in the context of a 
public school. Moreover, it is important to remember that Tinker itself addressed only student expres-
sion, invalidating school restrictions on nondisruptive symbolic student speech. It did not purport to 
establish a student's right to receive information and a teacher's reciprocal right of free expression in 
the classroom. See Goldstein , Asserted Right, supra note 38, at 1350-55. 
9 I. See Kalven , The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana , 1965 Sup. Ct. Rev. I; L. 
Tribe , American Constitutional Law 689-90 ( 1978); notes 93-97 and accompanying text infra. 
92. See Yudof, When Government Speaks: Toward a Theory of Government Expression and the 
First Amendment, 57 Tex. L. Rev. 863, 874-75 (1979). 
93. The term "public forum " was introduced by Professor Kalven , see Kalven, supra note 91 , 
at 11-12. Professor Tribe has characterized the public forum as "constitutional shorthand for the 
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meeting places such as parks, sidewalks, and public streets, which must be 
employed as public forums,9 4 facilities such as municipal theatres or meeting 
houses become public forums when they are dedicated by the state to "the ex-
change of views among members of the public." 95 The critical question is 
whether such facilities were created for the primary purpose of public access and 
communication. Public schools traditionally have not been deemed to come 
within this definition: they are created not for public interchange but for closely 
regulated and structured transmission of particular ideas and skills. There is no 
clear intent to dedicate the public school to unrestricted public access and com-
munication. 96 The state, then, has more leeway to limit expression, "to pre-
serve such tranquility as the facilit[y's] central purpose requires," than would 
obtain in the case of a true public forum . 97 
The analysis of the child's first amendment right to know is further compli-
cated because the state can interfere with that right in two ways. First, the state 
may regulate speech by silencing a teacher in some circumstances 98 or by re-
moving a book from the library. Second, it may itself refuse to speak, by decid-
ing not to teach certain subjects or purchase certain books. In traditional first 
amendment jurisprudence only the regulation of speech, not the refusal to speak 
at all, is thought to raise a constitutional issue. 99 There is, however, both 
proposition that, in addition to its usual obligation of content-neutrality (an obligation that exists 
whether or not a public forum is involved), government cannot regulate speech-related conduct in 
such places except in narrow ways shown to be necessary to serve significant governmental in-
terests.· · L. Tribe , supra note 91, at 689 (citations omitted). 
94. Id. at 690. 
95. Id. at 689-90. 
96 . Professor Tribe calls such facilities as schools and libraries .. semi-public forums" -neither 
private property nor public facilities "created primarily for public interchange." Id . at 690; Yudof , 
supra note 92, at 884-88. See also Greer v. Spock , 424 U.S . 828, 836 (1976) (no constitutional 
principle exists "that whenever members of the public are permitted freely to visit a place owned or 
operated by the Government, then that place becomes a ·public forum' for purposes of the First 
Amendment"). 
97. Id. Thus the state is not required to tolerate behavior, whether by speech or action, that 
unduly interferes with the effective operation of its publi c schools . Compare Tinker v. Des Moines 
lndep. School Dist. , 393 U.S. 503 , 513 (1969) ('"conduct ... which ... materially disrupts 
classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is .. . not immunized by 
the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech"), and Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 
( I 972) (conduct creating noise may be excluded from public property adjacent to school in session), 
with Terminiello v . City of Chicago, 337 U.S. I , 4 ( 1949) (free speech · ·best serve[s] its high 
purpose when it induces a condition of unrest , creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or 
even stirs people to anger") . Professor Yudof suggests, howeve r, that a total prohibition of outside 
influences is inconsistent with educational purposes and concludes that outside individuals and groups 
should be able to assert a qualified right of access to the public schools. Yudof, supra note 92, at 
885. 
98. See section Ill. C. infra. 
99. See Tribe , supra note 91, at 580-84; see also note 72 and accompanying text supra. 
At the time this Note was set in print, the Supreme Court had never explicitly held that the first 
amendment conferred on the public a right of access to governmental sources of information. The 
Court 's recent decision in Richmond Newspapers , Inc . v. Virgir.ia, 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980), 
suggests a willingness to do so, at least with regard to criminal trials. Although there was no 
majority opinion for the Court, seven Justices, each endorsing a first amendment right of public 
access in this context, voted to reverse a state judge·s order closing a criminal trial to the press and 
the public. Justice Powell took no part in this decision , but his concurring opinion in Gannett Co. v. 
DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 397 (1979), suggests there may be an eighth vote favoring this view. 
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reason and precedent for bringing the state as unwilling speaker within the scope 
of the first amendment. 100 
Although the state has considerable latitude in directing the public schools 
and determining the content of public education, 101 protection of fundamental 
first amendment values-utilitarian and individual-requires it to refrain from 
certain types of selective silence that may be tantamount to active indoctrination. 
It is this realization that led the Court in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC 102 
to uphold the constitutionality of the FCC's "fairness doctrine," which requires 
even unwilling licensed broadcasters to provide air time for opposing viewpoints 
on controversial subjects. Writing for the majority, Justice White explained that 
the fairness doctrine is justified and even required by the first amendment, 
whose purpose, he pointed out, is ''to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of 
ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance 
monopolization of that market, whether it be by the Government itself or a pri-
vate licensee .... " 103 Thus, the Court acknowledged for the first time that 
there are instances when the public's first amendment right to receive informa-
tion can require even the unwilling speaker to speak . 104 
Even if the marketplace of ideas principle is not fully applicable to lower 
levels of schooling, the principles set out in Red lion are certainly relevant to 
Richmond may herald a new receptivity by the Court to a vision of the first amendment that , in 
certain circumstances, compels an unwilling governmental source of information to "speak" because 
of the public 's right to "listen." It should be noted, however, that Richmond is not a clear mandate 
for a general right of access. The Justices emphasized the "presumption of openness lthat] inheres in 
the very nature of a criminal trial under our system of justice." 100 S. Ct. at 2825 (Burger, C.J., 
joined by White and Stevens , JJ.). See also id. at 2842 (Blackmun, J . , concuning in the judgment); 
id. at 2834 (Brennan and Marshall , JJ. , concurring in the judgment); id. at 2840 (Stewart, J. , concur-
ring in the judgment). Thus , it would be premature to assume that the same right of access can 
automatically be applied to other contexts which do not share this tradition of publicity. 
I 00 . Although it is reasonable to characterize books and teachers as willing-and restrictive 
school boards as unwilling-speakers , it is not necessary to do so to raise the constitutional issue. 
The student's first amendment right to receive information and the first amendment values of an 
educated citizenry independently restrain school board authority to regulate schoolbooks. See Section 
Ill. A . supra. 
IO I. See section II supra. But see Emerson. Symposium - The First Amendment and the Right 
to Know: Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 Wash. U.L.Q. I, 8 (1976) (suggesting that 
the Court in Epperson v. Arkansas , 393 U.S. 97 (1968), should have acknowledged that "in the field 
of education, where the government has a virtual monopoly , certain kinds of curriculum restrictions 
seem to run afoul of the right to know") . 
102. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
103. Id. at 390. 
104. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), at first glance seems 
conclusively to preclude any "right" of access to non-broadcast media. In Tornillo , the state at-
tempted to legislate a right of access to the privately owned press. The Court unanimously rejected 
this abridgment of the freedom of the press to make editorial judgments without governmental inter-
ference. As Chief Justice Burger explained, "governmental coercion [of newspapers] at once brings 
about a confrontation with the express provisions of the First Amendment and the judicial gloss on 
that Amendment developed over the years." Id . at 254. The "express provision " to which the Court 
referred , that "Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of the Press, " U.S. Const., 
amend. I, prevents "supplant[ing] pri vate control of the press with the heavy hand of government 
intrusion. . " Id. at 260 (White. J .. concurring). Without its protection , the "government [might 
become] the censor of what the people may read and know." Id. 
Tornillo is, thus, of limited value in schoolbook controversies, where the speaker-editor is the 
state, and application of a qualified "fairness doctrine" furthers the same goal of minimizing gov-
ernmental interference with the free flow of ideas. 
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schoolbook controversies. The fairness doctrine attempts to prevent the creation 
of "an unconditional monopoly of a scarce resource which the Government has 
denied others the right to use." 1 05 Obviously, since government controls the 
allocation of airwaves through licensing but does not control the establishment of 
alternatives in education, the analogy to public schools cannot be stretched too 
far. Within the public schools themselves, however, the state has complete edito-
rial control. It broadcasts its chosen educational message to an audience made up 
of children. The schools do not utilize a physically limited medium of expres-
sion, but they have neither enough time nor resources to permit all books, or 
even books "worth reading," to be read by their students. 106 Choices must be 
made, and the school boards will select some books and exclude others. 107 The 
student's right to receive information requires that when the board intentionally 
omits material from the school's message, it should have a reason for doing so 
consistent with its educational mission. 108 When the board's restrictions of ex-
pression are not motivated by educational judgment, students, parents, and 
teachers should be able to turn to the courts for relief. 
A final paradox concerning the student's right to know is presented by the 
"captive audience" status sometimes attributed to public school students. 109 
105. 395 U.S. at 391. 
106. Cf. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. , Inc. v. Democratic Nat'! Comm. 412 U.S. 94, 122 
( 1973) ("'With broadcasting, where the available means of communication are limited in both space 
and time, the admonition of Professor Alexander Meikle john that '[ w]hat is essential is not that 
everyone shall speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said' is peculiarly appropriate. Politi-
cal Freedom 26 (1948). ") . 
I 07. This Note does not, therefore , advocate the rigid imposition on the schools of the " equal 
time" type of ••fairness doctrine" used in broadcasting. See generally Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. 
FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); NBC, Inc. v. FCC, 516 F. 2d 1101 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Leventhal , J .), 
cert. denied, 424 U.S . 9 IO ( I 976). Some commentators, however, have suggested that if the gov-
ernment is the speaker-educator, the first amendment may require ··a fairly balanced exposition of 
various relevant theories and points of view, and of alternatives open for action." Emerson & Haber, 
supra note 41 , at 527. The authors, referring to basic curricular, rather than book, choices, would 
consider the extent to which the state's audience was denied access to alternative and opposing views 
as well as the age and relative maturity of its members before imposing a rigid balance requirement. 
In a public school, children make up the audience, and the state controls the content of the message. 
Such considerations might impose a higher degree of obligation on the public schools with regard to 
"fairness" than would obtain in other areas of government communication. Id. at 527-28. 
Similarly , Justices Black and Stewart suggested in Epperson, 393 U.S. at 111, 115, that a 
teacher must be permitted to present balanced material once the subject matter has been included in 
the curriculum. See notes 71-73 supra. See also Nahmod , First Amendment Protection for Learning 
and Teaching: The Scope of Judicial Review, 18 Wayne L. Rev. 1479, 1510 (1972); Nahmod, 
Controversy, supra note 89, at 1047-50; Right to Teach, supra note 35, at I 186. 
108. The principal disadvantage of a rigid "'balanced presentation" requirement lies in its cost 
in terrns of judicial intrusion as a watchdog over the school system. Not only would this have the 
practical effect of requiring a factfinding hearing with resp.:ct to virtually all school board educational 
choices, it would vest final educational decisionmaking authority in the courts, rather than the local 
educational authorities, as the state legislatures intended. Comment, 55 Tex. L. Rev. 511, 52 I 
( I 977) (courts might be tempted to substitute their own judgments for those of the educational au-
thorities through imposition of the fairness doctrine on school library collections). 
109. See Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387, 1392 (D . Mass. 1971). See also Ginsberg v. 
New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649-50 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring) (state "may permissibly determine 
that, at least in some precisely delineated areas, a child- like someone in a captive audience-is not 
possessed of that full capacity for individual choice which is the presupposition of First Amendment 
• 
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Captive audience status is usually invoked to justify governmental limitations on 
the freedom of expression in certain places at certain times. 11° Children in 
public schools intentionally are subjected to a preselected curriculum in part be-
cause they lack the capacity to assess their own educational needs and make 
independent choices. The state makes the selection for them, supplying useful 
materials they can comprehend, while protecting them from exposure to poten-
tially harmful expression. But while this very dependency justifies state rt;gula-
tion of expression to children 111 it makes them vulnerable to governmental 
abuses. Children are incapable of distancing themselves from and critically 
evaluating the state's educational message. 112 Moreover, the public school envi-
ronment traditionally has rewarded compliance and conformity, encouraging ac-
ceptance of educational messages from authority figures. In such an atmosphere, 
the courts must be sensitive to efforts by students, parents, and teachers to pre-
vent abuse of the state's extraordinary "power ... to persuade." 113 Explicit 
judicial recognition of the public school student ' s right to receive educational 
information would considerably diminish the potential for such abuse. 
C. The Teacher's Rights in the Public School Classroom 
The public school teacher who wishes to challenge school board regulation 
of classroom discussions and materials can assert a two-faceted first amendment 
right against the state . 114 First, like any other individual, the teacher has a 
personal right of free expression that is not shed "at the schoolhouse gate." 115 
guarantees " ). Indeed , one commentator has suggested that all children, not only those in a public 
school classroom , might be characterized as a captive audience. See Program Content , supra note 78 , 
at 1381-82 . 
110. See generally Black , He Cannot Choose But Hear: The Plight of the Captive Auditor , 53 
Colum. L. Rev . 960 , 963-64 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Black , Captive Auditor]; Lehman v. City of 
Shaker Heights , 418 U.S. 298,302 , 308 (1974); Public Util. Comm ' n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451,468 
(1952) (Douglas , J., dissenting); id. at 466 (Black, J., concurring in part). 
111. See also notes 78-87 and accompanying text supra. 
112. As one commentator has noted , "[g]overnment broadcasting to a captive audience on a 
bus is not very different from government broadcasting to school children , except that silence is an 
available alternative only in the first situation." See Garvey , First Amendment, supra note 31, at 369 
(referring to Public Util. Comm ' n v. Pollak , 343 U.S. 451 (1952)). It is important to remember, 
however, that in schoolbook conflicts , the plaintiffs , rather than demanding restriction of expression , 
often are attempting to compel expression in the form of books or materials that have been denied to 
them. 
I 13. See Yudof, supra note 92, at 874-~5. 
I 14. The teacher's freedom of instructional expression may be described as twin rights: a 
" speech" right and a " structural" right. Cf. Brennan, Address , 32 Rutgers L. Rev. 173, 176-77 
(1979) (articulating two models of first amendment protection for the press: (I) a "speech" model 
under which the press has the right to speak out and (2) a "structural" model that focuses on the role 
of the press as provider and circulator of the information necessary for informed public discussion). 
The teacher' s "speech" right to free expression is personal-a right to self-expression that 
flows from the individualist values inherent in the first amendment. The "structural" right is instru-
mental , flowing from the utilitarian value of an educated citizenry. See Section Ill. A. supra. This 
structural right is the complement to the student's right to receive information and is, arguably, the 
more important of the two. When a teacher is silenced, the students may never receive the restricted 
information. Their injury is not known to them and, not knowing of the deprivation, they are not 
likely to seek to correct it. The teacher' s institutional expertise thus makes him or her the appropriate 
champion of the child's right to receive information. See note 117 infra. 
I 15. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. at 506. Justice Fortas's dictum about 
teachers' rights, id., prompted Justice Black to respond , in dissent, that a teacher "no more canies 
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Although a state employee, the public school teacher retains first amendment 
protection against excessive state regulation of non instructional expression. 116 In 
addition, the teacher has a discrete first amendment right not to be compelled to 
infringe his or her students' first amendment right to receive information . 117 
Difficult problems arise in attempting to reconcile these rights with the 
legitimate educational interests of the state in disputes over the content of in-
struction, where the state's interests are strongest. In Epperson v. Arkansas, 118 
the Supreme Court sidestepped the issue of state control of instructional content 
when it invalidated Arkansas's anti-evolution statute on the ground that it vio-
lated the first amendment ' s establishment clause. The Court addressed the issue 
of curriculum and state control of the content of a teacher ' s classroom expression 
only in dictum. 119 
In one recent case, Kingsville Independent School District v. Cooper, 120 the 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit expressly held that the content of a 
teacher's classroom discussion is protected by the first amendment. The teacher, 
who used role-playing in her presentation of Reconstruction-era history, was not 
rehired after she refused " 'not to discuss Blacks in American history' " and did 
not eliminate everything "controversial" from classroom discussions. 121 The 
Fifth Circuit ordered her reinstated with back pay, holding that "classroom dis-
into school with him a complete right to freedom of speech and expression than [any other 
employee of an institution does to act] contrary to [its] rules and speak his mind on any subject he 
pleases. [A] teacher is not paid to go into school and teach subjects the State does not hire him to 
teach as a pan of its selected curriculum. " Id. at 521-22. But see note I I 6 infra. 
I 16. See, e .g., Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School, 439 U.S. 410 (1979) (teacher 
cannot be terminated because of private expression of opinion to school principal); Mount Healthy 
City Bd. of Educ . v. Doyle , 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (where school board claims mixed motives, it 
must show that nontenured teacher was not rehired for reasons other than exercise of first amendment 
freedom outside of classroom); Russo v. Central School Dist., 469 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1972) (teacher 
has first amendment right to refuse to panicipate in flag salute) , cen. denied, 411 U.S. 932 (1973). 
117. Academic Freedom, supra note 89 , at 725. 
Whether a teacher has standing to assen a student's right to receive information has not yet been 
decided by the Supreme Coun , and lower couns have reached conflicting conclusions. In Mercer v. 
Michigan State Bd. of Educ ., 379 F. Supp. 580 (E.D. Mich.), aff"d mem. , 419 U.S. 1081 (1974) , 
the district coun refused to grant a teacher third-pany standing to sue on behalf of his students and 
their parents , finding that the students and parents could have assened their rights themselves and 
that the coun would not easily be able to determine whether any parents or students desired a change 
in the challenged statute. 
Mercer's viability has been cast in doubt by Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) , in which the 
Supreme Coun recognized the third-pany standing of one who was legally obliged to engage in 
conduct that would "result indirectly in the violation of third panies' rights." Id. at I 95 (quoting 
Wanh v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 510 (1975)). Thus , when a teacher has been compelled to implement 
school policies that may unconstitutionally infringe the fi rst amendment rights of students, couns 
should recognize his or her standing to bring the claim. See generally Note, Standing to Assen 
Constitutional Jus Ten ii, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 423 ( 1974). 
I 18. 393 U.S. 97 (1968). See notes 64-70 and accom panying text supra. See also T. Emerson, 
supra note 41 , at 605-07. 
I 19. See 393 U.S. at 104-05. 
120. 61 I F.2d I 109 , 1113 (5th Cir. 1980). 
121. Id. at 1111, quoting school district's personnel director. After she completed the unit, the 
school board decided not to renew her contract despite the strong recommendations of her principal 
and the school superintendent. 
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cussion is protected activity" and that the board's actions violated her first 
amendment rights. 122 
The Kingsville court, acknowledging that first amendment protection must 
be qualified in the classroom context, concluded that such discussions are pro-
tected unless they " 'clearly ... overbalance [the teacher's] usefulness as an 
instructor. ' " 123 
This standard appears to give inadequate deference to the school board's 
authority over curriculum: the board is entitled to use reasonable judgment in 
evaluating the relative educational advantages and disadvantages not only of 
overall performance, but also of a teacher's approach to particular subjects. 124 
Too much deference to the teacher could lead to interference with the school's 
effort to transmit legitimate values and ideals to its students. For example, the 
teacher is not free to decide unilaterally to omit some portions of the prescribed 
curriculum. In Palmer v. Board of Education, 12 5 the Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit held that a probationary kindergarten teacher who was a 
Jehovah 's Witness was not free to disregard the prescribed curriculum regarding 
patriotic matters despite her claim that participation would violate her religious 
beliefs. The court noted the compelling parental and state interests in having 
democratically chosen representatives select the curriculum, and concluded that 
"[i]t cannot be left to individual teachers to teach what they please ." 126 
122 . Id. at 111 3. Of course, the texts may have included a comprehensive representation of the 
material, in which case there was, if anything, less reason to impose sanctions on the teacher's 
classroom discussions. If the books themselves omitted this significant material, the first amendment 
should protect the teacher's right to distribute appropriate material to fill the gap, as well as the 
student's right to receive it. 
123 . 61 I F.2d at 1113 (quoting Kaprelian v. Texas Woman·s University, 509 F.2d 133 , 139 
(5th Cir. 1975) ). 
I 24. Any other result would assure a teacher the right to continue to be useless , or even disrup-
tive, in one subject area if his or her overall performance was more useful than not. 
Courts sometimes prefer to decide these cases in whole or in part on procedural due process 
grounds, focusing on inadequate guidelines and lack of notice to the teachers being disciplined. See, 
e.g., Mailloux v. Kiley , 436 F.2d 565 (1st Cir.), on remand, 323 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Mass.) , aff'd, 
448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1971); Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969); Parducci v. 
Rutland , 3 I 6 F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. I 970). As Kingsville indicates, these cases can be viewed 
through a first amendment, as well as a due process, prism. To the extent that established educational 
policy does not constrain the teacher's choice, he or she enjoys discretion to make first-line educa-
tional decisions without fear of loss of, or suspension from, employment. See Mailloux v. Kiley , 323 
F. Supp. 1387 , 1392 (D. Mass. 1971). 
Although the courts in Keefe and Parducci emphasized the lack of adequate notice , in both cases 
the teachers had been instructed not to continue the act ivities in question , and no action was taken 
against them until they expressly refused to follow such instructions. See Keefe, 418 F.2d at 361; 
Parducci, 3 I 6 F. Supp. at 354. While the courts in these cases may simply have avoided making 
hard decisions, it may be that broader concerns than the absence of fair notice explain these rulings. 
In particular , first amendment considerations suggest that if the school authorities are unable to show 
a reasonable educational basis for their prohibition, the teacher's choice of methods or materials 
should be respected. See Section IV infra. See also Brubaker v. Board of Educ., 502 F.2d 973, 
991-92 (7th Cir. 1974) (Fairchild, J., dissenting) , cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975). 
125. 603 F .2d 1271 (7th Cir. 1979) , cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 689 (1980). 
126. Id . at 1274 . 
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The teacher, then, is required to adhere to the general curriculum, to pre-
pare and select relevant materials 127 reasonably tailored to the age and sophisti-
cation of the class, 128 and to use methods that appropriately maintain discipline 
in the classroom. 129 A teacher who fails to meet these conditions and who has 
adequate notice of the consequences may justifiably be discharged . 
The state's power to supervise instructional content, as reflected in these 
requirements, is warranted as a check on the autonomous teacher's considerable 
power over students 130-power that brings both benefit and danger into the 
classroom. Unfortunately, courts have tended to focus only on the danger to the 
exclusion of the benefit. The teacher's autonomy is more often an insulator 
against ideological bombardment than it is a danger. As long as all teachers 
retain the right to express independent views in the classroom, the state is unable 
to speak with a single voice. 131 
127. Relevance is not always self-evident. While it is clear that a science teacher is hired to 
teach science, not history , see, e.g., Birdwell v. Hazelwood School Dist. , 352 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. 
Mo. 1972); Ahern v. Board of Educ., 327 F. Supp. 1391 (D . Neb. 1971) , aff'd, 456 F.2d 399 (8th 
Cir. I 972), determinations of relevancy are issues of fact that the teacher is often required to prove. 
See, e.g., Brubaker v. Board of Educ., 502 F.2d 973, 977 (7th Cir. 1974) , cert. denied, 421 U.S. 
965 ( I 975) (teachers unsuccessfully attempted to show by expert testimony that Woodstock brochures 
were relevant and of educational value). But see id . at 99 1 (dissenting view that material was neither 
"so irrelevant to educational goals [nor so] patently offensi ve that the plaintiffs were precluded from 
exercising their judgment as teachers and electing to employ it in their classes"). Indeed , even 
demonstrably relevant expression may be restricted if there are valid educational justifications for 
imposing restraint. See Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387 , 1387 , 1392 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 448 
F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1971). 
128 . The "age and sophistication" requirement seems as much a question of common sense as 
of pedagogical theory. A younger child is generally more impressionable than an older child who has 
had time to develop critical and analytical skills. See Brubaker v. Board of Educ., 502 F.2d 973, 
976, 985 (7th Cir. I 974) (poem about free love and drugs too controversial for eighth-grade stu-
dents), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 ( 1975); Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359, 361-62 (1st Cir. 1969) 
(class discussion of assignment containing word "motherfucker" not too great a shock for high 
school seniors to stand). Sophistication does not always follow chronological age and might vary 
depending on geography and local custom. The teacher must thus be sensitive to the particular 
capabilities and sensibilities of the students in his or her charge. 
See also Kamenshine, supra note 35, at 1134 (reaching the seemingly anomalous result that it is 
acceptable to instill patriotic sentiments in very young school children, whereas junior or senior high 
school students must be shielded from indoctrination because they are mature enough to understand 
but lack the sophistication to be skeptical). 
129. Concern for maintenance of discipline is a factor bearing on students' right to receive 
information, see note 97 and accompanying text supra, but it also arises in the context of teachers ' 
activities. See, e.g., Russo v. Central School Dist. , 469 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1972) , cert. denied, 411 
U.S. 932 (1973); James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 
(1972). 
In this connection, the courts look not to the form of expression but to its impact on the school. 
See Birdwell v. Hazelwood School Dist. , 352 F. Supp. 6 13, 622 (E.D. Mo. 1972) (teacher' s exhor-
tation to students caused the "disruptions of the orderly and disciplined operation of the school "). 
130. See Yan Alstyne, supra note 38, at 855-58; Goldstein , Asserted Right , supra note 38, at 
I 345; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 4 79, 485 ( I 960); Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 , 493 
(1952). See also James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566 (2d Cir.), cert. denied , 409 U.S. 1042 
(1972); Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970). 
I 3 I. See Yudof, supra note 92, at 876-77: 
The greater the ability of the school system to control what goes on in every classroom, the 
greater the danger of its promulgating a uniform message to its captive listeners .... [J]ust 
• 
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Thus, the teacher's right to free expression requires the same balancing of 
first amendment freedoms against majoritarian educational values necessary in 
the analysis of the student's right to know. Accordingly, the same standard of 
judicial review is applicable in both contexts. The remainder of this Note de-
velops an approach for the balancing of these interests. 
IV . A FRAMEWORK FOR RESOLVING SCHOOLBOOK CONTROVERSIES 
The process of selection and removal of public school text and library books 
by school boards generates feelings powerful enough to tear communities 
apart. 132 The courts are struggling to reconcile the substantial constitutional 
claims of the parties to the conflict; to date, however, their attempts to accom-
modate the clashing concerns of states, parents, teachers, and students have pro-
duced no analysis capable of resolving the disputes. Before a satisfactory resolu-
tion can emerge, it is necessary to identify and address directly the latent tension 
between the first amendment values discussed above and the particular charac-
teristics of the public school context. 
A. Public School Decisionmaking: The Standard of Review 
Any reasonable approach to schoolbook controversies must begin with rec-
ognition of the inevitable tension between basic first amendment values and 
legitimate majoritarian control over public education. While the public schools 
are not constitutionally prohibited from espousing particular viewpoints or from 
engaging in social and civil indoctrination, they may not transgress the Constitu-
tion 's limits on infringement of free speech and expression. It seems clear that 
the states themselves may not determine where those limits lie; 133 that responsi-
bility must rest with the courts . 134 
as the balkanization of responsibility for education among governments reduces the poten-
tial danger of a thorough indoctrination, the autonomy of the classroom teacher diminishes 
the power of government to work its will through communication. 
132. See Schember, Textbook Censorship-the Validity of School Board Rules, 28 Ad. L. 
Rev. 259, 259 (1976) (outbreaks of violence in Kanawha County , West Virginia, after new textbooks 
were ordered that local community believed would "demean, encourage skepticism, or foster disbe-
lief in the institutions of the United States of America and in Western civilization"). See also Mur-
ph) , The Meaning of Freedom of Speech: First Amendment Freedoms from Wilson to FDR 208- I 0 
(1972); Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm ., 454 F. Supp. 703, 706-10 (D. Mass. 
1978) . 
133. Cf. Kalven , The New York Times Case: A Note on " The Central Meaning of the First 
Amendment, " 1964 Sup . Ct. Rev . 191 , 201 (" If the constitutional principle, for example , is that the 
state may regulate X, the principle can become illusory if the state is left free to define X as it 
will ."). 
I 34. It has been suggested that, whenever a first amendment claim is raised, only a judicial , 
rather than an administrative, determination "in an adversary proceeding ensures the necessary sen-
sitivity to freedom of expression. . ,. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965). See also 
Monaghan , First Amendment " Due Process ," 83 Harv . L. Rev. 518 , 524 (1970) ("Courts alone are 
institutionally able consistently to discern, and to apply, the values embodied in the constitutional 
guarantee of freedom of speech."). 
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The inherent tension between respecting democratic control of the schools 
and protecting freedom of thought and expression within them is typical of what 
one commentator has described as "the seeming anomaly of judicial supremacy 
in a democratic society.'' 13 5 The ideal of democratic governance is the legisla-
tive implementation of "popular sovereignty," 1 ;16 and the courts should refrain 
from disturbing this process unless there are compelling reasons "to regard the 
question at hand as appropriately committed to anti-majoritarian resolution." 137 
This dilemma is particularly acute in the case of first amendment review , be-
cause the amendment itself exalts both the ideals of democratic self-government 
by majority rule and the vindication of the minority 's right to disagree .138 But 
despite the difficulty, the courts must undertake the task of patrolling the line 
between reasonable majoritarian education 13 ri and abuses of discretion that may 
undermine the first amendment rights of parents , teachers, and students. 140 If, 
in fact, "[t]he vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more 
vital than in the community of American schools" 141 and the first amendment 
"does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom, " 142 the 
courts must safeguard the essential precondition of enlightened democracy: an 
educated citizenry. 
135. Bork, supra note 46, at 2. See also id. at 3: 
There are some things a majority should not do to us no matter how democratically it 
decides to do them. .. [For this reason] [s]ociety consents to be ruled undemocratically 
[i.e., by judicial review] within defined areas by certain enduring principles believed to be 
stated in, and placed beyond the reach of majorities by, the Constitution. 
See also A. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 16 (1962) ("The root difficulty is that j udicial 
review is a counter-majoritarian force in our system."). 
I 36. Commercial Speech , supra note 45 , at 6-7. 
137. Id. at 7. 
138. See Wellington , supra note 43 , at 1137-38 & nn. 130-40; BeVier, supra note 46, at 313. 
I 39. The courts are not educators and their intervention should be limited to the correction of 
clear abuses by school boards. It is important to remember, however, that many local school boards , 
unlike some administrative agencies, are composed of civically responsible local citizens having no 
particular educational expertise. There is , then , no compelling reason always to defer to their nonex-
pert educational judgments . Moreover, administrative law principles make clear that even expert 
bodies are not beyond review . See generally L. Jaffe , Judicial Control of Administrative Action 
(1965) . The mere knowledge that their policies are subject to review may, in fact, encourage reason-
ableness and flexibility on the part of local boards and "combat any imposition of monolithic, au-
thoritarian standards on children." Burt, Developing Constitutional Rights of, in, and for Children, 
39 Law & Contemp. Prob. I 18, 132 (1975). 
I 40. It is not a complete answer to suggest that those parents and teachers who object to school 
board policies enroll their children and seek employment in private schools. Parents and teachers 
cannot dictate educational policy to the state, but the s tate may not condition receipt of its 
benefits-i.e., access to and employment in its schools-on acquiescence in the violation of con-
stitutional rights. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 ( I 963) (state cannot condition unemployment 
benefits on willingness to work on Saturdays in violation of Sabbath observance). See also Frost & 
Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 593-94 (1926). But see Van Alstyne, The 
Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutiona l Law , 81 Harv . L. Rev. 1439 , 1448 
(1968) ("The basic flaw in the doctrine [of unconstitutional conditions] is its assumption that the 
same evil results from attaching certain conditions to government-connected activity as from impos-
ing such conditions on persons not connected with government."). 
141. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 
479, 487 (1960)). 
142. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 105 (1968) (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents , 
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To do so, they must apply a standard of review sufficiently deferential to 
the school board to protect community interests, and yet rigorous enough to 
protect freedom of expression. One such standard is a test requiring that 
"reasonable educational judgment" underlie schoolbook decisions made by 
school boards. 
This concept of reasonable educational judgment incorporates the spectrum 
of factors involved in school board decisionmaking . It encompasses all the prac-
tical considerations that inform decisions at the initial acquisition stage, including 
financial constraints, space limitations, curricular priorities, duplication of re-
sources, relevance and timeliness of subject matter, scholarship, relative educa-
tional impact, and appropriateness to the age of the student body. A school 
board is virtually certain to consider several of these factors in making the initial 
decision whether to purchase a book or include it in the curriculum, 143 and no 
board basing decisions on such considerations alone should be held to have acted 
in violation of the Constitution. 
As noted earlier, reasonable educational policy may also encompass some 
degree of indoctrination by persuasion . 144 School boards may seek to promote 
certain social and political values through the selection and rejection of school-
books. But a school board's decision to regulate student access to books and the 
information they contain must at all times be governed by legitimate educational 
concerns . 
Thus, to withstand first amendment review, a schoolbook purchase decision 
may take account of the pragmatic realities of the school's needs and resources 
and be responsive to community values and goals, but it must fall within the 
range of reasonableness established by the professional educational community, 
and serve educational purposes in the manner least restrictive of the teachers' 
and students' respective rights to convey and receive information. Adherence to 
such a standard of decisionmaking would leave the school board with substantial 
discretion to make its selections while affording students and teachers protection 
from unjustified infringements of their first amendment rights. However, a 
somewhat different treatment may be warranted for book removal decisions. 
143 . Regular book selection procedures with prescribed guidelines would help to establish the 
reasonableness of the board's educational policy. Although the statutes conferring the power to select 
books are often framed in general terms, see, e.g., Cary v. Board of Educ., 598 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 
I 979) (Colo. Rev. Stat. § 22-32- I 09 ( I 973) ), and do not require the promulgation of regulations, 
when such regulations exist and are followed the courts may take them into consideration as evidence 
from which the absence of arbitrariness may be inferred . Conversely, where the board has established 
routine procedures, deviations from them may create suspicion of impropriety in the decisionmaking 
process. Compare Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp . 1269 (D .N.H. 1979) (school 
board·s cancellation of magazine without following established procedures; court ordered board to 
resubscribe upon showing that board members were attempting to censor political content) , with Cary 
v. Board of Educ., 598 F.2d 535, 544 (10th Cir. 1979) (board's failure to adhere to procedure and 
explain its decision to exclude ten books overlooked where parties stipulated no attempt "to exclude 
any particular type of thinking or book"). But see Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High School Bd . of 
Directors, 475 F. Supp. 615 (D . Vt. 1979) (liberal language of school board 's library policy does not 
enlarge scope of plaintiff student's " right to read" or "right to access"), appeal pending, No. 
79-7676 (2d Cir. Feb. 6, 1980). 
144. See note 35 and accompanying text supra. 
1 
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B . Distinguishing Book Selection from Book Removal 
The courts are most sharply divided ove r the appropriate analysis for 
school board decisions to remove books already selected for library or classroom 
use. In Presidents Council, District 25 v. Community School Board, 145 the Sec-
ond Circuit equated the "shelving [and] unshelving of books " and found no 
constitutional issue in either situation. In Minarcini v. Strongsville City School 
District , 146 however, the Sixth Circuit did distinguish book selection from book 
removal, although it failed to articulate its reasons for doing so. 147 The distinc-
tion appears valid: while the substantive issues are the same-school board regu-
lation of expression through schoolbook policy and its impact on the student's 
I 
right to receive information-the risk of unconstitutional action is considerably 
greater at the removal stage. 148 
When a school board , or other authorized educational decisionmaker, 14 B 
selects a book for its collection, it has the opportunity to consider such factors as 
the book's scholarship, instructional value, subject matter, relevance , interest, 
and appropriateness to the age of the student body. In reaching a decision, it 
balances these factors against available funds and shelf space and competing 
priorities . On the other hand , when a decisionmaker removes a book from circu-
lation, it is in effect overriding the prior educational judgment that led to its 
acquisition and shelving. The fact of this earlier educational evaluation gives rise 
to a presumption when the same book is removed that other, noneducational 
considerations have come into play. Once the priorities have been ordered, the 
money spent, and the book shelved , there is an increased likelihood of uncon-
stitutional decisionmaking. 1 ;;o 
Thus, while book removal and acquisition decisions should be subject to the 
same constitutional standard of reasonable educational judgment, different pre-
sumptions may be appropriate. Initial acquisition decisions 151 by authorized edu-
cational decisionmakers in accordance with regular procedures may properly be 
regarded as presumptively constitutional. Accordingly, when plaintiffs challenge 
a school board's initial decision not to purchase a book, they bear the burden of 
showing that the decision was not prompted by reasonable educational judgment. 
Recognition of this presumption in favor of the state serves to minimize 
judicial intervention in school board decisionmaking. It is appropriate not only 
because the initial educational decisionmaker may be presumed to have acted 
145 . 457 F.2d 289,293 (2d Cir.) , cert. denied , 409 US. 998 (1972). See also Pico v. Board of 
Educ. , 474 F. Supp. 387 (E.D .N.Y. 1979), appeal pending, No . 79-7690 (2d Cir. Feb. 6, 1980). 
146. 541 F.2d 577 , 581-83 (6th Cir. 1976) . See also Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School 
Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703 , 710-11 (D. Mass. 1978). 
147 . See text accompanying notes 7-14 supra . 
148. See notes 149-57 and accompanying text infra. 
149. The relevant decisionmaker may be the board , a teacher acting not in contravention of 
established policy , librarian, library committee, textbook committee, etc. 
150. See Comment, 55 Tex. L. Rev . 511, 520-21 ( 1977). 
151. By this standard , book removal is a subsequent, not an initial, determination with regard to 
any particular volume. However, where a properly defined prohibitive policy exists, such as the 
exclusion of all discussion of a particular subject matter, ~ee Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 
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properly, 152 and because improper motivations at the initial stage are extremely 
difficult to detect, 153 but also because the school and its agents are the preferred 
sources of educational policy. 154 Thus, the school board need not justify its 
initial schoolbook decisions unless the challenging party can come forward with 
sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of an educationally proper mo-
tive. 155 
A teacher acting not in contravention of an initial school board decision 
should enjoy the benefit of the same presumption if the school board seeks to 
interfere with his or her initial schoolbook decision. In such a case, the board 
would bear the burden of demonstrating that its decision is based on a reasonable 
educational policy. 156 
Since the presumption of constitutionality attaches to the original decision, 
the school board stands in a different position when it seeks to remove a book. 
Any conflicts at the initial stage were presumably resolved in favor of inclusion 
by some person authorized to make such determinations. It seems reasonable, 
therefore, to recognize that there is a significantly greater risk that removal of 
the books is unconstitutionally motivated. 157 The initial decision should be pro-
tected by the proposed presumption of educational validity, and the school board 
desiring removal of a book should bear the burden, in accordance with usual first 
amendment practice, of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that 
its action is the result of a reasonable educational policy determination. Such an 
approach should prove a disincentive to arbitrary and unconstitutional removal 
decisions since the board must, if challengedr be prepared to persuade the trier 
of fact that its action was based on a legitimate educational consideration. Thus 
in all cases the standard of review is the presence or absence of a reasonable 
educational policy underlying the school board's schoolbook decisions, and the 
burden of proof is on the party challenging the initial educational determination. 
152. An analogy may be drawn to the presumption that public officers acting in their official 
capacity do so legally and in a regular manner. C. McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence 
807 (2d ed. 1972). 
153. Id. See also Garvey, First Amendment, supra note 31, at 372; Goldstein, Asserted Right , 
supra note 38, at I 349 n.183. 
154. See generally Section II , and notes 108 & 139 supra. 
155. Cf. Cruz v. Beto, 603 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1979) (plaintiff has burden of proving absence 
of prison director's good faith in order to pierce his qualified immunity to suits for damages). 
Evidence rebutting the presumption of validity may take a variety of forms, ranging from a 
specific record of improper motivation with respect to an individual book to an official statement of 
general policy or a pattern of decisions explicable only by the presence of impermissible considera-
tions. Cf. Note, Discriminatory Purpose and Disproportionate Impact: An Assessment After Feeney, 
79 Colum. L. Rev. 1376, 1395 (1979) (" With a pattern of activity [extending over time) to 
review , a court could legitimately place emphasis on the number of foreseeably segregative choices 
made: the cumulative results of many independent school board decisions can present a reasonably 
accurate indication of what the institution as a whole is up to.'") (referring to proof of discriminatory 
purpose in school desegregation cases) (emphasis added). 
156. For an illustration , see text accompanying notes 158-59. 
157. This approach is further justified by traditional first amendment analysis with regard to 
willing and unwilling speakers. The state ' s silencing of a "willing speaker" on the basis of 
content-in this case a book-is inherently suspect, whereas the state's own refusal to speak at all 
typically has not been viewed as raising a first amendment issue. See notes 98-99 and accompanying 
text supra. The refusal to buy a book may be analogized to the refusal to speak. 
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C. Seven Illustrative Cases 
I. School Board Refusal to Permit Use of Teacher-Furnished Materials. A 
high school social studies teacher wants to discuss the controversial subjects of 
American race relations and United States participation in the Vietnam con-
flict. 1.,s Both clearly fall within the rough outlines of "current events" and 
"social studies" established by the curriculum. In support of her class discus-
sions, she distributes reprints of literature not in the school library collection. 
These materials , which are not proscribed by any existing school board policy, 
explore views on these topics differing from those in the authorized social 
studies textbook. A number of parents then complain to the school board about 
the views their children are bringing home , and the school board responds by 
directing the teacher to alter her presentation . Resisting what she regards to be 
unconstitutional censorship, the teacher seeks to enjoin the board from restricting 
her presentation of alternative views. The board claims that its authority to con-
trol the curriculum includes the power to prohibit use of any disfavored mate-
rials. 
In this case, the teacher is the first-line educator hired and licensed by the 
state to implement the curriculum, and her distributions did not contravene estab-
lished school board policy. Hers is therefore the initial determination , and is 
entitled to the presumption of constitutionality accorded to such determinations. 
The presumption, of course , is not conclusive; the board will prevail if it can 
meet its burden of demonstrating a reasonable educational policy for barring her 
supplemental material. 15 H To make this showing, the board cannot simply rest 
on its superior position in the educational hierarchy, nor can it assert that it was 
merely deferring to parental wishes. Instead, the board must demonstrate that a 
reasonable body of professional educational opinion regards the teaching of a 
"negative" view of American race relations and involvement in the Vietnam 
conflict as unsuitable for high school students. Such a showing establishes a 
constitutionally acceptable motivation for content discrimination. Since the Con-
158 . This hypothetical case is loosely based on Sterzing v. Fort Bend lndep. School Dist., 376 
F . Supp. 657 (S.D. Tex. 1972) , vacated for reconsideration of relief granted, 496 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 
1974). The teacher challenged his dismissal by the school board , and the district court, although it 
did not order actual reinstatement, found that the teacher had been dismissed without adequate notice. 
The court reached its conclusion after determining that the teacher's conduct served a " dem-
onstrated educational purpose ," stating that "[t]he freedom of speech of a teacher and a citizen of 
the United States must not be so lightly regarded that he stands in jeopardy of dismissal for rai sing 
controversial issues in an eager but disciplined classroom." 376 F. Supp . at 661-62. Although this 
language seems to suggest that a board may not contravene the reasonable instructional choices of a 
teacher, a better view is that in the absence of a reasonable, constitutional prohibitive policy, no 
teacher can be dismissed for exercising sound educational judgment. If such a prohibitive policy 
exists and the teacher deliberately violates it , however re«sonable the proscribed behavior , the board 
may discipline the teacher without running afoul of the fi rst amendment. See also Kingsville Jndep. 
School Dist. v. Cooper , 611 F.2d I 109 (1980) (teacher' s classroom discussion of controversial as-
pects of Reconstruction era); notes 120-24 and accompanying text supra. 
I 59. Thus, if the board can show that the teacher used materials that were irrelevant or inap-
propriate to the age of the students , or attempted to proselytize in the classroom , the trier of fact 
would be justified in finding that the board's restriction was merely an implementation of legitimate 
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stitution is not offended by decisions grounded in reasonable educational policy, 
the dispute between a teacher and a properly motivated board must be resolved 
in favor of the latter's superior authority, by virtue of state law, over education 
in the public school. 
2. School Board Refusal to Approve Teacher Requisition of New Course 
Books. Another teacher, attempting to present an alternative view of current 
events to his high school class, requisitions a new set of schoolbooks, and the 
school board refuses to authorize the purchase . When the teacher goes to court 
seeking to require the board to purchase the books requested , the board's refusal 
should enjoy presumptive educational validity. In this case, the teacher bears the 
burden of proving the absence of a reasonable educational policy underlying the 
board 's decision. I60 
If the teacher is able to show that the board's refusal is not prompted by 
educational concerns, the court may compel the board to act constitutionally by 
correcting the imbalance of curricular subject matter. But even when the teacher 
successfully carries this burden , it is not clear that the court can require the 
school board to purchase any specific volume. The Constitution may require that 
the board protect the student's right to receive information unless there is educa-
tional justification for the omission but it does not mandate the manner in which 
the board corrects an imbalance. The board may be able to meet the constitu-
tional requirement without expending funds, I6I or, if materials must be pur-
chased, the board may reasonably conclude that other books will better serve the 
constitutional interests at stake. 
3. School Board Removal of Teacher-Assigned Materials from School Li-
brary Shelves. Yet another teacher attempts to correct an unbalanced approach 
toward race relations or the Vietnam conflict in the required social studies 
textbook by making reading assignments from a book in the school library. 
Bombarded by parental complaints about the "radical" opinions to which their 
children have been exposed, the school authorities remove the offending volume 
from the library . The teacher then goes to court seeking its reinstatement. 162 
A book included in a school library collection has already been approved by 
an authorized educational decisionmaker, whether that board or its predecessor or 
the school librarians . The court may therefore presume that its inclusion was 
based on reasonable educational judgment and place the burden of proof on the 
160. Although this would be a heavy burden , it is not an impossible one. The teacher could, for 
example, show a pattern or practice of rejections of such materials, while other books presenting one 
side of a controversial issue within the curricular subject matter have been routinely approved. 
I 6 I. For example, the teacher could lead in-class discussions, supplemented by materials she 
has prepared or by assigning outside reading. 
I 62. If school officials in Arkansas had attempted to destroy all volumes containing material 
about evolution, after the Epperson decision, see text accompanying notes 64-69 supra, they probably 
would have been enjoined from doing so. Such action would have been prima facie evidence of an 
intent to perpetuate the unconstitutional policy. See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 
526, 539-40 (1979); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick , 443 U.S. 449, 456-58 & n.7 (1979). See 
also Loewen v. Turnipseed, 488 F. Supp . I 138 (N.D. Miss. 1980) (in light of legislative history 
favoring racial segregation, committee which rejected school history text on basis of racial content 
deprived authors, teachers , and students of their first and fourteenth amendment rights). 
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objecting board to show an educational purpose for its removal. 163 It would not 
be sufficient to argue that removal is necessary simply to open up shelf space for 
new books . Whenever the removal of a particular book raises parental, teacher, 
or student objection, the board 's decision cannot be deemed content-neutral; a 
book 's removal must be justified in terms of reasonable educational policy re-
lated to the content of that particular book. 
4. School Board Exclusion of Ten out of 1,285 Previously Used Books from 
Elective-Course Reading Lists . A group of senior high school language arts 
teachers seeks board approval of a list of I ,285 books for use in elective lan-
guage courses. The books had been used in the past and are still owned by the 
school. The board of education approves all but ten of the books . The teachers 
seek to enjoin the ex~lusion of the ten disfavored books .164 At the trial, both 
parties stipulate that the ten books are not obscene, that a "constitutionally 
proper decision-maker" could choose to include them in the list, and that there 
has been no attempt on the part of the board to exclude a "particular system of 
thought or philosophy." 165 
This case is considerably more difficult from the teachers ' perspective than 
the preceding hypothetical. On the one hand, the ten excluded books had been 
previously selected and used by authorized educational decisionmakers, a deci-
sion presumably unchallenged in past years. This inclusion decision, then, enjoys 
a presumption of educational validity that places the burden on the school board 
to demonstrate its own reasonable educational purpose in excluding the volumes. 
On the other hand, the first amendment does not require inclusion in a reading 
list of every book that could be of conceivable value in a course. The school 
board's cause is aided by the stipulation that it was not attempting to exclude 
"any particular system of thought or philosophy," but it must still prove that 
some reasonable educational purpose, such as mappropriateness to the age of 
students of the language used , or the complexity and subtlety of the subject 
163. In Presidents Council, Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd., 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied , 409 U.S. 998 (1972), see notes 2-6 and accompanying text supra, the school board argued 
that restricting access to a book violated no constitutional rights, since the teachers were permitted to 
discuss the subject matter and even the book itself in class, although they could not assign it to be 
read. Dissenting from the denial of certiorari in the case, Justice Douglas found this anomaly unac-
ceptable. He noted that the students "can do everything but read it. This in my mind lessens some-
what the contention that the subject matter of the book is not proper. " 409 U.S. 998, 999 (1972). 
Justice Douglas seemed to anticipate the risk of abuse when one school board weeds the library 
collection amassed by its predecessors . See text accompanying notes 145-50 supra. Yet his sugges-
tion that if a book's subject matter is proper it cannot be removed is not sound; the board may well 
be able to demonstrate that its removal decision was motivated by a reasonable educational policy. 
See also Pico v. Board of Educ., 474 F. Supp. 387 (E.D.N .Y. 1979), appeal pending, No. 
79-7690 (2d Cir. Feb. 6, I 980). 
164. This hypothetical is derived from Cary v. Board of Educ., 598 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1979). 
See notes 15-22 and accompanying text supra. 
I 65 . Id. at 542-43. Although the board decision at issue in Cary seems not unreasonable , since 
no attempt was made to skew the presentation of ideas, the court gave insufficient weight to the 
constitutionally relevant issue of the board 's motivation. As the concurrence urged , "the exclusion of 
books for secondary school students is not to be an arbitrar) exclusion." Id. at 544. The "personal 
predilections" of board members are improper-unconstitut10nal-grounds for exclusion of a book 
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matter, rather than personal dislike by the board members , prompted these par-
ticular exclusions. 
5. Parental Objection to Teacher-Assigned Readings Approved by the 
School Board. A senior high school student has been assigned Oliver Twist and 
The Merchant of Venice for a required English course. 166 Her parents object to 
these books because they contain stereotypical portraits of Jews that, it is as-
serted, may engender anti-Semitism in the community. The teacher is unwilling 
to substitute other works by Dickens and Shakespeare, and the school board 
supports the teacher's decision. The parents seek to enjoin the assignment of the 
books. 
Since the books in question have already been chosen by a first-line 
educator, they enjoy a presumptive constitutional validity. The board's endorse-
ment of the teacher's assignments indicates its view that the use of these books 
serves a legitimate educational goal. Consequently, the parents bear the consid-
erable burden of demonstrating that the use of these books advances no legiti-
mate educational purpose . t 67 In this case, it is obvious that a high school 
teacher's choice of these two classics is not educationally unreasonable, and that 
the board acted properly in approving the choice. 168 · 
For equally valid educational reasons, the board might also conclude that, in 
the future, David Copperfield and Julius Caesar would be equally valuable and 
less controversial for adolescent students who are more vulnerable than adults to 
the suggestive power of stereotypes. 169 If the teacher were to challenge such a 
decision, operating prospectively, the court should view the case in the same 
light as it would a school board's attempt to remove teacher-assigned materials 
from the library shelf. The board would thus bear the burden of justification; in 
this case, it seems likely that the board would be able to demonstrate a reason-
able educational basis for the decision . 
6. Parental Veto of a Mature Minor's Access to a Restricted Book Shelf. A 
seventeen-year-old high school senior wants to read a book that the school has 
placed on a limited-access library shelf. The school is willing to lend the book to 
the minor's parents directly, so that they can decide whether they want their 
child to read it. The parents refuse to permit their child to read the book. The 
child seeks to compel the school board to ignore the parental veto and lend her 
the book . 
166. This situation arose in Rosenberg v. Board of Educ., 196 Misc. 542, 92 N.Y.S.2d 344 
(Sup. Ct. 1949). The coun refused to order removal where no showing was made of deliberate intent 
by the author to generate anti-Semitism among readers . 
167. Parents, having chosen to send their child to public school, are entitled only to the board's 
reasonable educational judgment. As long as the board continues to make its book decisions for 
legitimate educational reasons, without attempting to coerce beliefs, infringe religious freedom, or 
abridge the student's right to receive educational information, parents have no personal constitutional 
right to require or prevent the use of any panicular book. Their only recourse is to alternative 
education, either private school or, under proper circumstances, instruction at home. 
168. Of course, the teacher may not use the books to espouse anti-Semitism; indeed , he or she 
might even be directed by responsible school authorities to discuss and counterbalance the social 
misconceptions to which the parents object. 
169. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 113 (1968) (Black, J., concurring) (assening that 
the state may exclude from its curriculum subjects "too emotional and controversial" for public 
school students). • 
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The school board's judgment that this book is so controversial-in its ideas 
or language or both-that it wishes to defer to the wishes of parents, should be 
respected by the court. The rearing of children has always been viewed in this 
country as a fundamental prerogative of parents . 170 When parents enroll their 
child in the public school system, they implicitly waive this right to control the 
child's environment during school hours, at least to the extent the school is 
pursuing a legitimate educational program. 171 This "delegation" of decision-
making power is not irreversible, however, and the state may choose to restore a 
portion of the responsibility to parents when it sees fit. 172 Thus, it is really 
parental authority that the student wishes to challenge. While there is ample 
precedent for state intervention between parent and child when the state's interest 
in the child's welfare is paramount , 173 when the harm is no greater than tolerat-
ing a waiting period before the child may read a particular book, state interven-
tion might inflict unjustifiable harm on family relationships. 174 
Of course, the state may not abdicate its educational responsibilities and use 
this parental veto device to infringe indirectly the student's right to receive in-
formation or to impose orthodox beliefs. The burden, however, is on the student 
to show that no reasonable educational concerns justify the abridgment of his or 
her right to receive information by restricting access to the book. 
7. The Student's Right to Receive Educat1onal Information from an Unwill-
ing Speaker. A family from the Deep South moves to a small New England 
community, where the fifteen-year-old daughter enrolls in the local high school. 
In history class she studies the Civil War and the Reconstruction era. The class 
text portrays the North as a generous victor whose efforts to rebuild the nation 
were thwarted by the venality of the South. The daughter's parents, deeply dis-
turbed, ask the teacher to supplement the text with materials concerning carpet-
bagging and the punitive measures directed against the southern states by the 
post-war government. He refuses and the school board supports his decision. The 
parents seek an injunction to compel the school to change its text on the grounds 
that it distorts the subject matter and infringes the student's right to receive 
information. 
170. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 
U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). The complex issue of parental substan-
tive due process interests in the rearing of their children is beyond the scope of this Note. For 
interesting discussions of parental rights and state interests , see Burt, supra note 139; Garvey, Child , 
Parent, State and the Due Process Clause: An Essay on the Supreme Court ' s Recent Work, 51 S. 
Cal. L. Rev. 769 ( 1978); Hirschoff, supra note 33; Moskowitz , supra note 33. 
171. See , e.g. , Sugarman & Kirp , Rethinking Collective Responsibility for Education, 39 Law 
& Contemp. Prob. 144 , 207-08 (1975); Davis v. Page , 185 F. Supp. 395, 406 (D.N.H. 1974) . 
172. Cf. Mercer v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ . , 379 F. Supp. 580 , 586 (E.D. Mich .), aff ' d 
mem., 419 U.S. 1081 (1974) (state "has the power to permit the parents to make the final decision 
as to exactly which courses [in this case elective sex education courses] the child should take " ). 
173. See generally Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of " Neglected" Children: Standards for 
Removal of Children from Their Homes , Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care, and 
Termination of Parental Rights , 28 Stan. L. Rev. 623 (1976). 
174. If the state wishes to allow "mature minors " to make their own book choices , it should do 
so not on a case-by-case basis , but by legislation defining the age of maturity, in order to avoid 
lawsuits between parent and child over the issue of maturity. Cf. Goldstein , Medical Care for the 
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Because the school's selection of texts is presumed constitutional, the par-
ents bear the burden of showing that continued use of this text alone is educa-
tionally unreasonable at the high school level. The parents claim that the students 
have the right to receive an accurate picture of this important period in the 
nation ' s political and legal development-a right that the first amendment pro-
tects even when the state-speaker wishes to be silent. 175 They will try to muster 
expert testimony to support their contention that the school's presentation does 
not fall within the range of reasonableness for high school instruction in this 
subject. 
The parents seem unlikely to prevail in this instance . The "range of rea_§,On-1 
a~s" is very b.r,pad , and courts will intervene only where the school board 
has egregiously violated acceptable standards of scholarship. The students have 
the right to demand that the school board exercise educational judgment, but not 
more. 176 
CONCLUSION 
Controversies over schoolbook policies have generated considerable litiga-
tion and the procession to the courthouse is likely to continue. What the public 
schools teach their students is vitally important to each child's future and to the 
well-being of society generally. Accordingly, the states wish to control the cur-
ricular content of public school instruction, and particularly the selection of 
schoolbooks, without interference from local parents and students, or from 
teachers. Moreover, if schools are to operate effectively, state and local boards 
;;:J"ust be free to make and carry out educational policy, including decisions 
wfiether or not to acquire or retain certain books for classroom and library use. 
Nevertheless, public school regulation of educational expression places at risk 
the first amendment value of an educated citizenry; while the state may educate 
its young, it may not abrogate the first amendment rights of students and 
teachers within its public schools . " ~ 
The students' right to receive educational information and the teachers' 
complementary right to impart it may notoe infringed by arbitrary and unjus-
tified school board restrictions. Courts, thus far, have had difficulty striking the 
precarious balance that honors majoritarian decisionmaking while preserving 
these first amendment interests . This Note suggests that a challenged school 
board action should be subjected to a test of educational reasonableness . In prac-
tice, this would allow school boards to exercise freely their discretion to select 
and remove schoolbooks as long as their decisions are supported by legitimate 
educational concerns . All initial schoolbook decisions-whether reached by a 
175. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S . 367 (1969), suggests that under certain 
circumstances this may be true. See notes 99 & 101-08 and accompanying text supra. 
176. If the teacher chose to implement the parents' suggestion by distributing supplementary 
materials , and the board objected , the burden would shift. To restrict the teacher's presentation , the 
board would have to prove that suppression of these materials was justified by reasonable educational 
concerns. 
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prior school board, a librarian, or a teacher acting not in contravention of estab-
lished educational policy-should enjoy a presumption of constitutionality. The 
burden of proving the absence of reasonable educational policy should therefore 
fall on the challenger of an initial decision-whether student, parent, teacher, or 
removing school board. 
This proposed framework for judicial review would accord. proper deference 
to the school board as the preferred educational decisionmaker . At the same time 
it would recognize the substantial first amendment interests at stake, and create 
an avenue for relief from patent abuses of authority . 
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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM 
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BD. OF EDUCATION, ISLAND TREES Cert to CA 2 
UNION FREE SCHOOL DIST. {Mansfield [diss.], Newman 
NO. 26, et al. [cone. in result], Sifton 
[ DJ] ) 
~ .,5 ~ L-oLe.~~~~ ~ 
v. ~h_j--~ ~ ~  
PICO, e~ ~ ~ l~ ¼u_ Timely ~ 
1. SUMMARY: Petrs ordered the removal of nine ~ ~' 
high school and junior high school libraries because they 
contained passages which petrs found to be inconsistent with the 
basic ~ s of the community that elected them. Resp students 
~"~ 1RJ A:JFJ"._1"r ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
,).,-0 c::.o. /;::,/\_____....--.n>-~  ~ Dtri Ah, ..k-1:. ~ - ....t..-
- -
- 2 -
brought suit alleging violation of their First Amendment rights, 
the DC rendered summary judgment for petrs, and CA 2 reversed. 
2. FACTS: Both parties agree to the following facts. In 
September, 1975, the President, Vice-President, and another 
member of the Board of Education (Board) of the Island Trees 
Union Free School District attended a conference sponsored by 
Parents of New York United. At the conference the Board members 
obtained a collection of excerpts from books which the parents 
group classified as "objectionable." 
On November 7, 1975, the President and Vice-President of the 
Board searched the card catalog of the Island Trees High School 
library and found cards for nine of the objectionable books. Two 
more objectionable books were subsequently located in the junior 
high school library and in the 12th grade curriculum. On 
February 24, 1976, at a "private session" of the Board attended 
by the Superintendent of Schools and the principals of the junior 
and senior high schools, the Board gave an "unofficial direction" 
that the objectionable books be moved to the Board's office. The 
books were removed from the libraries by the Superintendent, 
pending further Board action, and were delivered to the Board's 
office where Board members could personally review the books. 
In response to public and newspaper commentary objecting to 
removal of the books, the Board issued a press release on March 
19, 1976, in which it stated its reasons for removing and 
reviewing the books: 
"To date, what we have found is that the 
books do, in fact, contain material which is 
- -
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offensive to Christians, Jews, Blacks, and 
Americans in general. In addition, these books 
contain obscenities, blasphemies, brutality, and 
perversion beyond description." Petn. at A-92. 
On March 30, 1976, the Board met and ratified the already 
accomplished transfer of the "objectionable" books to the Board 
Office. At the same meeting, the Board appointed four Island 
Trees parents along with four school staff members to act as a 
"Book Review Committee" to make recommendations to the Board on 
the educational suitability of the books. 
On July 1, 1976, the Committee recommended that four books 
be "retained" by school libraries and that two books be 
"removed." The Committee could not agree upon a recommendation 
as to some of the books and recommended that parental approval be 
required for access to others. On July 28, 1976, the Board acted 
on the Committee report. It concluded that one book should be 
returned to the libraries without restriction, that one book 
should be returned with students' access conditioned on parental 
approval, and that the remaining nine books should "be removed ---------
from elementary and secondary libraries and for use in the ---------- - -· ----- ~ 
curriculum." 
By statements filed in the DC pursuant to local Rule 9(g), 
the parties to the lawsuit agreed that: 
"Although the books themselves were excluded 
from use in the schools in any way, defendants 
have not precluded discussion about the themes of 
the books or the books themselves. 
No teacher has been instructed not to 
discuss the books which were removed or to 
refrain from discussion or comment upon the ideas 
and positions they represent." Petn. at 5. 
- -
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As to the motive behind the removal, the ~ found: 
"The pleadings and affidavits submitted by 
the parties and amici demonstrate that the Board 1) {_ 
acted not on religious principles but on its 
conservative educational philosophy, and on its 
belief that the nine books removed from the 
school library and curriculum were irrelevant, 
vulgar, immoral, and in bad taste, making them 
e<Itfcationally unsuitable for the district's 
junior and senior high school students." Petn. 
at A-97. 
On January 4, 1977, resps filed an action for injunctive and 
declaratory relief in New York State Supreme Court alleging 
violation of their rights under the federal and state 
constitutions and§ 1983. The case was subsequently removed to 
federal court and a motion to remand was denied on August 16, 
1977. Although the complaint alleged five separate causes of 
action based on the Board's removal of the books, the DC found, 
and CA 2 did not disagree, that the causes of action reduced to a 
single claim of violation of resps' First Amendment rights. 
3. DECISIONS BELOW: At trial, both petrs and resps moved 
for summary judgment. After concluding that it had subject 
matter jurisdiction and that a class action should not be 
certified, the DC granted petrs' motion for summary judgment. As 
noted above, the DC concluded that the Board had acted on the 
basis of "its conservative educational philosophy." Following 
Presidents Council District 25 v. Community School Board No. 25, 
457 F.2d 289 (CA 2), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972), the court 
conclud= ould not "interve~ in the resoluti~ of ,!} c::; 
conflicts which arise in the daily operations of school systems 





constitutional values." Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 
(1968) Applying this test, the court concluded: 
"The Board has restricted access only to 
certain books which the Board believed to be, in 
essence, vulgar. While removal of such books 
from a school library may, indeed in this court's 
view does, reflect a misguided educational 
philosophy, it does not constitute a sharp and 
direct infringement of any First Amendment 
right." Petn. at A-107. 
In applying the Presidents Council test the court declined to 
follow three contrary federal court cases: Minarcini v. 
Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (CA 6 1976); Salvail 
v. Nashua Board of Education, 469 F.Supp. 1269 (D. N.H. 1979); 
Right to Read Defense Committee of Chelsea v. School Committee of 
the City of Chelsea, 454 F.Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978). The court 
rejected the notion adopted in Minarcini that removal of a book 
from a library shelf presents a greater threat to First Amendment 
rights than does the mere refusal to acquire a book in the first 
place. 
In three dissimilar opinions, CA 2 voted 2 to 1 to reverse. 
Judge Sifton (DJ;E.D.N.Y.) concluded that the DC erred in 
granting summary judgment for petrs. He first recognized that 
bare allegations of book removal make out no prima facie First 
Amendment violation because school boards are charged with the 
C fJ z... 
~ 
~ 
responsibility of determining what to teach and from which books 
it should be taught. However, when confronted with a colorable 
First Amendment claim, a school board must show, first, that its 
policy falls within one or more of the catagories of exceptional 
cases in which regulation of speech is permitted in schools and, 




applied criteria. "Not only must there be 'narrow specificity' 
in the criteria applied, but there must be the use of 'sensitive 
tools' in their application." Applying this standard, Judge 
Sifton concluded that "the criteria for removal suggested by the 
evidence suffer from excessive generality and overbreadth," and 
that "quite apart from the articulated criteria for selection of 
the books for removal, precision of regulation and sensitivity to 
First Amendment concerns are hardly established by the erradic, 
arbitrary and free-wheeling manner in which the defendant school 
officials proceeded in this case." Even if the court had 
demonstrated properly drawn and applied criteria, Judge Sifton 
stated summary judgment would have been error because plaintiffs 
are entitled to show that a Board's justification is a mere 
pretext for suppression of speech. 
Judge Newman articulated a different analysis of the First 
Amendment issues but concurred in the result of Judge Sifton's 
opinion. Judge Newman found official disapproval and removal of 
a book to be a particularly potent threat to First Amendment 
principles. Such actions, he concluded, "signal to the students 
and the teachers an official message that the ideas presented in 
those books are unacceptable, are wrong, and should not be 
discussed or considered. The chilling effect of this message on 
those who would express the idea is all too apparent." This 
threat is even greater when removal of a book is poli h cally rJ 





may be present." Applying these principles to this case, Judge 
Newman concluded: 
- "There i s no claim that shelf space was 
scarce or that these books contained obsolete or 
disproven statements of fact. These books were 
singeled out for disapproval. There is also no 
question that the removal was a positive, 
clearly-defined act by school authorities. By 
the time the books were removed, the action had 
become a major policy decision, and there could 
be little doubt in the minds of the Island Trees 
students about the message that the school 
authorities intended to communicate. 
"A trial is required to determine precisely 
what happened, why it happened, and whether, in 
the circumstances of this case, the School 
Board's actions, looking forward from the time 
they were taken, created a sufficient risk of 
suppressing ideas to constitute a violation of 
the First Amendment." Petn. at A-74, A-79. 
In dissent, Judge Mansfield emphasized that "public ----secondary school education can function effectively only if 
school boards are accorded rather broad discretionary authority 
to determine •.. the educational tools to be used, whether those 
tools be test tubes in a laboratory or books in a library." He 
also disagreed with Judge Sifton's charact~rization of the Board 
action: "the Board acted carefully, conscientiously and 
responsibly after according due process to all parties 
concerned." Judge Mansfield agreed with the DC's reliance upon 
Presidents Council and Epperson, that courts may not intervene in 
decisions of school systems unless they "directly and sharply 
implicate basic constitutional values." "[T]his test clearly 
requires, as a condition precedent to judicial intervention, a 
showing that the school's action (1) violates the students' right 
- -
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of expression and (2) is not reasonably related or necessary to 
the performance by the school of its educational function." 
Petn. at A-50. Removal of the books in this case did not 
infringe the students' First Amendment rights because, as 
stipulated by the parties, topics in the books and even the books 
themselves may be freely discussed in class and students have 
access to the books outside of the school library. In addition, 
the school board acted conscientiously and carefully in 
fulfilling its duty to reflect local community views and values 
as to educational content. 
A motion for rehearing was denied by the panel, and CA 2 
split 5 to 5 and therefore denied a motion for rehearing en bane. 
Judge Mansfield, joined by Judges Mulligan, Timbers, Van 
Graafeiland, and Meskill, dissented to the denial of en bane 
review. He stated that the denial disregarded the importance of 
the issues in this case and the intra-circuit conflict between 
this case and Presidents Council. Moreover, he argued that 
nothing will be gained by remand because the exacting procedural 
requirements of Judge Sifton's opinion "virtually mandate a 
decision for the plaintiffs." 
4. CONTENTIONS: Petrs make four arguments in support of 
their petition for cert. (1) The decision below raises 
significant and recurring problems concerning the extent of a 
school board's right to use its member's value systems in 
determining which instructional materials to utilize. "A time 
honored and cherished concept is basically at issue in this case-
-that of local control of public education." Petrs cite numerous 
- -
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magazine and newspaper articles reporting the wide-spread nature 
of this issue. In addition, Judge Sifton's requirement that 
regulations be drawn with "narrow specificity" and applied with 
"sensitive tools," and Judge Newman's requirement that the court 
determine prospectively whether there is a risk of suppression, 
place an impossible burden of defense on school boards. (2) 
Four circuit court and two DC decisions, in addition to the 
decision below, create "a clear and irreconcilable 
conflict •.• over whether a book on a shelf has greater values than 
off, whether personal value systems of a Board member may be 
utilized in making curriculum decisions, whether the possibility 
that the underlying reason is the 'political' views of the Board 
members taints their actions, and whether an infant student has 
standing under Virginia Pharmacy Board to raise these issues 
initially." (3) The decision below conflicts with CA 2's own 
decision in Presidents Council and with a companion case to the 
decision below: Bicknell v. Fergennes Union High School Board of 
Directors, 638 F.2d 438 (1980). (4) For reasons stated by the DC 
and Judge Mansfield, the decision below is incorrect. 
An amicus brief filed in support of the petition for cert by 
the Citizens for Decency through Law, Inc. argues that the Board 
was simply fulfilling its statutory duty to determine the content 
of school libraries and did not infringe on student rights to 
discuss, own, or have non-school access to the books. The brief 
also argues that although students clearly have First Amendment 
rights, those rights are subject to and limited by the reasonable 




not have a suffucient First Amendment entitlement to require 
greater due process protections in removal of the books than 
those which were afforded by the school board. 
An amicus brief filed in support of the petition by the 
National Associatin of Secondary School Principals reasserts the 
arguments adopted by the DC and Judge Mansfield. In addition, it 
contends that the distinction between removing books from the 
library and refusing to acquire books in the first place reverses 
the burden of proof and requires the Board to prove an absence of 
improper motive whenever a book removal has been challenged on 
First Amendment grounds. The brief also contends that school 
boards have the authority and the legal obligation to inculcate 
minimum standards of morality, and that the values accepted by 
the majority of the community are an appropriate source of that 
morality. Ready intervention by the courts in cases of this type 
will make courts "the school boards of the nation." 
Resps oppose the petition for only one reason: the DC 
~
decision was a summary judgment and thus presents an incomplete -----·~ 
factual record. This Court should await development of a 
--
complete record on remand. Resps argue "that after the facts of 
this case have been fully developed at trial, it will be apparent 
that the actions of the Island Trees School Board grew out of a 
desire to impose an orthodoxy of values and beliefs." Resps 




"(l) The firing of the Superintendent of 
Schools for opposing the Board's book removal 
policy; 
(2) The intimidation of librarians who 
opposed book removal; 
(3) The methods of the Board employed to 
marshal community support including a poll 
conducted by mail; 
(4) The Board's formal and informal contacts 
with conservative organizations such as Parents 
of New York United, an affiliate of the Heritage 
Foundation; 
(5) The views of Board members other than 
[the President and Vice-President] whose 
testimony was exclusively relied upon by 
[petitioners]; 
(6) The proceedings at Board meetings at 
which the issue of book removal was discussed; 
(7) The circumstances surrounding the 
Board's rejection of the recommendation of the 
Book Review Committee which urged retention of 
several of the books; 
(8) The proposed methods of disciplining 
teachers and students who violate the book ban." 
Resp. at 11-12 (fn). 
5. DISCUSSION: I recommend that the Court grant cert. 
This case presents an issue of current, nation-wide concern which 
has produced a split among the circuits, with CA 7, CA 10, and 
two decisions of CA 2 on one side, and CA 6, two DCs, and the 
decision below on the other side. Moreover, this case raises the 
most significant of the issues confronted by these various cases: 
the extent and nature of students' First Amendment right of 
access to information, whether book removal presents a greater 
threat to First Amendment rights than refusal to acquire a book 
in the first place, the First Amendment implications of a school 





procedural protections which the First Amendment requires in 
book-removal cases. 
Although it is true that trial would produce a mo_:.;,-complete 
factual record, I am not convinced that such a record would be 
necessary or desirable in this case. The events leading up to ---- --
and the procedures used in the Board's action are not in dispute. 
The facts were certainly sufficient to produce a wide range of 
views in the CA. In addition, the specific areas of factual 
development identified by resps (p. 11, supra) would not clearly 
be helpful. Items (1) through (3) appear to be irrelevant. If 
removal of the books was a lawful action, then dismissal of the 
Superintendent for opposition to the action, requiring librarians 
to comply with the action, and marshalling community support in 
favor of the action were not improper. Item (4) would add little 
helpful information because the Board's contact with the parents 
organization is readily conceded by petrs, as is the fact that 
the books were initially identified by a list produced by the 
conservative group. Factual development of item (5) would be 
helpful in determining whether the Board was politically 
motivated. However, such development is not needed for this 
Court to rule upon the relevance or propriety of various Board 
motivations. Legal principles could be announced and the case 
could be remanded for trial and decision consistent with those 
principles. The same is true of item (6). The record discloses 
the general procedures followed by the Board, and although 
further understanding of in-meeting procedures would assist in 




understanding is not essential to an articulation of the general 
procedural protections required by the First Amendment. Factual 
development of item (7) would add little to the decision of this 
case because both parties concede that appointment of the Review 
Committee was a gratuitous action by the Board, not required by 
state law. The fact that the Board rejected the Committee's 
findings simply demonstrates that the book-removal decision was 
based upon the Board members' individual opinions of the books. 
Finally, factual inquiry into item (8) seems unnecessary in light 
of the parties' stipulation that the Board action only removed 
books from the library and did not specify subjects which could 
not be discussed or books which could not be read by teachers and 
students. 
In addition to the lack of necessity in developing the 
record, a trial court decision would be extremely difficult in 




------------------ -- C 
majority judges adopted different tests for First Amendment 
violations and emphasized different shortcomings in the Board's 
action. Trial would be much easier in this case, and in the 
numerous other cases being heard around the nation, were this 
Court to clearly articulate the First Amendment principles 
governing book-removal decisions. 
There is a response. 
7/22/81 
CMS 
Campbell Op in petn. 
' . 
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The only respondents in this case are students and their ~ 
parents. Standing thus depends clearly on the question whether 12..~ -
students have a First Amendment right to receive books or ideas. 




The few cases d 
/U-o 4? 1-
assert a First Amendment right to receive ideas. 
to deal with this issue have upheld student standing. This ~?:j_lJ 
standing has been predicated on largely on the rationale of tr1 tc.,. r2...~ 
lrl,,,' 
Consumer ~ Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citi~ens 
\ 
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. ~ (1976) (" [W]here a speaker exists, as ~~ 
-----is the case here, the protection afforded is to the 
communication, to its source and to its recipients both."). See, 
e.g., Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 
583 (CA6 1976) • 
I would still recommend that the Court ask for briefing on 
this issue. Recognition of student standing to sue, based on 
nothing more substantial than "a right to receive ideas," could 
,, ~ 




will articulate diverse views? The question of drawing a 
sensible line ought to be considered. Perhaps the place to - ----------that line is not identified by the "standing" doctrine. 
Recognizing a general "right to receive" ideas, the courts 
draw) 
could 
find that that right was not substantively implicated in various 
contexts. The inquiry would then be into the existence of the 
right asserted, not into the student's standing to claim such a 
right. But I still think that this matter deserves some thought. 
A careless treatment of this issue could lead to an unwanted 
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To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: David Levi 
BENCH MEMORANDUM 
-
March 1, 1982 
No. 80-2043, Board of Education v. Pico 
Question Presented 
Whether the school board's removal of books from the 
shelves of a high school library violates the First Amendment 




- - 2. 
This is a most unusual case. The Court has 
considered the application of the first amendment in the 
context of the schoolhouse but never in a setting so closely 
touching the state's control of the curriculum or the ideas 
that students are exposed to. In Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 
U.S. 97 (1968), in passing on Arkansas' "monkey law" the Court 
was concerned with the state's regulation of the curriculum. 
But that was a case decided under the religion clauses of the 
First Amendment and not the speech provision. Indeed, the 
Epperson Court chose such a narrower route deliberately so to 
avoid the sorts of problems faced by the Court in this case. 
See 303 U.S., at 105-106 ("We need not take advantage of the 
broad premise which the Court's decision in meyer furnishes, 
nor need we explore the implictions of that decision in terms 
of the justiciability of the multitude of controversiers that 
beset our campuses today. Today's problem is capable of 
resolution in the narrower terms of the Fir st Amendment's 
prohibition of laws respecting an establishment of religion or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.") 
The other first amendment school cases concern 
compulsion of students or teachers to affirm their allegiance 
to a credo--as in Barnette (flag salute) and Keyishian 
(teacher's loyalty oath) or to refrain from stating a position 
in a nondisruptive fashion--as in Tinker (black armbands 
protesting Vietnam War). 
-
-
- - 3. 
By contrast, there is no indication of coercion in 
this case. Certain books were removed. No one was punished 
or threatened. No teacher was told not to teach the ideas in 
the books. I think that the absence of coercion of this sort 
is highly significant to a decision. 
- ---- - ..... 
I think that there are two The questions here. _..,. 
~ is whether a school board ~ hold the purpose of 
promoting certain ideas and principles. And the ~ 
question is whether--assuming that there are some limits to a 
school board's power to shape what a student is taught--the 
constitutionality of school board action ought to turn on 
motive, and if it does turn on motive, who must bear the 
burden of demonstrating impermissible motivation. 
As to the first question, it would seem that school 
boards and schools must have some considerable leeway to shape 
what students are taught without answering to some kind of 
"equal time" requirement. Thus, if the school board decides to 
buy several books on 20th Century liberal t hought, they should 
not be subjected to an injunction compelling them to purchase 
books on conservative thought. To force the school to teach 
or present all sides of every question would place an 
intolerable burden and would subject them to continuing 
lawsuits. Moreover, even if it were possible for the schools 
- to present all views, it would not seem that they must do so 




- - 4. 
held that the state could require public school teachers to be 
citizens. The unstated assumption is that the schools may 
teach loyalty to American values and civic institutions 
without also being required to teach disloyalty. Presumably 
there are other values that a school board may wish to convey: 
good citizenship, tolerance, the work ethic, tradition, order, 
etc. And, in general, the schools may have some notion as to 
what is appropriately taught in school, as opposed to 
elsewhere, and as to what is appropriate reading for school 
age children. 
In short, I think that a school board may have 
"political" purposes in its shaping of the curriculum or the 
books in the library. Thus, I do not think that it states a 
first amendment violation to claim that the school board has 
removed books for political reasons. I think that this view 
of the matter may differ somewhat from Judge Mansfield who at -
some points in his opinion assumes that if the school board 
had a political motive then there would have been a first 
amendment violation. 
This is not to say that a school board may never 
violate the first amendment by its control over what students 
read and learn or say. But rather than placing the question 
~ 
II '-' 
on motivation it seems more reasonable to me to make any 
~/4-_ ...... J JJ --~\~--------
violation~ hinge on objective effect--either the outright 
coercion of students and teachers or a pervasive effort to 
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conflicting ideas. 
on two grounds. 
I would argue for this "effect" approach 
First, if I am right that political 
motivation in the broad sense is perfectly legitimate, then 
merely showing a politic~ion d.,Q_es not state~ first 
amendment v-toi-crtion. And, second, assuming that a political 
<--- --~---
motivation is not permissible, but that a desire to shield 
students from obscenity is a legitimate motive, every time 
there is a case such as this it will have to proceed to trial 
on the question of motivation. 
If you agree, I think that there are ~e 
ways of disp~ the matter. ~ the Court could held 
that there was no effort by the school board to suppress 
speech or impose orthodoxy on the student body. Removing 7 
~
books from the library, without more, simply does not rise to ___ __ __,,,. --- - - - -
,---- ------ "--- -
the level of a first amendment violation. There was no effort --- ~ -------to discipline anyone or to prevent any teacher or student from 
speaking. ~ the Court might hold that a political 
motive is impermissible. Yet in order to avoid the danger 
that all of these cases would then go to trial, the Court 
could adopt Justice Harlan's suggestion in Tinker that the 
burden of showing impermissible motivation ought to rest upon 
the complainant: 
"I certainly agree that state public 
school authorities in the discharge of their 
reponsibilities are not wholly exempt from the 
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment respecting 
the freedoms of expression and association. At the 
same time I am reluctant to believe that there is 









the proposition that school officials should be 
accorded the widest authority in maintaining 
discipline and good order in their institutions. To 
translate that proposition into a workable 
constitutional rule, I would, in cases like this, 
cast upon those complaining the burden of showing 
that a particular school measure was motivated by 
other than legitimate school conerns--for example, a 
desire to prohibit the expression of an upopular 
point of view, while permitting expression of the 
dominant opinion." 
6. 
The Court might then remand to the CA for a finding of whether 
the students met such a burden at this stage of the 
proceedings. If not, summary judgment ought be granted for 
the school board. Without adopting Justice Harlan's approach 
it may be somewhat difficult on these facts to support Judge 
Mansfield's opinion. Without casting the burden on the 
students, there is probably enough evidence of political 
motive in the record to get this case past summary judgment. 
- -
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\' SUPR(lE COUR\ OF THE UNITED STATES 
~~ - } IL W ! 
T ~ No. 80-2043 
Bf~4 
/3~ 
BOARD OF EDUCATION, ISLAND TREES UNION 
FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 26 ET AL., PETI-
TIONERS, v. STEVEN ~~ BY HIS 
NEXT FRIEND, FRANCE~9}'ET AL. 
, . 0 _ I~ ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
~ APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
~ [May-, 1982] 
/1.. ./J __, ~ ~ ~ JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
ryr I • { ~ The principal question presented is whether the First 
. ,rv..nr- . Amendment 1 imposes limitations upon the exercise by a local 
}J& F,lY ~ school board of its discretion to remove library books from 
) ~ L - high school and junior high school libraries. 
t:F
_,,, .J.,o" 1 \ I 
~ "' ) Petitioners are the Board of Education of the Island Trees 
(J Union Free School District No. 26, in New York, and Rich-
1 I 7) ard Ahrens, Frank Martin, Christina Fasulo, Patrick 
r /l I Hughes, Richard Melchers, Richard Michaels, and Louis 
d N essim. When this suit was brought, Ahrens was the Presi-o/ dent of the Board, Martin was the Vice-President, and the remaining petitioners were Board members. The Board is a I r state agency charged with responsibility for the operation 
and administration of the public schools within the Island 
1 The Amendment provides in pertinent part that "Congress shall make 
no law . .. abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press. " It applies to 
the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. Gitlow v. New York, 









BOARD OF EDUCATION v. PICO 
Trees School District, including the Island Trees High School 
and Island Trees Memorial Junior High School. Respond-
ents are Steven Pico, Jacqueline Gold, Glenn Yarris, Russell 
Rieger, and Paul Sochinski. When this suit was brought, 
Pico, Gold, Yarris, and Rieger were students at the High 
School, and Sochinski was a student at the Junior High 
School. 
In September 1975, petitioners Ahrens, Martin, and 
Hughes attended a conference sponsored by Parents of New 
York United (PONYU), a politically conservative organiza-
tion of parents concerned about education legislation in the 
State of New York. At the conference these petitioners ob-
tained lists of books described by Ahrens as "objectionable," 
App. 22, and by Martin as "improper fare for school stu-
dents," id., at 101.2 It was later determined that the High 
School library contained nine of the listed books, and that an-
other listed book was in the Junior High School library. 3 In 
February 1976, at a meeting with the superintendent of 
schools and the principals of the High School and Junior High 
School, the Board gave an "unofficial direction" that the 
listed books be removed from the library shelves and deliv-
ered to the Board's offices, so that Board members could read 
them. 4 When this directive was carried out, it became pub-
2 The District Court noted, however, that petitioners "concede that the 
books are not obscene." 474 F. Supp. 387, 392 (1979). 
3 The nine books in the High School library were: Slaughter House Five, 
by Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.; The Naked Ape, by Desmond Morris; Down These 
Mean Streets, by Piri Thomas; Best Short Stories of Negro Writers, edited 
by Langston Hughes; Go Ask Alice, of anonymous authorship; Laughing 
Boy, by Oliver LaFarge; Black Boy, by Richard Wright; A Hero Ain't 
Nothin' But A Sandwi,ch, by Alice Childress; and Soul On Ice, by Eldridge 
Cleaver. The book in the Junior High School library was A Reader for 
Writers, edited by Jerome Archer. Still another listed book, The Fixer, 
by Bernard Malamud, was found to be included in the curriculum of a 
twelfth grade literature course. 474 F . Supp. 387, 389 and nn. 2--4. 
' The superintendent of schools objected to the Board's informal direc-
tive, noting that: 
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licized, and the Board issued a press release justifying its ac-
tion. It characterized the removed books as "anti-American, 
anti-Christian, anti-Semitic, and just plain filthy," and con-
cluded that "It is our duty, our moral obligation, to protect 
the children in our schools from this moral danger as surely 
as from physical and medical dangers." 474 F. Supp. 387, 
390. 
A short time later, the Board appointed a "Book Review 
Committee," consisting of four Island Trees parents and four 
members of the Island Trees schools staff, to read the listed 
books and to recommend to the Board whether the books 
should be retained, taking into account the books' "educa-
tional suitability," "good taste," "relevance," and "appropri-
ateness to age and grade level." In July, the Committee 
made its final report to the Board, recommending that five of 
the listed books be retained 5 and that two others be removed 
from the school libraries. 6 As for the remaining four books, 
the Committee could not agree on two, 7 took no position on 
one, 8 and recommended that the last book be made available 
"we already have a policy . .. designed expressly to handle such problems. 
It calls for the Superintendent, upon receiving an objection to a book or 
books, to appoint a committee to study them and make recommendations. 
I feel it is a good policy-and it is Board policy-and that it should be fol-
lowed in this instance. Further, I think it can be followed quietly and i,1 
such a way as to reduce, perhaps avoid, the public furor which has always 
attended such issues in the past." App. 44. 
The Board responded to the superintendent's objection by repeating its 
directive "that all copies of the library books in question be removed from 
the libraries to the Board's office." App. 47 (emphasis in original). 
5 The Fixer, Laughing Boy, Black Boy, Go Ask Alice, and Best Short 
Stories by Negro Writers. 474 F . Supp., at 391, nn. 6-7. 
6 The Naked Ape and Down These Mean Streets. 474 F. Supp., at 391, 
n. 8. 
1 Soul On Ice and A Hero Ain't Nothin' But A Sandwich. 474 F. 
Supp., at 391, n. 9. 
8 A Reader for Writers. 474 F . Supp. , at 391 , n. 11. The reason given 
for this disposition was that all members of the Committee had not been 
4 
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to students only with parental approval. 9 The Board sub-
stantially rejected the Committee's report later that month, 
deciding that only one book should be returned to the High 
School library without restriction, 10 that another should be 
made available subject to parental approval, 11 but that the re-
maining nine books should "be removed from elementary and 
secondary libraries and [from] use in the curriculum." 4 7 4 
F. Supp., at 391. 12 The Board gave no reasons for rejecting 
the recommendations of the Committee that it had appointed. 
Respondents reacted to the Board's decision by bringing 
the present action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. 
They alleged that petitioners had 
"ordered the removal of the books from school libraries 
and proscribed their use in the curriculum because par-
ticular passages in the books offended their social, politi-
cal and moral tastes and not because the books, taken as 
a whole, were lacking in educational value." App. 4. 
Respondents claimed that the Board's actions denied them 
their rights under the First Amendment. They asked the 
court for a declaration that the Board's actions were uncon-
stitutional, and for preliminary and permanent injunctive re-
lief ordering the Board to return the nine books to the school 
libraries and to refrain from inter [ering with the use of those 
books in the schools' curricula. App. ~-
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of 
petitioners. 474 F. Supp. 387 (1979). In the court's view, 
able to read the book. Id., at 391. 
• Slaughter House Five. 474 F . Supp., at 391, n. 10. 
10 Laughing Boy. 474 F. Supp., at 391, n. 12. 
11 Black Boy. 474 F . Supp., at 391, n. 13. 
12 As a result, the nine removed books could not be assigned or sug-
gested to students in connection with school work. Ibid. However, 
teachers were not instructed to refrain from discussing the removed books 
or the ideas and positions expressed in them. App. 131. 
80--2043--0PINION 
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"the parties substantially agree[d] about the motivation be-
hind the board's actions," id., at 391-namely, that 
"the board acted not on religious principles but on its 
conservative educational philosophy, and on its belief 
that the nine books removed from the school library and 
curriculum were irrelevant, vulgar, immoral, and in bad 
taste, making them educationally unsuitable for the dis-
trict's junior and senior high school students." Id., at 
392. 
With this factual premise as its background, the court re-
jected respondents' contention that their First Amendment 
rights had been infringed by the Board's actions. Noting 
that statute, history, and precedent had vested local school 
boards with a broad discretion to formulate educational pol-
icy, 13 the court concluded that it should not intervene in" 'the 
daily operations of school systems'" unless "'basic constitu-
tional values"' were "'sharply implicate[d], "' 14 and deter-
mined that the conditions for such intervention did not exist 
in the present case. Acknowledging that the "removal [of 
the books] ... clearly was content-based," the court never-
theless found no constitutional violation of the requisite 
magnitude: 
"The board has restricted access only to certain books 
wr.- ich the board believed to be, in essence, vulgar. 
While removal of such books from a school library may 
... reflect a misguided educational philosophy, it does 
not constitute a sharp and direct infringement of any 
first amendment right." Id., at 397. 
13 /d., at 39&-397, citing Presidents Council, District 25 v. Community 
School Board # 25, 457 F. 2d 289 (CA21972); James v. Board of Education, 
461 F. 2d 566, 573 (CA2 1972); East Hartford Educational Assn. v. Board 
of Education, 562 F. 2d 838, 856 (CA2 1977) (en bane). 
14 474 F. Supp., at 395-397, quoting Presidents Council, District 25 v. 
Community School Board # 25, supra, at 291 (in turn quoting Epperson v. 
Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97, 104 (1968)). 
6 
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A three judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit reversed the judgment of the District 
Court, and remanded the action for a trial on respondents' 
allegations. 638 F. 2d 404 (1980). Each judge on the panel 
filed a separate opinion. Delivering the judgment of the 
court, Judge Sifton treated the case as involving "an unusual 
and irregular intervention in the school libraries' operations 
by persons not routinely concerned with such matters," and 
concluded that petitioners were obliged to demonstrate a rea-
sonable basis for interfering with respondents' First Amend-
ment rights. Id., at 414--415. He then determined that, at 
least at the summary judgment stage, petitioners had not of-
fered sufficient justification for their action, 15 and concluded 
that respondents "should have ... been offered an opportu-
nity to persuade a finder of fact that the ostensible justifica-
tions for [petitioners'] actions . . . were simply pretexts for 
the suppression of free speech." Id., at 417. 16 Judge New-
man concurred in the result. Id., at 432-438. He viewed 
the case as turning on the contested factual issue of whether 
petitioners' removal decision was motivated by a justifiable 
desire to remove books containing vulgarities and sexual 
explicitness, or rather by an impermissible desire to suppress 
ideas. Id., at 436--437. 17 We granted certiorari, -- U. S. 
-(1981). 
15 After criticizing "the criteria for removal" employed by petitioners as 
"suffer[ing] from generality and overbreadth," and the procedures used by 
petitioners as "erratic, arbitrary and free-wheeling," Judge Sifton ob-
served that "precision of regulation and sensitivity to First Amendment 
concerns" were "hardly established" by such procedures. 638 F . 2d, at 
416. 
1•Judge Sifton stated that it could be inferred from the record that peti-
tioners' "political views and personal taste [ were] being asserted not in the 
interests of the children's well-being, but rather for the purpose of estab-
lishing those views as the correct and orthodox ones for all purposes in the 
particular community." Id ., at 417. 
17 Judge Mansfield dissented, 638 F. 2d, at 419-432, based upon a dis-
tinctly different reading of the record developed in the District Court. 
According to Judge Mansfield, "the undisputed evidence of the motivation 
80-2043--OPINION 
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7 
We emphasize at the outset the limited nature of the sub-
stantive question presented by the case before us. Our 
precedents have long recognized certain constitutional limits 
upon the power of the State to control even the curriculum 
and classroom. For example, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 
390 (1923), struck down a state law that forbade the teaching 
of modern foreign languages in public and private schools, 
and Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97 (1968), declared un-
constitutional a state law that prohibited the teaching of the 
Darwinian theory of evolution in any state-supported school. 
But the current action does not require us to re-enter this dif-
ficult terrain, which Meyer and Epperson traversed without 
apparent misgiving. For as this case is presented to us, it 
does not involve textbooks, or indeed any books that Island 
Trees students would be required to read. 18 Respondents do 
for the Board's action was the perfectly permissible ground that the books 
were indecent, in bad taste, and unsuitable for educational purposes." 
Id., at 430. He also asserted that in reaching its decision "the Board [had] 
acted carefully, conscientiously and responsibly after according due proc-
ess to all parties concerned." Id., at 422. Judge Mansfield concluded that 
"the First Amendment entitles students to reasonable freedom of expres-
sion but not to freedom from what some may consider to be excessively 
moralistic or conservative selection by school authorities of library books to 
be used as educational tools." Id., at 432. 
18 Four of respondents' five causes of action complained of petitioners' 
"resolutions ordering the removal of certain books from the school libraries 
of the Distict and prohibiting the use of those books in the curriculum." 
App. 5. The District Court concluded "that respect for the school board's 
substantial control over educational content .. . precludes any finding of a 
first amendment violation arising out of removal of any of the books from 
use in the curriculum." 474 F. Supp., at 397. This holding is not at issue 
here. Respondents' fifth cause of action complained that petitioners' 
"resolutions prohibiting the use of certain books in the curriculum of 
schools in the District" had "imposed upon teachers in the District arbi-
trary and unreasonable restrictions upon their ability to function as teach-
ers in violation of principles of academic freedom." App. 6. The District 
Court held that respondents had not proved this cause of action: "before 
8 
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not seek in this Court to impose limitations upon their school 
board's discretion to prescribe the curricula of the Island 
Trees schools. On the contrary, the only books at issue in 
this case are library books, books that by their nature are op-
tional rather than required reading. Our adjudication of the 
present case thus does not intrude into the classroom, or into 
the compulsory courses taught there. Furthermore, even as 
to library books, the action before us does not involve the ac-
quisition of books. Respondents have not sought to compel 
their school board to add to the school library shelves any 
books that students desire to read. Rather, the only action 
challenged in this case is the removal from school libraries of 
books originally placed there by the school authorities, or 
without objection from them. 
The substantive question before us is still further con- \ 
strained y the proce ura pos ure o his case. Petitioners 
were granted summary judgment by the District Court. 
The Court of Appeals reversed that judgment, and remanded 
the action for a trial on the merits of respondents' claims. 
We can reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and 
grant petitioners' request for reinstatement of the summary 
judgment in their favor, only if we determine that "there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact," and that petitioners 
are "entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. Rule 
Civ. Proc. 56(c). In making our determination, any doubt as 
to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be 
resolved against petitioners as the moving party. Adickes 
v. Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144, 157-159 (1970). Further-
more, "On summary judgment the inferences to be drawn 
from the underlying facts contained ... in the affidavits, at-
tached exhibits, and depositions submitted below ... must 
be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing 
such a claim may be sustained there must at least be a real, not an imag-
ined controversy." 474 F . Supp., at 397. Respondents have not sought 
review of that holding in this Court. 
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the motion." United States v. Diebold, Inc. , 369 U. S. 654, 
655 (1962). 
In sum, the issue before us in this case is a narrow one, 
both substantively and procedurally.~ may best be re-
stated as two di§!;inct questions. ®§Q Does the First 
Amendment impose .!!!!!!ll Timitations upon the discretion of pe-
titioners to remove library books from the Island Trees High 
School and Junior High School?~ , If so, do the affida-
vits and other evidentiary m'ateriafs before the District 
Court, construed most favorably to respondents, raise a gen-
uine issue of fact whether petitioners might have exceeded 
those limitations? If we answer either of these questions in 
the negative, then we must reverse the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals and reinstate the District Court's summary 
judgment for petitioners. If we answer both questions in 
the affirmative, then we must affirm the judgment below. 
We examine these questions in turn. 
A 
(1) 
The Court has long recognized that local school boards 
have broad discretion in the management of school affairs. 
See, e.g., Meyerv. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 402 (1923); 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters , 268 U. S. 510, 543 (1925). 
Epperson v. Arkansas, supra, at 104, reaffirmed that, by 
and large, "public education in our Nation is committed to the 
control of state and local authorities," and that federal courts 
should not ordinarily "intervene in the resolution of conflicts 
which arise in the daily operation of school systems." Tin-
ker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U. S. 503, 507 (1969), 
noted that we have "repeatedly emphasized ... the compre-
hensive authority of the States and of school officials ... to 
prescribe and control conduct in the schools." We have also 
acknowledged that public schools are vitally important "in 
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and as vehicles for "inculcating fundamental values necessary 
to the maintenance of a democratic political system." 
Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U. S. 68, 76-77 (1979). We are 
therefore in full agreement with petitioners that local school 
boards must be permitted "to establish and apply their 
curriculum in such a way as to transmit community values," 
and that "there is a legitimate and substantial community in-
terest in promoting respect for authority and traditional 
values be they social, moral, or political." Brief for Petition-
ers 10. 19 
At the same time, however, we have necessarily recog-
nized that the discretion of the States and local school boards 
in matters of education must be exercised in a manner that 
comports with the transcendent im eratives of the First 
Amendment. In West irginia v. Barnette, 31 . . 624 
(1943), we held that under the First Amendment a student in 
a public school could not be compelled to salute the flag. We 
reasoned that 
"Boards of Education . . . have, of course, important, 
delicate, and highly discretionary functions, but none 
that they may not perform within the limits of the Bill of 
Rights. That they are educating the young for citizen-
ship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional 
freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the 
free mind at its source and teach youth to discount im-
portant principles of our government as mere plati-
tudes." Id., at 637. 
Later cases have consistently followed this rationale. Thus 
Epperson v. Arkansas, supra, invalidated a State's anti-
evolution statute as violative of the Establishment Clause, 
and reaffirmed the duty of federal courts "to apply the First 
Amendment's mandate in our educational system where es-
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sential to safeguard the fundamental values of freedom of 
speech and inquiry." 393 U. S. , at 104. And Tinker v. Des 
Moines School Dist., supra, held that a local school board had 
infringed the free speech rights of high school and junior high 
school students by suspending them from school for wearing 
black armbands in class as a protest against the Govern-
ment's policy in Vietnam; we stated there that the "compre-
hensive authority . . . of school officials" must be exercised 
"consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards." 
393 U. S., at 507. In sum, students do not "shed their rights 
to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate," 
id., at 506, and therefore local school boards must discharge 
their "important, delicate, and highly discretionary func-
tions" within the limits and constraints of the First 
Amendment. 
The nature of studen~ ' First Amendment rights in the 
context oftnis case requires further exaniinah on. West Vir-
ginia v. Barnette, supra, is instructive. There the Court 
held that students' liberty of conscience could not be in-
fringed in the name of "national unity" or "patriotism." 319 
U. S. , at 640-641. We explained that 
"the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag 
salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations 
on their power and invades the sphere of intellect and 
spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to 
our Constitution to reserve from all official control." 
Id., at 642. 
Similarly, Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist. , supra, held 
that students' rights to freedom of expression of their politi-
cal views could not be abridged by reliance upon an "undif-
ferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance" arising from 
such expression: 
"Any departure from absolute regimentation may cause 
trouble. Any variation from the majority's opinion may 
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room, or on the campus, that deviates from the views of 
another person may start an argument or cause a distur-
bance. But our Constitution says we must take this 
risk, Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1 (1949); and our 
history says that it is this sort of hazardous freedom-
this kind of openness-that is the basis of our national 
strength and of the independence and vigor of Americans 
who grow up and live in this ... often disputatious soci-
ety." 393 U. S., at 508-509. 
In short, "First Amendment rights, applied in light of the 
special characteristics of the school environment, are avail-
able to ... students." Id., at 506. 
Of course, courts should not "intervene in the resolution of 
conflicts which aris · n the · o erations of school sys-
tems" less "basic constitutio 1 valu are "directly and 
sharply imp cate[d in~ conflicts. Epperson v. Arkan-
sas, 393 U. S., at 104-(__~-~ e think that the First Amend-
ment rights of stude_Ets max b~~cfu: and sharply impli-
cated by the_rem~ of b~ s from the shelves of a school 
library. Our precedents7iave focused "not only on the role 
of the First Amendment in fostering individual self-expres-
sion but also on its role in affording the public access to dis-
cussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and 
ideas." First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 
765, 783 (1978). And we have recognized that "the State 
may not, consistently with the spirit of the First Amend-
ment, contract the spectrum of available knowledge." 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 482 (1965). In keep-
ing with this principle, we have held that in a variety of con-
texts "the Constitution protects the right to receive informa-
tion and ideas." Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 564 
(1969); see Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U. S. 753, 762-763 
(1972) (citing cases). This right is an inherent corollary of 
the rights of free speech and press that are explicitly guaran-
teed by the Constitution, in two senses. First, the right to 
receive ideas follows ineluctably from the senders First 
,~~~ 
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Amendment right to send them: "The right of freedom of 
speech and press ... embraces the right to distribute litera-
ture, . . . and necessarily protects the right to receive it." 
Martin v. Struthers, 318 U. S. 141, 143 (1943) (citation omit-
ted). "The dissemination of ideas can accomplish nothing if 
otherwise willing addressees are not free to receive and 
consider them. It would be a barren marketplace of ideas 
that had only sellers and no buyers." Lamont v. Postmaster 
General, 381 U. 8. 301, 308 (1965) (BRENNAN, J., 
concurring). 
More importantly, the right to receive ideas is a necessary 
predicate to the recipient's meaningful exercise of his own 
rights of speech, press, and political freedom. ~ ad-
monished us that 
"A popular Government, without popular information, or 
the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or 
a Tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge will forever 
govern ignorance: And a people who mean to be their 
own Governors, must arm themselves with with the 
power which knowledge gives." 9 Writings of James 
Madison 103 (G. Hunt ed. 1910). 20 
00 For a modern version of this observation, see A. Meiklejohn, Free 
Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government 26 (1948): 
"Just so far as ... the citizens who are to decide an issue are denied ac-
quaintance with information or opinion or doubt or disbelief or criticism 
which is relevant to that issue, just so far the result must be ill-considered, 
ill-balanced planning, for the general good." 
See also Butler v. Michigan, 352 U. S. 380, 383-384 (1957); Procunier v. 
Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 408--409 (1974); Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 
U. S. 1, 30 (1978) (STEVENS, J ., dissenting) ("[T]he First Amendment pro-
tects not only the dissemination but also the receipt of information and 
ideas."); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U. S. 843, 862--863 (1974) 
(POWELL, J., dissenting) ("[P]ublic debate must not only be unfettered; it 
must be informed. For that reason this Court has repeatedly stated that 
First Amendment concerns encompass the receipt of information and ideas 
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As we recognized in Tinker, students too are beneficiaries of 
this principle: 
"In our system, students may not be regarded as closed-
circuit recipients of only that which the State chooses to 
communicate .... [S]chool officials cannot suppress 'ex-
pressions of feeling with which they do not wish to con-
tend."' 393 U. S., at 511 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 
363 F. 2d 744, 749 (CA5 1966)). 
In sum, just as access to ideas makes it possible for citizens 
generally to exercise their rights of free speech and press in a 
meaningful manner, such access prepares students for active 
and effective participation in the pluralistic, often contentious 
society in which they will soon be adult members. Of course 
all First Amendment rights accorded to students must be 
construed "in light of the special characteristics of the school 
environment." Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist. , supra, at 
506. But the special characteristics of the school library 
make that environment especially appropriate for the recog-
nition of the First Amendment rights of students. 
A school library, no less than any other public library, is "a \ 
place dedicated to ~1et, to ~ edge, and to J>eauty ." 
Brown v. Louisiana, 83 U. S. 131, 142 (1966) (Opinion of 
Fortas, J.). Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S. 589 
(1967), observed that "students must always remain free to 
inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and 
understanding." 21 The school library is the principal locus of 
such freedom. As one District Court has well put it, in the 
school library 
"a student can literally explore the unknown, and dis-
cover areas of interest and thought not covered by the 
prescribed curriculum .... Th[e] student learns that a li-
brary is a place to test or expand upon ideas presented to 
21 385 U.S. , at 603, quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 
250 (1957) (Opinion of Warren, C. J. ). 
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him, in or out of the classroom." Right to Read Defense 
Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703, 715 (D. 
Mass. 1978) 
Petitioners emphasize the inculcative function of secondary 
education, and argue that they must be allowed unfettered 
discretion to "transmit community values" through the Island 
Trees schools. But that sweeping claim overlooks the 
unique role of the school library. It appears from the record 
that use of the Island Trees school libraries is completely vol-
untary on the part of students. Their selection of books 
from these libraries is entirely a matter of free choice; the li-
braries afford them an opportunity at self-education and indi-
vidual enrichment that is wholly optional. Petitioners might 
well defend their claim of absolute discretion in matters of 
curriculum by reliance upon their duty to inculcate commu-
nity values. But we think that petitioners' reliance upon 
that duty is misplaced where, as here, they attempt to ex-
tend their claim of absolute discretion beyond the compulsory 
environment of the classroom, into the school library and the 
regime of voluntary inquiry that there holds sway. 
(2) 
In rejecting petitioners' claim of absolute discretion to re-
move books from their school libraries, we do not deny that 
local school boards have a substantial legitimate role to play 
in the determination of school library content. We thus 
must turn to the uestion of the extent to which the First 
Amen ment laces limitations upon t e iscretion o petition-
ers o remove bo~J_ e1r · raries. In this inquiry we 
enjoy the guidance of several precedents. West Virginia v. 
Barnette, supra, stated that 
(
"If there be any fixed star in our constitutional constella-
tion, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe 
/ what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, 
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cumstances which permit an exception, they do not now 
occur to us." 319 U. S., at 642. 
This doctrine has been reaffirmed in later cases involving 
education. For example, Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 
supra, at 603, noted that "the First Amendment ... does not 
tolerate laws which cast a pall of orthodoxy over the class-
room;" see also Epperson v. Arkansas, supra, at 104-105. 
And Mt. Healthy City Board of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274 
(1977), recognized First Amendment limitations upon the dis-
cretion of a local school board to refuse to rehire a non-ten-
ured teacher. The school board in Mt. Healthy had declined 
to renew respondent Doyle's employment contract, in part 
because he had exercised his First Amendment rights. Al-
though Doyle did not have tenure, and thus "could have been 
discharged for no reason whatever," Mt. Healthy held that 
he could "nonetheless establish a claim to reinstatement if the 
decision not to rehire him was made by reason of his exercise 
of constitutionally protected First Amendment freedoms." 
429 U. S., at 283--284. We held further that once Doyle had 
shown "that his conduct was constitutionally protected, and 
that this conduct was a 'substantial factor' ... in the Board's 
decision not to rehire him," the school board was obliged to 
show ''by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have 
reached the same decision as to respondent's re-employment 
even in the absence of the protected conduct." Id. , at 287. 
With respect to the present case, the message of these 
precedents is clear. Petitioners rightly possess s1gmficant 
discretion to determine the content of their school libraries. 
But that qiscretion may nQt be .ex~ d in a ~ owly yad:,i-
san or political ~ anner. If a DemocraITc school board, moti-
vated by party affiliation, ordered the removal of all books 
written by or in favor of Republicans, few would doubt that 
the order violated the constitutional rights of the students 
denied access to those books. The same conclusion would 
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animus, decided to remove all books authored by blacks or 
advocating racial equality and integration. Our Constitution 
does not permit the official suppression of ideas. Thus 
whether petitioners' removal of books from their school li-
braries denied respondents their First Amendment rights de-
pends upon the motivation behind petitioners' actions. If pe-
titioners intended by their removal decision to deny 
respondents access to ideas with which petitioners disagreed, 
and if this intent was the decisive factor in petitioners' deci-
sion, 22 then petitioners have exercised their discretion in vi-
olation of the Constitution. To permit such intentions to 
control official actions would be to encourage the precise sort 
of officially prescribed orthodoxy unequivocally condemned 
in Barnette. On the other hand, respondents implicitly con-
cede that an unconstitutional motivation would not be demon-
strated if it were shown that petitioners had decided to re-
move the books at issue because those books were 
pervasively vulgar. Tr. of Oral Arg. 36. And again, re-
spondents concede that if it were demonstrated that the re-
moval decision was based solely upon the "educational suit-
ability" of the books in question, then their removal would be 
"perfectly permissible." Id., at 53. In other words, in re-
spondents' view such motivations, if decisive of petitioners' 
actions, would not carry the danger of an official suppression 
of ideas, and thus would not violate respondents' First 
Amendment rights. 
As noted earlier, nothing in our decision today affects in 
any way the discretion of a local school board to choose books 
to .JJ4d to the libraries of their schools. Because we are con-
certie'a in this case with the suppression of ideas, our holding 
~ ~cts only the discretion to remove bo_Q}{s. In brief, 
~ at local school boards may not remove books from 
22 By "decisive factor" we mean a "substantial factor" in the absence of 
which the opposite decision would have been reached. See Mt. Healthy 
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school library shelves simply because they dislike the~ as 
CO!!_tained in tho~ po~ s ana= seek b y tnefr re~ l to "pre-
scribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, reli-
gion, or other matters of opinion." West Virginia v. 
Barnette, 319 U. S., at 642. Such purposes stand inescap-
ably condemned by our precedents. 
B 
We now turn to the rel_!!_ai~~ qy~tion presented by this 
case: Do the evidentiary materials that were before the Dis-
trict Court, when construed most favorably to respondents, 
raise a genuine issue of material fact whether petitioners ex-
ceeded constitu tat10ns m exercising their discretion 
to remove the books from the school libraries? We conclude 
that the materials do raise such a question, which forecl3ses 
summary .j_u gme m avor o pet1 10ners. 
Before the District Court, respondents claimed that peti-
tioners' decision to remove the oooks "''was based upon [their] 
personal values, morals and tastes." App. 139. Respond-
ents also claimed that petitioners objected to the books in 
part because excerpts from them were "anti-American." 
Id., at 140. The accuracy of these claims was partially con-
ceded by petitioners, 23 and- petitioners' own affidavits lent 
further support to respondents' claims. 24 In addition, the 
23 Petitioners acknowledged that their "evaluation of the suitability of 
the books was based on [their] personal values, morals, tastes and concepts 
of educational suitability." App. 142. But they did not accept, and thus 
apparently denied, respondents' assertion that some excerpts were ob-
jected to as "anti-American." Ibid. 
24 For example, petitioner Ahrens stated that: 
"I am basically a conservative in my general philosophy and feel that the 
community I represent as a school board member shares that philosoP, y. 
ee tna It IS my c nserva Ive pnncip es o the 
decision making process in which I am involved as a board member and I 
have done so with regard to . . . curriculum formation and content and 
other educational matters. 
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record developed in the District Court shows that when peti-
tioners offered their first public explanation for the removal 
of the books, they relied in part on the assertion that the re-
moved books were "anti-American," and "offensive to ... 
Americans in general." 474 F. Supp., at 390.25 Further-
more, while the Book Revi~w. Co~ ee appointed by peti-
tioners was instructed to make its recommendations based 
upon criteria that appear on their face to be permissible-the 
books' "educational suitability," "good taste," "relevance," 
and "appropriateness to age and grade level," App. 67-the 
Committee's recommendations that five of the books be re-
tained and that only two be removed were essentially re-
jected by petitioners, without any statement of reasons for 
doing so. Finally, while petitioners originally defended their 
removal decision with the explanation that "these books con-
tain obscenities, blasphemies, and perversion beyond de-
scription," 474 F. Supp., at 390, one of the books, A Reader 
for Writers, was removed even though it contained no such 
language. 638 F. 2d, at 428, n. 6 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). 
Standing alone, this evidence respecting the substantive 
motivations behind petitioners' removal decision would not 
be decisive. This would be a very different case if the record 
''We are representing the community which first elected us and re-elected 
us and our actions have reflected its intrinsic values and desires." App. 
21, 27. 
Petitioners Fasulo, Hughes, Melchers, Michaels and Nessim made a sim-
ilar statement, that they had "represented the basic values of the commu-
nity in [their] actions." Id., at 120. 
25 When asked to give an example of "anti-Americanism" in the removed 
books, petitioners Ahrens and Martin both adverted to A Hero Ain't 
Nothin' But a SandW'ich, which notes at one point that George Washington 
was a slaveholder. See A Hero Ain't Nothin' But a SandW'ich 43; Deposi-
tion of Petitioner Ahrens 89; Deposition of Petitioner Martin 20-22. Peti-
tioner Martin stated that "I believe it is anti-American to present one of 
the nation's heroes, the first President, ... in such a negative and obvi-
ously one-sided life. That is one example of what i would consider anti-
American." Deposition of Petitioner Martin 22. 
20 
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demonstrated that petitioners had employed established, 
regular, and facially unbiased procedures for the review of 
controversial materials. But the actual record in the case 
before us suggests the exact opposite. Petitioners' removal 
procedures were vigorously challenged below by respond-
ents, and the evidence on this issue sheds further light on the 
issue of petitioners' motivations. 26 Respondents alleged that 
in making their removal decision petitioners ignored "the ad-
vice of literary experts," the views of "librarians and teach-
ers within the Island Trees School system," the advice of the 
superintendent of schools, and the guidance of "publications 
that rate books for junior and senior high school students." 
App. 128-129. Respondents also claimed that petitioners' 
decision was based solely on the fact that the books were 
named on the PONYU list received by petitioners Ahrens, 
Martin, and Hughes, and that petitioners "did not undertake 
an independent review of other books in the [school] librar-
ies." Id., at 129-130. Evidence before the District Court 
lends support to these claims. The record shows that imme-
diately after petitioners first ordered the books removed 
from the library shelves, the superintendent of schools re-
minded them that "we already have a policy ... designed ex-
pressly to handle such problems," and recommended that the 
removal decision be approached through this established 
26 We have recognized in numerous precedents that when seeking to dis-
tinguish activities unprotected by the First Amendment from other, pro-
tected activities, the State must employ "sensitive tools" in order to 
achieve a precision of regulation that avoids the chilling of protected activi-
ties. See, e. g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 525-526 (1957); 
N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 433 (1963); Keyishian v. Board of 
Regents, 385 U. S. 589, 603-604 (1966); Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U. S. 410, 417 
(1971). In the case before us, the presence of such sensitive tools in peti-
tioners' decisionmaking process would naturally indicate a concern on their 
part for the First Amendment rights of respondents; the absence of such 
tools might suggest a lack of such concern. See 638 F. 2d, at 416--417 
(Opinion of Sifton, J .). 
~ 
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channel. See n. 4, supra. But the Board disregarded the 
superintendent's advice, and instead resorted to the extraor-
dinary procedure of appointing a Book Review Committee--
the advice of which was later rejected without explanation. 
In sum, respondents' allegations and some of the evidentiary 
materials presented below do not rule out the possibility that 
petitioners' removal procedures were highly irregular and ad 
hoc-the antithesis of those procedures that might tend to al-
lay suspicions regarding petitioners' motivations. 
Construing these claims, affidavit statements, and other 
evidentiary materials in a manner favorable to respondents, 
we cannot conclude that petitioners were "entitled to a judg-
ment as a matter of law." The evidence plainly does n~t/ 
foreclose the possibility that petitioners' decision to removl 
the books rested decisively upon disagreement with constitu-
tionally protected ideas in those books, or upon a desire on 
petitioners' part to impose upon the students of the Island 
Trees High ·School and Junior High School a political ortho-
doxy to which petitioners and their constituents adhered. 
Of course, some of the evidence before the District Court 
might lead a finder of fact to accept petitioners' claim that 
their removal decision was based upon constitutionally valid 
concerns. But that evidence at most creates a genuine issue 
of material fact on the critical ·question of the credibility of 
petitioners' justifications for their decision: On that issue, it 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 80-2043 
BOARD OF EDUCATION, ISLAND TREES UNION 
FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 26 ET AL., PETI-
TIONERS v. STEVEN A. PICO, BY HIS 
NEXT FRIEND, FRANCES PICO ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
[June-, 1982] 
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, dissenting. 
The First Amendment, as with other parts of the Constitu-
tion, must deal with new problems in a changing world. In 
an attempt to deal with a problem in an area traditionally left 
to the states, the Court today, in a lavish expansion of the 
First Amendment, holds that a school board's decision con-
cerning what books are to be in the school library is .subj-Wt ~ti fed~t,.review under the First Amendment. 1 e 
t us proclaim ourselves a "super censor" of school board li-
1 At the outset, the Court notes that certain school board members found 
the books in question "objectionable" and "improper" for junior and senior 
high school students. What the Court apparently finds objectionable is 
that the inquiry as to the challenged books was initially stimulated by "a 
politically conservative organization of parents concerned about educa-
tion," which had concluded that the books in question were "improper fare 
for school students." Ante, at 2. As noted by the District Court, how-
ever, and in· the Court's opinion, ante, at 5, both parties substantially 
agreed about the motivation of the School Board in removing the books: 
"[T]he board acted not on religious principles but on its conservative educa-
tional philosophy, and on its belief that the nine books removed from the 
school library and curriculum were irrelevant, vulgar, immoral, and in bad 
taste, making them educationally unsuitable for the district's junior and se-
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brary decisions. Stripped to its essentials, the issue comes 
down to two important propositions: first, whether local 
schools are to be administered by elected school boards, or by 
federal judges and teenage pupils; and second, whether the 
values of morality, good taste, and relevance to education are 
valid reasons for school board decisions concerning the con-
tents of a school library. In an attempt to place this case on 
the plane of the First Amendment, the Court creates a new 
"right" that, when shorn ·of the Court's rhetoric, allows this 
Court to im os its own views about what book"s must 6e 




I agree with the fundamental proposition that "'students 
do not shed their rights to freedom of speech or expression at 
the schoolhouse gate.'" Ante, at 11. For example, the 
Court has held that a school board cannot compel a student to 
participate in a flag salute ceremony, West Virginia Bd. of 
Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943), or prohibit a 
student from expressing certain views, so long as that ex-
pression does not disrupt the educational process. Tinker v. 
Des Moines School Dist., 393 U. S. 503 (1969). Here, how-
ever, no restraint of any kind are p ced on t tu ents. 
They are free to read e oo s m question, which are avail-
able at public libraries and bookstores; they are free to dis-
cuss them in the classroom or elsewhere. Despite this 
absense of any direct external control on the students' ability 
to express themselves, the Court today discovers a new First 
Amendment "entitlement" to have access to particular books 
in a school library. 
The Court cites Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923), 
which struck down a state law that restricted the teaching of 
modern foreign languages in public and private schools, and 
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unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause a law ban-
ning the teaching of Darwinian evolution, to establish the va-
lidity of federal court interference with the functioning of 
schools. Today the Court finds it "unnecessary to re-enter 
this difficult terrain," ante, at 7, yet in the next breath relies 
on these very cases and others to establish the previously un-
heard of "right" of access to particular books in the public 
school library. 2 The apparent underlying basis of the 
Court's holding seems to be that students have a "right" to 
receive information and ideas. Ante, at 12. The Court tells 
us this "right" follows "ineluctably" from the sender's First 
Amendment right to freedom of speech and as a "necessary 
predicate" to the recipient's meaningful exercise of his own 
rights of speech, press, and political freedom. Ante, at 
12-13. No such right, however, has previously been 
recognized. 
It is true that where there is a willing distributor of materi-
als, the government may not impose unreasonable obstacles 
to dissemination by the third party. Virginia State Board of 
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U. S. 748 (1976). This properly respects the sender's First 
Amendment rights. And where the speaker desires to ex-
press certain ideas, the government may not impose unrea-
sonable restraints. Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 
supra. It does not follow, however, that a school board 
must affirmatively aid the speaker in its communication with 
the recipient. In short the Court says today that if a writer 
has something to say, the government through its schools 
must be the courier. None of the cases cited by the Court 
establish this broad-based proposition. 
First, the Court argues that the right to receive ideas is 
derived in part from the sender's first amendment rights to 
2 Of course, it is perfectly clear that, unwise as it would be, the board 
could wholly dispense with the school library, so far as the First Amend-
ment is concerned. 
4 
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send them. Yet we have previously held that a sender's 
rights are not absolute. Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 
U. S. 728 (1970). 3 Never before today has the Court held 
that the government has an obligation to aide a speaker or 
author in reaching its audience. 
Second, the Court concludes that "the right to receive 
ideas is a necessary predicate to the recipient's meaningful 
exercise of his own rights of speech, press, and political free-
dom." Ante, at 13 (emphasis supplied). However, the 
"right to receive information and ideas," Stanley v. Georgia, 
394 U. S. 557, 564 (1969), cited ante, at 12, does not carry 
with it the concomitant right to have those ideas affirma-
tively provided at a particular place by the government. 
The Court cites James Madison to emphasize the importance 
of having an informed citizenry. Ante, at 13. We all agree 
with Madison, of course, that knowledge is necessary for ef-
fective government. Madison's view, however, does not es-
tablish a right to have particular books retained on the school 
library shelves if the school board decides that they are inap-
propriate or irrelevant to the school's mission. Indeed, if 
the need to have an informed citizenry creates a "right," why 
is the government not also required to provide ready access 
to a variety of information? This same need would support a 
constitutional "right" of the people to have public libraries as 
part of a new constitutional "right" to continuing adult educa-
tion. Can the courts command what books are then to be 
provided? 
The Court also cites Tinker, supra, to establish that the re-
cipient's right to free speech encompasses a right to have par-
ticular books retained in the school library shelf. Ante, at 
14. But the cited passage of Tinker notes only that school 
officials may not prohibit a student from expressing his or her 
3 In Rowan a unanimous Court upheld the right of a homeowner to di-
rect the local post office to stop delivery of unwanted materials that the 
householder viewed as "erotically arousing or sexually provocative." 
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view on a subject unless that expression interferes with the 
legitimate operations of the school. The government does 
not "contract the spectrum of available knowledge." 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 482 (1965), cited 
ante, at 12, by choosing not to retain certain books on the 
school library shelf; it simply chooses not to be the conduit for 
that particular information. In short, even assuming the de-
sirability of the policy expressed by the Court, there is not a 
hint in the First Amendment, or any holding of this Court, of 
a "right" to have the government provide continuing access 
to certain books. 
B 
Whatever role the government might play as a conduit of 
information, schools in particular ought not be made a slavish 
courier of the material of third parties. The Court pays 
homage to the ancient verity that in the administration of the 
public schools "'there is a legitimate and substantial commu-
nity interest in promoting respect for authority and tradi-
tional values be they social, moral or political.'" Ante, at 10. 
Schools may legitimately be used as vehicles for "inculcating 
fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a demo-
cratic political system." Amback v. No~ k, 441 U. S. 68, 
77 (1979). Presumably alf activity within a primary or sec-
ondary school involves the conveyance of information and at 
least an implied approval of the worth of that information. 
\ 
The Court fails totally to explain how "fundamental values" 
are to be incu cate oards make 
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power it asserts today. 
The Court holds that under the Constitution school boards \ 
cannot choose to retain or dispense with books if their discre-
tion is exercised in a "narrowly partisan or political manner." 
Ante, at 16. The Court concedes that permissible factors 
are whether the books are "pervasively vulgar," ante, at 17, 
or educationally unsuitable. Ibid. "Educational suitabil-
ity," however, is a standardless phrase. This conclusion will 
undoubtedly be drawn in many-if not most-instances be-
cause of the decisionmaker's content-based judgment that the 
ideas contained in the book or the idea expressed from the 
author's method of communication are inappropriate for teen-
age pupils. 
The Court also tells us that a book may be removed from a 
school library is it is "pervasively vulgar." But why must 
the vulgarity be "pervasive" to be offensive? Vulgarity 
might be concentrated in a single poem or a single chapter or 
a single page, yet still be inappropriate. Or a school board 
might reasonably conclude that even "random" vulgarity is 
inappropriate for teenage school students. A school board 
might also reasonably conclude that the school board's reten-
tion of such books gives those volumes an implicit endorse-
ment. Cf. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726 
(1978). 
Further, there is no guidance whatsoever as to what con-
stitutes "political" factors. This Court has previously recog-
nized that public education involves an area of broad public 
policy and "'go[es] to the heart of representative govern-
ment."' Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U. S. 68, 74 (1979). If 
"political" refers to a defined educational policy, then of 
course all educational decisions are political. If "political" 
refers to public issues that are controversial, then of course 
most decisions involved in the selection or removal of books 
are "political." 
What the Court views as valid reasons for removing a book 
at their core involve partisan judgments. Ultimately the 
' 
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federal courts will be the judge of whether the motivation for 
book removal was "valid" or "reasonable." Undoubtedly the 
validity of many book removals will ultimately turn on a 
judge's evaluation of the books. Discretion must be used, 
and the appropriate body to exercise that discretion is the 
local elected school board, not judges. 4 
We can all agree that as a matter of educational policy stu-
dents should have wide access to information and ideas. But 
the people elect school boards, who in turn select adminis-
trators, who select the teachers, and these are the individ-
uals best able to determine the substance of that policy. The 
Court fails to recognize the fact that local control of education 
involves democracy in a microcosm. In most public schools 
in the United States the parents have a large voice in running 
the school. 5 Through participation in the election of school 
board members the parents influence, if not control, the di-
rection of their childrens' education. A school board is not a 
giant bureaucracy far removed from accountability for its ac-
tions; it is truly "of the people and by the people." A school 
• Indeed, this case is illustrative of how essentially all decisions concern- ( ~ 
ing the retention of school library books will become the responsibility of 
federal courts. As noted above, supra, n. 1, the parties agreed that the 
school board in this case acted not on religious principles "but on its belief 
that the nine books removed from the school library and curriculum were 
irrelevant , vulgar, immoral, and in bad taste, making them educatonally 
unsuitable for the district's junior and senior high school students." 
Despite this agreement as to motivation, the case is to be remanded for a 
determination of whether removal was in violation of the standard adopted 
by the Court. The school board's error appears to be that they made their 
own determination rather than relying on experts. Ante, at 20. 
• Epperson v. Arkansas, supra, at 104. There are approximately 
15,000 school districts in the country. U. S. Bureau of the Census, Statis-
tical Abstract of the United States (102 ed. 1981) (table 495: Number of 
Local Governments, by Taxing Power and Type, and Public School Sys-
tems-States: 1971 and 1977). See also Diamond, The First Amendment 
and Public Schools: The Case Against Judicial Intervention, 59 TX L. Rev. 
477, 506-507, n. 130 (1981). 
8 
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board reflects its constitutency in a very real sense and thus 
could not long exercise unchecked discretion in its choice to 
acquire or remove books. If the parents disagree with the 
educational decisions of the school board they can take steps 
to remove the board members from office. 
Finally, even if parents and students cannot convince the 
school board that book removal is inappropriate, they have 
alternative sources to the same end. Books may be acquired 
from books stores, public libraries or other alternative 
sources unconnected with the unique environment of the local 
public schools. 6 
II 
No amount of "limiting'' language can rein in the sweeping 
"right" created by the Court today. The Court distinguishes 
library books from textbooks ecause liorary books "by their 
nature are optional rather than e mre rea mg." Ante, at 
8. Yet nowhere does the Court explain why this distinction 
requires greater scrutiny before "optional" reading materials 
may be removed. It would appear that required reading and 
textbooks have a greater likelihood of imposing a "pall of or-
thodoxy" over the educational process than does optional 
reading. Ante, at 16. In essence, the Court's holding 
transforms this "optional" reading into a "right" to have this 
"optional" reading maintained at the demand of teenagers. 
The Court proclaims that its holding is really very narrow 
because it is limited to removing books once acquired and 
does not extend to what books are to be acquired. Yet if the 
First Amendment commands that certain books cannot be re-
moved, does it not equally require that the same books be ac-
quired? Why does the coincidence of timing become the 
basis of a constitutional holding? According to the Court, 
the evil to be avoided is the "official suppression of ideas," 
6 Other prov1s10ns of the Constitution, such as the Establishment 
Clause, Epperson v. Arkansas, supra, and the Equal Protection Clause, 
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ante, at 17. It does not follow in any sense that the decision 
to remove a book is less "official suppression" than the deci-
sion not to acquire a book desired by someone.; Similarly, a 
decision to eliminate certain material from curriculum, his-
tory for example, would carry an equal-probably greater-
prospect of "official suppression." Would the decision be 
subject to our review? It strains analysis to spell out any 
kind of limiting principle on the new "right" created by the 
Court today. 
III 
Through use of bits and pieces of prior opinions unrelated 
to the issue of this case, the Court demeans our function of 
constitutional adjudication. Today the Court decides that 
the Constitution distinguishes between school libraries and 
school classrooms, between removing unwanted books and 
acquiring books. Even more extreme, the Court holds that 
the Constitution requires school boards to justify to its teen-
age pupils the decision to remove a particu ar oo om a 
schom1ibrary. I categorically reject this notion that the 
Constitution dictates that judges, rather than parents, teach-
ers and local school boards, must determine how the stand-
ards of morality and vulgarity are to be treated in the 
classroom. 
; The formless nature of the "right" found by the Court in this case is 
exemplified by this purported distinction. Presumably a school district 
could, for any reason, choose not to purchase a book for its library. Once 
it purchases that book, however, it is "locked in" to retaining it on the 
school shelf until it can justify a reason for its removal. This anomolous 
result of "book tenure" was pointed out by the District Court in this case. 
474 F . Supp. 387, 396. See also Presidents Council v. Community School 
Board, 457 F. 2d 289, 293 (CA2 1972). After the Court's decision, if a 
school board wants to be assured that it maintains control over the educa-
tion of its students, every page of every book sought to be acquired must 








Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
80-2043 Pico 
11, 1982 / 
~ 
/ 
Last night, for the first time, I read WJB's and 
the CJ's opinions in this case with some care. 
The WJB opinion is a large target, and one I would 
like to attack. The Chief's opinion, upon a second reading, 
is a good deal stronger than I had first thought. He makes 
some excellent points, but does not make the most of them. 
When we get a dissent to the printer in Seattle, I 
would appreciate your doing a three or four page, hard 
hitting dissent in Pico. We now know we will be here at 
least until June 24, and this gives us time. 
My basic view is one the CJ emphasizes: the 
effect - despite the rhetoric - of WJB's opinion is to 
transfer from school boards to judges the ultimate decision 
as to the contents of school libraries. On its face, this 
... 
-rs an absurdity. It also reflects a rejection of a basic 
concept of public school education in our country: that 
localities, through locally elected boards, should have the 
primary responsieility for the operation of public schools. 
It "'-.. l: ( ,...,.n.W"'\ ...,_h"',,,..h...,_ -1-'h~...,_ ...,_'h,..._ ru,h1 ·• ccu 1..uvu'::lu'- 1..ua1.. 1..uc J:-'Uu.1.lC education of children it 
a matter of such direct parental and community concern that 
the schools should be operated by civilian, local boards 
• 
that reflect parental as well as community and traditional 
American values. 
2. 
Today's decision would allow any junior high 
school student, by instituting a suit against the board, to 
~ 
invite a judge to overrule an education decision by the duly 
' elected body responsible for operating the schools. Books, 
of course, are essential toeducation - even though TV 
threatens to supplant them. School boards traditionally 
have had control - subject to general oversight by state 
boards of education - of the curricula and the entire 
educational program. The boards choose the teachers select 
the text books (within options allowed by the state board) 
and are responsible for the libraries, for educational 
standards, etc. 
I agree with the Chief that the cases cited by WJB 
are irrelevant except at the level of First Amendment 
generalities. In none of these cases was the judgment of 
local school boards held to be subject to a federal court's 
oversight on a strictly educational issue. It is one thing 
to outlaw prayers or to invalidate regulations with respect 
to arm bands, or even regulations with respect to hair 
style. It is something else to inject court oversight into 
the very heart of the content education of children. If 
----------------------------- -----,It. 
courts can decide which books are appropriate for libraries, 
what is to keep them from supplanting board discretion in a 




As the CJ notes, WJB's opinion - while paying lip -
service to school board discretion - says "that discretion 
may not be exercised in a narrowl partisan or political 
manner". What provision of the Constitution says this? The 
First Amendment? Certainly not before today's decision. 
And who - besides a judge is to decide what is narrowly 
partisan or political? This is a { tandardless st~ da~ that 
affords no guidance to educational authorities to school 
board counsel, or to other courts. It is simply a 
"chanecllor's foot" standard - to be exercised not about a 
matter of law or equity {in which judges are presumed 
knowledgeable) but by judges displaying their prejudices in 
an area foreign to their training and experience. 
And the Court's distinction between the addition 
of books and the removal of books is a further example of 
the sheer silliness of what purports to be a judicial 
decision by the Supreme Court of the United States. 
I hardly need say to you, David, that the 
foregoing are the sort of after dinner ruminations of a 
tired and exasperated ex-school board member. I am glad you 
are here to put this together in a lawyer-like fashion. I 
have of no new bright ideas other than those in the Chief's 
opinion. But in far fewer pages, I think we can give them a 
good deal more force. 
As I recall, few - if any - of the amici briefs 
support our views. The National Education Association - and 
in recent years even the National School Board Association -
tc: 
4. 
have felt compelled to wear their "liberalism" 
conspicuously. Few people in education can bear the thought 
of being identified as either unliberal or less than 150% in 
favor of free speech. 
But there must be literature in the Library of 
Congress that would provide some history on the origin and 
role of school boards. Ask our library to see what it can 
find. I don't want eight or ten books. Perhaps our library 
could identify one or two that address directly the role and 
responsibility of local schools boards. 
We have agreed that a good deal of WJB's language 
in Plyler can be used against him in this case. Do not 
hesitate to use it. 
The dissents become more important now that BRW 
declines to join the Court opinion. He does so on a 
procedural rather than substantive ground. Nevertheless, he 
leaves open - I suppose - the possibility in a future case 
of agreeing with us. At least he is not yet committed to 
the view that federal judges, in addition to taking over 
pupil assignemtn in school systems (e.g., Boston), operating 
state prison systems, and overseeing the care provided in 
mental institutions, four of my Brothers would now have 
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Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
80-?.043 Pico 
Last night, for the first time, I read WJB's and 
the CJ's opinions in this case with some care. 
The WJB opinion is a large target, and one I woula 
like to attack. The Chief's opinion, upon a second reading, 
is a good deal stronger than I had first thought. He makes 
some excellent points, but does not make the most of them. 
When we get a di.ssent to the pr inter in Seattle, I 
would appreciate your ooinq a three or four page, hard 
hitting dissent in Pico. We now know we will be here at 
least until June 24, and this gives us time. 
My basic view is one the CJ emphasizes: the 
effect - nespite the rhetoric - of WJR's opinion is to 
transfer froM school boards to judges the ultimate decision 
as to the contents of school libraries. On its face, this 
is an absurdity. It also reflects a rejection of a basic 
concept of public school education in our country: that 
localities, through locally elected boards, should have the 
primary responsibility for the operation of public schools. 
It has been thought that the public education of chilaren it 
a matter. of such direct parental and community concern that 
the schools should be operated by civilian, local boards 
- -
that reflect parental as well as community and traditional 
American values. 
2. 
Today's decision would allow any junior high 
school student, by instituting a suit against the board, to 
invite a judge to overrule an education decision by the duly 
elected body responsible for operating the schools. Books, 
of course, are essential toeducation - even though TV 
threatens to supplant them. School boards traditionally 
have had control - subject to general oversight by state 
boards of education - of the curricula and the entire 
educational program. The boards choose the teachers select 
the text books (within options allowed by the state board) 
and are responsible for the libraries, for educational 
standards, etc. 
I agree with the Ch5.e€ that the cases cited by WJB 
are irrelevant except at the level of First Amendment 
generalities. In none of these cases was the judgment of 
local school boards held to be subject to a federal court's 
oversight on a strictly educational issue. It is one thing 
to outlaw prayers or to invalidate regulations with respect 
to arm bands, or even regulations with respect to hair 
style. It is something else to inject court oversight into 
the very heart of the content education of children. If 
courts can decide which books are appropriate for libraries, 
what is to keep them from supplanting board discretion in a 
host of other educational decisions? 
• - - 3. 
As the CJ notPs, WJB's opinion - while paying lip 
service to school board discretion - says "that discretion 
may not be exerciRed in a narrowly partisan or political 
manner". What provision of the Constitution says thiR? The 
First Amendment? Certainly not before today's decision. 
And who - besides a iudqe is to decide what is narrowly 
partisan or political? This is a standardless stanaar1 that 
affords no guidance to educational authorities to school 
board couns~l, or to other courts. It is simply a 
"chanecllor's foot" standard - to be exercised not about a 
matter of law or equity (in which judges are oresumed 
knowledgeable) but by judges displaying their prejudices in 
an area foreign to their training and experience. 
And the Court's distinction between the addition 
of books and the removal of boo~s is a further example of 
the sheer silliness of what purports to be a judicial 
decision by the Supreme Court of the United States. 
I hardly need say to you, David, that the 
foregoing are the gort of after dinner ruminations of a 
tired and exasperated ex-school board member. I am glad vou 
are here to put this together ln a lawyer-like fashion. I 
have of no new bright ideas other than those in the Chief's 
opinion. But in far fewer. pages, I think we can give them a 
good deal more force. 
As I recall, few - if any - of the amici briefs 
support our views. The National Education Association - and 
in recent years even the National School Board Association -
- - 4. 
have felt compelled to wear their "liberalism" 
conspicuously. Few people ln education can bear the thought 
of being identified as either unliberal or less than 150% in 
favor of free speech. 
But there must be literature in the Library of 
Congress that would provide some history on the origin and 
role of school boards. Ask our library to see what it can 
find. I don't want eight or ten books. Perhaps our library 
could identify one or two that address directly the role and 
responsibility of local schools boards. 
We have agreed that a good deal of WJ'B's language 
in Plyler can be used against him in this case. Do not 
hesitate to use it. 
•rhe dissents become more important now that BRW 
declines to join the Court opinion. He does so on a 
procedural rather than substantive ground. Nevertheless, he 
leaves open - I suppose - the possibility in a future case 
of agreeing with us. At least he is not yet committed to 
the view that federal judges, in addition to taking over 
pupil assi.qnemtn in school systems (e.g., Boston), operating 
state prison systems, and overseeing the care provided in 
mental institutions, four of my Brothers would now have 
judges determine educational content. 
L.F'.P., ,Jr. 
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Draft: Board of Education v. Pico: 80-2043 
Justice Powell, dissenting. 
d.L~ ~  ~~---
~ 
The Court today rejects a basic concept of 
public school education in our country: that the States 
and locally elected school boards should have the ~ imart=-? __ _ 
responsibility he aperaeio~ of public schools. After 
.. 
today's decision any 
a; 9 ; ;t j,ii;1 < .-,!!lJJ • 7 Jc x w>k - -
junior high school stude~ \ by 
instituting a suit against a school board or teacher, may 




official~ designated by the people to operate the schools. 
,A, X_ 
outcome of this suit and suits like 
I 
the submission of educational decisionmaking to judicial 
oversight and to the corrosive process of litigation is 
- / 
tL-~~ 
destructive of the proper \ authority of the teaching 
11,, ~ ~h ~f-b( t ... .; ,,.+ ~ 
profession and local school boards. The Court speaks r,_~, . 
repeatedly of "sensitive tools" and "regular" procedures. 
Ante, at and n. 26. Yet would anyone argue that the 
courtroom is a "sensitive" or even regular forum for the 
resolution of matters of educational policy and local 
feeling? ---- ---;""----, . ~ ) 
As the dissenting opinions of the Chief Justice 
nd Justice Rehnquist so powerfully demonstrate, today's 
ecision finds no support in the precedents of this Court. 
e have never held that there is a constitutional right o~ 
access to the books in a high school 1 ibr ary. Such a 
ight extends the First Amendment beyond any prior 
pplication, and it also trivializes that Amendment. The 
~ urt's 
P--~ 
suggestion that "the First Amendment 













s t.udents may be directly and sharply implicated," ante, aj 
.--
limit 
by the removal of nine, /iy 
is simply absurd . 
--- / i 
unprincipled are the Court's e f forts to 
found right to the library or l the books / 
already on the s p elves. If a decision to r ( move books fo+ 
their unsuitability violates the First Amendment, so does 
a school's initial de,cision to purchase certain books but 
not others. And if it violates the First Amendment for a 
~ 
school to carefully supervise what a student may find on / 
the library shelves, then/ t must also violate that 
Amendment for a teacher / to offer some topics but not 
others. The Court's suqgestion that the school library is 
\ a special, constitutionally protected, entity--unlike 
anything else in "'e school--i s pa ten tly ridiculous • I 
know of no hiqh school library that simply stocks the 
shelves what ever books come to hand. School library 
\ collectio/s are carefully chosen so that when stu.dents 
exercise choice they do so within a range of materials all 
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~ 
The Court's reasoning 1 is marked 
by 
contradiction. The Court purports to acknowledge the 
traditional role of school boards and parents in deciding 
what should be taught in the schools. It 
~ 
./'/ ~J:Vijnize that the schools are "vitally important 'in the 
preparation of individuals for participation as citizens,' 
and as vehicles for 'inculcating fundamental values 
necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political 
~a.. 
system.'" Ante, at 
I 
Yet the "ffl~t~ school board J 
£(/2..U->Y7,.,u_~, 
7 takes its responsibilities 
'\ 
seriously and seeks to decide 
I.,~, J;-.;:&; -~J:>.+ZZ&v« :J , 
what the community values are that should be imparted, the 
Court finds a constitutional violation. 
certain values--and only 
e suppres 
,I vi-A--c,.\...,~ 9 ~) 
Just this term the Court held that the children 
"'\ 
of illegal aliens must be permitted to attend the public 
schools. See Doe v. Plyler, U.S. (1982). Quoting 
from earlier opinions, the Court noted that "the public 
school [is] a most vital civic institution for the 
preservation of a democratic system of government" and 
that the public schools are "the primary vehicle for 
5. 
transmitting 'the values on which our society rests.'" 
Id., at By denying to illegal aliens the 
opportunity "to absorb the values and skills upon which 
our social order rests" the law under review placed a 
lifelong disability upon these illegal alien children. 
~ rases. 
~~6-f~~~ 
Today the Court l'\ma-ke.s a mockery oJ: ~ e /.:c:.;,, 
A school board's attempt to instill in its 
I\ (.~_. "'-~ i 1;; (I st 'f"' #,. P ( D .a,,;;.,..ct 
students theAvalues on which a democratic system depends 
Ad ,< ,I-< ~~~ a;J 
,i s , ~ the" -eyes-of ~:;;;; C t L impermissible 
suppression of other ideas and values on which other 
systems of government and 
may not be removed 
other societies thrive. Books 
~~ 
extoll violence, J 
intolerance and racism, or eeeat.M..e ehe¥ degrade the 
dignity of the individual. Human history, not the least 
'1 the 
A 
twentieth century, records the power and political 
' 
~~ 
life of these very ideas. But they are not our~ values . ..R<l 
~~ ~'o/)t • a a :in fl,,":'~~~~ 
) I would not r;;iire a- ~~. board( to promote them or to ~ ~ 
teach the,JU~ d ~ 
~ l~?5nrr~~ /f 
One I\ ~ the · ~~
Co urt's only these 
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decision of the i'-6ara V r . "sensitive" 
might not have been subject to attack. But the processes 
~~~ 
of democratic decisionmaking are -r aFely 
/\ 
~◄~ 
Questions concerning the education of children w4-H. lead 
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Local school boards are uniquely democratic 
institutions. Unlike the governing bodies of cities and 
counties, s chool boards have only one responsbility: the 
education of the youth of our country during their most 
formative and impressionable years. Apart from health, no 
subject is closer to the hearts of parents than their 
children's education during those years. For these 
reasons, the governance of ele mentary and secondary 
2. 
education traditionally have been placed in the hands of a 
local board, responsible locally to the parents and 
citizens of school districts. Through parent-teacher 
associations (PTAs), assists and enables both parental 
participation and oversight of school boards and even of 
the teaching faculties. It is fair to say that no single 
agency of government of any level is closer to the people 
whom it serves than the typical school board. I therefore 
view today's decision with genuine dismay. Whatever the 
final outcome of this suit and suits like it, the 
submission of edcuational decision making to judicial 
oversight - and to the corrosive process of litigation -
is destructive of a significant part of what has been 
beneficial to our system of public school educat~on. 
Moreover, and contrary to what I am sure is the intention 
3. 
of the Court, the decision implies the degree of distrust 
of democratic institutions. Substituting the judgment of 
a court on a purely edcuational matter for that of the 
duly constitutioned school board is an unwarranted 
intrusion.* My respect for the courts of our country is 
profound. Yet, it is not easy to visualize the courtroom 
as a "sensitive", or even as a forum in which "regular" 
procedures could prevail, in the resolution of matters of 
educational policy and parental concern. 
*The Court speaks repeatedly of "sensitive tools" and the 
need for "regular" procedures in decision making . Ante, 
at ___ , and n. 26. 
4. 
As the dissenting opinions of the Chief Justice and 
Justice Rehnquist so powerfully demonstrate, today's 
decision finds no support in the precedence of this Court. 
The new constitutional right, announced by the Court, is 
described as "a right to receive ideas" in a school. Ante 
at 12. I suppose no one would deny that, where schools 
are provided by the state, their purpose is to teach and 
this involves the conveyance of ideas as well as facts. 
The difficulty is that announcing a constitutional right 
in terms that approach a meaningless generalization 
affords no guidance to courts, if they - as the Court now 
authorizes - is to oversee the inculcation of ideas. The 
Court, therefore, in addressing specifically its 
limitation on school board's discretion, announces the 
following standard: "That discretion may not be exercised 
5. 
in a narrowly partisan or political manner." Ante, at 
Again, this is a standardless standard that affords 
no more than wholly subjective guidances to school boards, 
their counsel, and to courts that now will be required to 
decide whether a particular decision was made in a 
"narrowly partisan or political manner". Even the 
"chancellor's foot" standard in ancient equity 
jurisdiction was never this fuzzy. 
Moreover, as Justice Rehnquist tellingly observes, 
how does one - (cabin?) - on a principle basis - today's 
new constitutional right? If a fourteen-year-old child 
may challenge a school board's decision to remove a book 
from the library, upon what theory is to prevent a like 
challenge to the board's decision not to purchase, that 
identical book? And at the even more critical level of 
----~ - - - -----
" 6. 
"receiving ideas", does today's decision entitle student 
oversight of which coarses may be added or removed from 
the curriculum, or even over what a particular teacher 
elects to teach or not teach in the classroom? Is not the 
"right to receive ideas" as much - or indeed even more 
implicated in these educational questions? 
.. 
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Through parent-teacher associations (PTAs), and even less 
formal arrangements that vary with schools, parents are 
informed and often may influence decisions of the board. 
Frequently, parents know the teachers and visit classes. 
It is fair to say that no single agency of government at 
any level is closer to the pupil whom it serves than the 
typical school board. 
I therefore view today's decision with more than a 
little concern. Whatever the final outcome of this suit 
or other suits like it, litigating educational policy 
decisions - made by the body duly entrusted to make them 
by law - could have a corrosive effect on the authority of 
such boards. As is evident from the generality of the 
... 
2. 
court's "standards" for judicial review, see infra at __ , 
the decision as to the educational worth of a book is a 
highly subjective one. Judges rarely are as competent as 
school authorities to make this decision; nor are judges 
responsive to the parents and people of the school 
district.* 
*The Court speaks of the need for "sensitive" decision 
making, pursuant to "regular" procedures. One wonders 
what indeed does this mean. In this case, for example, 
the board did not act preemptively or without mature 
consideration. It di not agree with the recommendations 
of a committee it appointed. I cannot assume that the 
Court would require an irrefusable delegation of authority 
to such a committee. 
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subject is closer to the hearts of parents than their 
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elects to teach or not teach in the classroom? Is not the 
"right to receive ideas" as much - or indeed even more -
implicated in these educational questions? 
To: The Chi ef Justic-8 
J ustice Brennan 
J:· .:- ·; :.0e i·.-i1i t e 
J ,::... ~ ·_.::, -3 !Lirshall 
J ustice Blackmun 
J ·. !.::;tice Rehnquist 
Justice St evens 
Jus tice O'Connor 
From: Justice Powell 
Circulated: o/z..t./'t"l-
Board of Education v. Pico: ao-201,circulated:~~ ------
Justice Powell, dissenting. 
The Court today rejects a basic concept of 
public school education in our country: 
and locally elected school boards 
that the States 
should have the 
responsibility for determining the educational policy of 
the public schools. After today's decision any junior 
high school student, by instituting a suit against a 
school board or teacher, may invite a judge to overrule an 
educational decision by the official body designated by 
the pe ople to operate the schools. 
I 
School boards are uniquely local and democratic 
institutions. Unlike the governi ng bodies of cities and 
counties, school boards have only one responsibility: the 
/ 
2. 
education of the youth of our country during their most 
formative and impressionable years. Apart from health, no 
subject is closer to the hearts of parents than their 
children's education during those years. For these 
reasons, the governance of elementary and secondary 
education traditionally has been placed in the hands of a 
local board, responsible locally to the parents anQ 
citizens of school districts. Through parent-teacher 
associations (PTAs), and even less formal arrangements 
that vary with schools, parents are informed and often may 
influence decisions of the board. Frequently, parents 
know the teachers and visit classes. It is fair to say 
that no single agency of government at any level is closer 
to the people whom it serves than the typical school 
board. 
I therefore view today's decision with genuine 
dismay. Whatever the final outcome of this suit and suits 
like it, the resolution of educational policy decisions 
through litigation, and the exposure of school board 
members to liability for such decisions, can b~- expected 
to corrode the school board's authority and effectiveness. 
As is evident from the generality of the court's 
"standard" for judicial review, the decision as to the 
3. 
educational worth of a book is a highly subjective one. 
Judges rarely are as competent as school authorities to 
make this decision; nor are judges responsive to the 
parents and people of the school district. 1 
The new constitutional right, announced by the 
Court, is described as "a right to receive ideas" in a 
Ante, at 12. As the dissenting opinions of the school. 
Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist so powerfully 
demonstrate, however, this new found right finds no 
support in the First Amendment precedents of this Court. 
And even apart from the inappropriateness of judicial 
oversight of educational policy, the new constitutional 
right is framed in terms that approach a meaningless 
generalization. It affords little guidance to courts, if 
they--as the Court now authorizes them--are to oversee the 
inculcation of ideas. The Court does announce the 
1The Court speaks of the need for "sensitive" 
decisionmaking, pursuant to "regular" procedures. See 
ante, at • One wonders what indeed does this mean. In 
this case, for example, the board did not act 
precipitously. It simply did not agree with the 
recommendations of a committee it had apointed. Would the 
Court require--as a constitutional matter--that the board 
delegate unreviewable authority to such a committee? 
4. 
following standard: A school board's "discretion may not 
be exercised in a narrowly partisan or political manner." 
Ante, at But this is a standardless standard that 
affords no more than subjective guidance to school boards, 
their counsel, and to courts that now will be required to 
decide whether a particular decision was made in a 
"narrowly partisan or political manner." Even the 
"chancellor's foot" standard in anci e nt equity 
jurisdiction was never this fuzzy. 
As Justice Rehnquist tellingly observes, how 
does one limi t--on a principled basis--today's new 
constitutional right? If a 14 year old child may 
challenge a school board's decision to remove a book from 
the library, upon what theory is a court to prevent a like 
challenge to a school board's decision not to purchase 
that identical book? And at the even more "sensitive" 
level of "receiving ideas," does today's decision entitle 
student oversight of which courses may be added or removed 
from the curriculum, or even of what a particular teacher 
elects to teach or not t e ach in the classroom? Is not the 
"right to receive ideas" as much--or indeed even more--
implicated in th e se e ducational questions? 2 
Footnote(s} 2 will appear on following pages. 
5. 
II 
The Court's reasoning is marked by 
contradiction. The Court purports to acknowledge the 
traditional role of school boards and parents in deciding 
what should be taught in the schools. It states the 
truism that the schools are "vitally important 'in the 
preparation of individuals for participation as citizens,~ 
and as vehicles for 'inculcating fundamental values 
necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political 
system.' 11 Ante, at Yet when a school board, as in 
this case, takes its responsibilities seriously and seeks 
to decide what the community values are that should be 
imparted, the Court finds a constitutional violation. 
Just this term the Court held, in an opinion I 
joined, that the children of illegal aliens must be 
2The Court suggests that the books in a school 
library derive special protection under the cons ti tut ion 
because the school library is a place in which students 
exercise unlimited choice. See ante, at . This 
suggestion is without support in law or fact. It is 
contradicted by this very case. The school board in this 
case does not view the school library as a place in which 
students pick from an unlimited range of books--sorne of 
which may be inappropriate for young people. Rather, the 
school libary is analogous to an assigned reading list 
within which students may exercise a degree of choice. 
6 . 
permitted to attend the public schools. See Doe v. 
Plyle r , U. S. (1982). Quoting from earlier 
opinions, the Court noted that "the public school [is] a 
most vital civic institution for the preservation of a 
democratic system of government" and that the public 
schools are "the primary vehicle for transmitting 'the 
values on which our society rests.'" Id. , at __ • By 
denying to illegal aliens the opportunity "to absorb the 
values and skills upon which our social order rests" the 
law under review placed a lifelong disability upon these 
illegal alien children . 
Today the Court drains much of the content from 
these apt phrases . A school board's attempt to instill in 
its students the ideas and values on which a democratic 
system depends is viewed as an impermissible suppression 
of other ideas and values on which other systems of 
government and other societies thrive. Books may not be 
removed because they extoll violence, intolerance and 
racism, or degrade the dignity of the individual. Human 
history, not the least of the twentieth century, records 
the power and political life of these very ideas. But 
they are not our ideas or values. Although I would leave 
this educational decision to the duly constituted board, I 
7 . 
certainly would not require a school board to promote 
ideals and values repugnant to a democratic society or t o 
teach such values to children. 
In different contexts and in different times , 
the destruction of written materials has been the symbol 
of despotism and intolerance. But the removal of nine 
arguably vulgar and racist books from a high school 
library by a concerned local school board does not raise 
this specter . For me, today's decision symbolizes a 
debilitating encroachment upon the institutions of a free 
people. 
Attached as an Appendix hereto is Judge 
Mansfield's summary of excerpts from the books at issue in 
this case . 
8. 
APPENDIX 
"The excerpts which led the Board to look into the 
educational suitability of the books in question are set 
out (with minor corrections after comparison with the text 
of the books themselves) below. The pagination and the 
underlinings are retained from the original report used by 
the board. In newer editions of some of the books, the 
quotes appear at different pages. 
"l) SOUL ON ICE by Eldridge Cleaver 
PAGE QUOTE 
157-158 ' ••• There are white men who will pay you to fuck 
their wives. They approach you and say, 'How would yoµ 
like to fuck a white woman?' 'What is this?' you ask. 
'On the up-and-up, ' he assures you. 'It's all right. 
She's my wife. She needs black rod, is all. She has to 
have it. It's like a medicine or drug to her. She has to 
have it. I' 11 pay you. It's all on the level, no trick 
involved. Interested?' You go with him and he drives you 
to their home. The three of you go into the bedroom. 
There is a certain type who will leave you and his wife 
alone and tell you to pile her real good. After it is all 
over, he will pay you and drive you to wherever you want 
to go. Then there are some who 1 ike to peep at you 
through a keyhole and watch you have his woman, or peep at 
you through a window, or lie under the bed and listen to 
the creaking of the bed as you work out. There is another 
type who likes to masturbate while he stands beside the 
bed and watches you pile her. There is the type who likes 
to eat his woman up after you get through piling her. And 
there is the type who only wants you to pile her for a 
little while, just long enough to thaw her out and kick 
her motor ove and arouse her to heat, then he wants you to 
jump off real quick and he will jump onto her and together 
they can make it from there by themselves.' 
"2) A HERO AIN'T NOTHING BUT A SANDWICH 
by Alice Childress 
PAGE QUOTE 
10 'Hell, no! Fuck the society.' 
64-65 'The hell with the junkie, the wino, the 
capitalist, the welfare checks, the world ... yeah, and 
fuck you too! ' 
75-76 'They can have back the spread and curtains, I'm 
too old for them fuckin bunnies anyway.' 
"3} THE FIXER by Bernard Malamud 
PAGE QUOTE 
9. 
52 'What do you think goes on in the wagon at night: Are 
the drivers on their knees fucking their mothers?' 
90 'Fuck yourself, said the blinker, etc.' 
92 'Who else would do anything like that but a 
motherfucking Zhid?' 
146 'No more noise out of you or I'll shoot your Jew cock 
Off• I 
189 'Also there's a lot of fucking in the Old Testament, 
so how is that religious?' 
192 'You better go fuck yourself, Bok, said Kogin, I'm 
onto your Jew tricks.' 
215 'Ding-dong giddyap. A Jew's cock's in the devils's 
hock.' 
216 'You cocksucker Zhid, I ought make you lick it up off 
the floor. 
"4} GO ASK ALICE by Anonymous 
PAGE QUOTE 
31 'I wonder if sex without acid could be so exciting, so 
wonderful, so indescribable. I always thought it just 
took a minute, or that it would be like dogs mating.' 
47 'Chris and I walked into Richie and Ted's apartment to 
find the bastards stoned and making love to each other .•• 
low class queer.' 
81 'shitty, goddamned, pissing, ass, goddamned be Jesus, 
screwing life's, ass, shit. Doris was ten and had humped 
with who knows how many men in between ••. her current 
stepfather started having sex with her but good 
sonofabitch balling her' 
83 'but now when I face a girl its like facing a boy. I 
get all excited and turned on. I want to screw with the 
girl ..• ' 
84 'I'd rather screw with a guy ... sometimes I want one 
of the girls to kiss me. I want her to touch me, to have 
her sleep under me.' 
84 'Another day, another blow job .•• If I 
Ass a blow he'll cut off my supply ... and 
yelling, 'Mama, Daddy can't come now. 
Carla.' 
don't give ~ 
LittieJacon is 
He's hum~ 
85 'Shit, goddamn, goddamn prick, son-of-a-bitch, ass, 
pissed, bastard, goddamn, bullshit 
94 'I hope you have a nice orgasim with your dog 
tonight.' 
10. 
110 'You fucking Miss Polly pure 
117 'Then he said that all I needed was a good fuck.' 
146 'It might be great because I'm practically a virgin 
in the sense that I've never had sex except when I've been 
stoned .•.. ' 
"5) SLAUGHTERHOUSE FIVE by Kurt Vonnegut, Jr. 
PAGE QUOTE 
29 ' 'Get out of the road, you dumb motherfucker.' The 
last word was still a novelty in the speech of white 
people in 1944. It was fresh and astonising to Billy, who 
had never fucked anybody ..• ' 
32 'You stake a guy out on an anthill in the desert-see? 
He's facing upward, and you put honey all over his balls 
and pecker, and you cut off his eyelids so he has to stare 
at the sun till he dies.' 
34 'He had a prophylactic kit containing two tough 
condoms 'For the prevention of disease only!' ... He had a 
dirty picture of a woman attempting sexual intercourse 
with a shetland pony.' 
95 & 95 'But the Gospels actually taught this: Before 
you kill somebody, make absolutely sure he isn't well 
connected • . . The flaw in the Christ stories, said the 
visitor from outer space, was that Christ who didn't look 
like much, was actually the son of the Most Powerful Being 
in the Universe. Readers understood that, so, when they 
came to the crucifix ion, they naturally thought • . . Oh 
boy-they sure picked the wrong guy to lynch this time! 
And that thought had a brother: There are right people to 
lynch. People not well connected . . . . The visitor from 
outer space made a gift to Earth of a new Gospel. In it, 
Jesus really WAS a nobody, and a pain in the neck to a lot 
of people with better connections then he had ..•. So the 
people amused themselves one day by nailing him to a cross 
and planting the cross in the ground. There couldn't 
possibly be any repercussions, the lynchers thought 
since the new Gospel hammered home again and again what a 
nobody Jesus was. And then just before the nobody dies 
. • • . The voice of God came crashing down. He ' told the 
people that he was adopting the bum as his son • • • God 
said this: From this moment on, He will punish horribly 
anybody who torments a bum who has no connections.' 
99 'They told him that there could be no Earthling babies 
without male homsexuals. There could be babies without 
female homosexuals.' 
11. 
120 'Why don't you go fuck yourself? Don't think I 
haven't tried • . he was going to have revenge, and that 
revenge was sweet ••. It's the sweetest thing there is, 
said Lazaro. People fuck with me, he said, and Jesus 
Christ are they ever fucking sorry.' 
122 'And he'll pull out a gun and shoot his pecker off. 
The stranger' 11 let him think a couple of seconds about 
who Paul Lazzaro is and what life's gonna be like without 
a pecker. Then he'll shoot him once in the guts and walk 
away. • • . He died on account of this silly cocksucker 
here. So I promised him I'd have this silly cocksucker 
shot after the war.' 
134 'In my prison cell I sit ... With my britches full of 
shit, And my balls are bouncing gently on the floor. And 
I see the bloody snag when she bit me in the bag ... Oh, 
I'll never fuck a Polack any more.' 
173 'And the peckers of the young men would still be 
semierect, and their muscles would · be bulging like 
cannonballs.' 
175 'They didn't have hard-ons •.. Everybody else did.' 
177 'The magazine, which was published for lonesome men 
to jerk off to.' 
178 'and one critic said ..•• 'To describe blow-jobs 
artistically.'' 
"6} THE BEST SHORT STORIES BY NEGRO WRITERS Ed. by 
Langston Hughes 
PAGE QUOTE 
176 'like bat's shit and camel piss,' 
228 'that no-count bitch of a daughter of yours is up 
there up North making a whore of herself.' 
237 'they made her get out and stand in front of the 
headlights of the car and pull down her pants and raise 
her dress--they said that was the only way they could be 
sure. And you can imagine what they said and what they 
did--.' 
303 'You need some pussy. Come on, let's go up to the 
whore house on the hill.' 
'Oh, these bastards, these bastards, this God damned Army 
and the bastards in it. The sons of bitches!' 
436 'he produced a brown rag doll, looked at her again, 
then grabbed the doll by its legs and tore it part way up 
the middle. Then he jammed his finger into the rip between 
the doll's legs. The other men laughed ...• ' 
12. 
444 'The pimps, hustlers, lesbians, and others trying to 
misuse me.' 
462 'But she had straight firm legs and her breasts were 
small and upright. No doubt if she'd had children her 
breasts would be hanging like little empty purses.' 
464 'She first became aware of the warm tense nipples on 
her breasts. Her hands went up gently to clam them.' 'In 
profile, his penis hung like a stout tassle. She could 
even tell that he was circumcised.' 
406 'Cadillac Bill was busy following Luheaster around, 
rubbing her stomach and saying, 'Magic Stomach, Magic 
Stomach, bring me a little baby cadillac.'' 'One of the 
girls went upstairs with Red Top and stayed for about 
forty five minutes.' 
"7) BLACK BOY by Richard Wright 
PAGE QUOTE 
70-71 'We black children-seven or eight or nine years of 
age-used to run to the Jew's store and shout: 
.•. Bloddy Christ Killers 
Never trust a Jew 
Bloody Christ Killers 
What won't a Jew do 
Red, white and blue 
Your pa was a Jew 
Your ma a dirty dago 
What the hell is you?' 
265 'Crush that nigger's nuts, nigger!' 'Hit that 
nigger!' 'Aw, fight, you goddam niggers!' 'Sock 'im, in 
his f-k-g-piece!' 'Make 'im bleed!' 
11 8) LAUGHING BOY by Oliver LaFarge 
PAGE QUOTE 
38 'I'll tell you, she is all bad; for two bits she will 
do the worst thing.' 
258-9 'I was frightened when he wanted me to lie with 
him, but he made me feel all right. He knew all about how 
to make women forget themselves, that man.' 
"9) THE NAKED APE by Desmond Morris 
PAGE QUOTE 
7 3-7 4 "Also, the frontal approach prov ides the maximum 
possibility for stimulation of the female's clitoris 
during the pelvic thrusting of the male, It is true that 
13. 
it will be passively, stimulated by the pulling effect of 
the male's thrusts, regardless of his body position in 
relation to the female, but in a face-to-face mating there 
will in addition be the direct rhythmic pressure of the 
male's pubic region on to the clitoral area, and this will 
considerably heighten the stimulation .•• ' 'So it seems 
plausible to consider that face-to-face copulation is 
basic to our species. There are, of course, a number of 
variations that do not eliminate the frontal element: 
male above, female above, side by side , squatting, 
standing, and so on, but the most efficient and commonly 
used one is with both partners horizontal, the male above 
the fem ale .••• ' 
80 ' ..• This broadening of the penis results in the 
female's external genitals being subjected to much more 
pulling and pushing during the performance of pelvic 
thrusts. With each inward thrust of the penis, the 
clitoral region is pulled downwards and then with each 
withdrawal, it moves up again. Add to this the rhythmic 
pressure being exerted on the clitoris region by the pubic 
region of the frontally copulating male, and you have a 
repeated massaging of the clitoris that--were she a male--
would virtually be masturbatory.' 
94-99 '... If either males or females cannot for some 
reason obtain sexual access to their opposite numbers, 
they will find sexual outlets in other ways. They may use 
other members of their own sex, or they may even use 
members of other species, or they may masturbate •.•. ' 
10) READER FOR WRITERS ..• " 
638 F. 2d 404, 419-422 n. 1 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). 
,, 
June 22, ]982 
80-2043 Board of Education v. Pico 
Dear Bill: 
Here is my dissent 1n ~ico, that twill circulate 
within a matter of minutes. 
You will not be surprised, in view of my 11 vears 
on th~ Richmond School Board and eight years on the Virginia 
State Board of Education, that I am not enthusiastic about 
your opinion! 
If there should be any delay because of the 
r1.ppendix, I believe it could be printed after the opi.nion is 
announced. 






June 22, 1982 
80-2043 Board of Education v. Pico 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me in your dissent. 
Justice Rehnquist 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
- -
June 22, 1982 
80-2043 Board of Education v. Pico 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me in your dissent. 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CH IEF .JUSTICE 
, -
~u.p:rtntt {!j:ourl of tqt ~h ~taus 
~asJrngfan. J. (!j:. 2llffe~_;l 
June 22, 1982 




I had completely forgotten the~ mootness issue 
until you called about expediting announcement. I should have 
had this in mind since most high schools have their graduation 
well before mid-June. 
However, with an extra effort Donovan and Goldstraw were 
able to manage as I reported in my earlier memo today. 
This raises another question, at least for me, but since I 
am in the minority the majority position controls. 
Is it not a bit odd that the Court strains so mightily to 
get down a plurality opinion on an important constitutional 
question 24-40 hours before it is mooted? 




.1 ~ C-j rt--- ,u.J -k., ~ 
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THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
- -~u.prtnU <qettrl of t~t ~uh ~tales 
~ ru;-fringtc14 ~. cq. 2!lffe .ll-2 
June 22, 1982 
Re: No . 80- 2043 - Board of Education, Island Trees 
Union Free School District, No. 26, 
et al. v. Steven A. Pico 
Dear Bill: 
I had completely forgotten the possible mootness issue 
until you called about expediting announcement. I should have 
had this in mind since most high schools have their graduation 
well before mid - June. 
However, with an extra effort Donovan and Goldstraw were 
able to manage as I reported in my earlier memo today. 
This raises another question, at least for me, but since I 
am in the minority the majority position controls. 
Is it not a bit odd that the Court strains so mightily to 
get down a plurality opinion on an important constitutional 
question 24-40 hours before it is mooted? 




Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
- -j;n.prtttU ~curl of t4t 'Jllnitth' j)hdts 
~aslp:nghtn. ~. ~. 2!Jgi)!.~ 
June 22, 1982 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
RE: No. 80-2043, Bd of Education v. Pico 
At footnote 1 I will be adding the following paragraph: 
In oral argument counsel advised the Court that of 
the original plaintiffs, "[o]ne of them is still in 
school ... until this June, and will assumedly graduate 
in June. There is a potential question of mootness." 
The sole surviving plaintiff has therefore either 
recently been graduated from high school or is within 
days or even hours of graduation. Yet the plurality 
strains mightily to reach out to express its views on a 
very important constitutional issue. In this case 
there is no problem of the issue "evading review." 
See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 
U.S. 555 (1980). Fortunately, there is no binding 
holding of the Court on this critical issue. But in 
its haste the plurality forgets the admonition of 
Justice Frankfurter that "the most fundamental 
principle of constitutional adjudication is not to face 
constitutional questions but to avoid them, if at all 
possible." United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 320 
( 19 46) (Fr ankf ur ter, J. , concurring.) The plurality 
also ignores Justice Stone's warning that "the only 
check upon our own exercise of power is our own sense 
of self-restraint." United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 
1, 79 (1936) (Stone, J., dissenting.) Far from 
exercising self-restraint, the plurality races to 
reach, although happily cannot resolve in any binding 
way, the critical constitutional issues initially 
raised. 






JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
- -~u:µt tmt <!f curl cf flrt ~b ~tattg 
~UJrittgtlllt. ~. <lf. 20,t,rJ.l.,'.3 
June 22, 1982. 
No. 80-2043 -- Board of Education v . Pico - -
Possible Mootness Issue . 
Dear Chief, 
I have rece i ved the new footnote that you intend to 
add to your dissenting opinion . I am constrained to 
point out several facts . 
In the first place, there is nothing whatever in the 
record as to the date on which the remaining respondent, 
Sochinski, will be graduated . I have always thought that 
we decided cases on the basis of the record before us, 
not on the basis of vague references at oral argument. 
Moreover, even assuming that this extra-record informa-
tion is accurate, any number of unexpected events -- such 
as illness, or academic failure -- might prevent 
Sochinski's graduation at the end of the term. Cf. my 
separate opinion in DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 
348 (1974). And even if Sochinski does graduate as 
scheduled, he may retain his library privileges for the 
summer after graduation, as is not uncommon. The plain 
fact of the matter is that we just do not know whether 
the case will be moot "hours" from Friday, as you suggest 
in line 7 of your new footnote -- and it would simply be 
an abdication of our constitutional responsibility to sit 
around waiting for the case to become moot. 
As for the fact that this case presents "a very im-
portant constitutional issue," lines 8-9 of your new 
footnote, we all crossed that bridge a long time ago, 
when certiorari was granted on the votes of Lewis, Bill 
Rehnquist, Sandra, and you. Your vote meant that you 
were willing to take this question and decide it. Thus 
it seems to me strange that you should now take the view 
that the issue has somehow become too important to de-
cide: especially strange since you are now in dissent. 
- -2- -
Finally, as for the potential question of mootness 
in this case, we have all known about that question since 
at least March 2, the date of oral argument. See Tr. of 
Oral Arg. 1-2. And it has been perfectly plain from the 
outset that this case was one of those important ones 
that normally come down in the last week of our Term --
that is, in June. In short, we have all possessed all of 
the information pertinent to this case for many months, 
and we resolved to decide the case based on that informa-
tion. In my view, nothing has changed since then except 
that time has passed -- and that you, who voted to grant, 
are now in dissent. 
Sincerely, 
I 
/ - ~ / ( 
.,.-· ' ( ( / . 
W. J.B., Jr. 
The Chief Justice. 
Copies to the Conference. 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
- -.§n.prmtt Clfottrl of tqt ~h .:§taftg 
:Nfagfrng-htn. 10- (4. 2!lffe.l!,$ 
June 23, 1982 
Re: No. 80-2043 - Board of Education, Island 
Dear Bill: 
Trees Union Free School District, 
No. 26 v. Pico 
I am not sure I "track" your memo on June 23. 
✓ 
On a Constitutional issue, I had thought, we search for 
reasons to avoid decision. The statements made by counsel at the 
opening of his argument are hardly "vague references", i.e. 
"There is a potential question of mootness." (Transcript of Oral 
Argument 4-5). 
What brought the possible mootness back into my own 
consciousness was your concern that we get the case out before 
Monday in case the respondent was graduated on Saturday or 
Sunday. Mootness, like jurisdiction generally, "never goes away" 
as someone once said; the sole exception is if the issue is 
"capable of repetition yet evading review." This case is quite 
unlike today's Globe mootness issue where we all agree that case 
is not moot. 
I did not expect to persuade you to my view. I simply 
want to assert my own. 
The significance of your point that four voted for cert is 
not clear to me. You can't be saying this was an irrevocable 
vote on the existence of a live controversy. 
As to your other points, I remain in doubt as to what you 
mean. Are you suggesting that I am inhibited in some way from 
expressing my view that the ancient doctrine of avoiding 
Constitutional decisions whenever possible still retains a "mite" 
of validity? -
I repeat, I did not assume anyone would be persuaded, but 
we now have all points of view stated. 
Wf-{3 
Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
-
C HAMBE R S o r 
-
~ltpUllU (!}o-ttrl llf ilrt ~tUlt ~htlt.9' 
:.a:slfhtgfcn. ~ . (!I. 2ngt'1,~ 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
June 23, 1982 
Re: 80-2043 - Ba. of Eauc., Islana 
Trees Union Free School Dist. 
No. 26 v. Pico 
Dear Chief: 
Every time three members of the Court aissent from 
the aenial of certiorari, the conference vote is fully 
aisclosea. Moreover, in an arguea case, I see no 
reason for not making public every formal action that 
affected the disposition of the case. 
In this case, I do not regard the conference vote 
as irrelevant since your dissent implies that the five 
Justices who actually voted to deny cert are the ones 
who eagerly have reached out to decide a constitutional 
question unnecessarily, when the exact opposite is 
true. 
If, as you state in your note, you are agreeable 
to having the case come down on Friday, I must confess 
to some puzzlement as to why you criticize the Court 
for taking action of which you approve. In all events, 
I will of course withdraw my concurrence if you 




The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBE RS Of" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
- -
~u.prmtt {!Jonrl cf tqi- 1!initdt ~taftg 
~asfpng-ron. ~- QJ. 20ffeJ!.,;l 
June 23, 1982 
Re: No. 80-2043 - Board of Education, Island 
Dear John: 
Trees Union Free School District 
No. 26 v. Pico 
/ 
Of course you are wholly free to articulate any view you 
wish, as I have mine in this case. Bill's memo of June 22 
however, seemed to intimate a challenge to my even referring to 
the imminent mootness. My reference to it was prompted by his 
desire to expedite announcement and I agree on that. There is no 
basis whatever to suggest that there is an effort to delay 
announcement to effect mootness. However, what you say on that 
score is your affair. 
On the matter of disclosing the Conference voting on cert 
however,that is another matter. That is strictly confidential, 
internal information and it is wholly irrelevant to any issue. 
Plainly the case will not be moot if it comes down Friday as now 
scheduled. If there is any further delay, it may become moot and 




Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
- -~u.punu (!Jonri of flrt ~ h ~taftg 
1llhurfrmgron. ~. <.q:. 2!lgi~~ 
June 23, 1982 
Re: No. 80-2043 - Board of Education, Island 
Dear John: 
Trees School District, No. 26 v. 
Pico 
I am still puzzled why the point is made now concerning 
the date of announcement. That was agreed on at least by Monday 
June 21 after Bill Brennan alerted us on the mootness problem. 
We have all agreed on the Friday release. No one suggested delay 
that might moot the case. 
I do not agree we should depart from the fixed practice of 
non-disclosure of Conference votes, particularly as to argued 
cases. Three dissents from denial do occasionally reveal some 
data, but out of thousands of cases that represents only a 
handful in one year. No data has ever been disclosed on argued 
cases. 
It is not correct that my dissent "implies that the five 
Justices who actually voted to deny cert are the ones who eagerly 
have reached out to decide a constitutional question 
unnecessarily •... " I think you confused my June 23 memo with my 
footnote. Moreover only the public disclosure of the cert vote 
puts flesh on your point and there should be no public disclosure 
of that vote. 
I cannot conceive that anyone would seriously question the 
propriety of our raising the "Frankfurter doctrine" that 
Constitutional issues should be avoided "if at all oossible." 
Here a plurality tries to resolve a Constitutional issue on a 
case not yet tried and possibly on the verge of becoming moot. 
The dissenters acknowledge the right of the plurality to have the 
case come down Friday by agreeing on that so as to avoid the risk 
of mootness. 
If you withdraw your comment I will undertake to 
accommodate by modifying my note to read as attached. 
Regards, 
"T ... -.a...:-- C!,1..-··---




.:§uµunu <!fo-url o-f t!rt ~lt .:§fatt.a' 
'JlfagJrittghm. ~. <!f. 2lJffeJ!.~ 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
June 23, 1982 
Re: 80-2043 - Bd. of Educ., Island 
Trees Union Free School Dist. 
No. 26 v. Pico 
Dear Chief: 
Every time three members of the Court dissent from 
the denial of certiorari, the conference vote is fully 
disclosed. Moreover, in an argued case, I see no 
reason for not making public every formal action that 
affected the disposition of the case. 
In this case, I do not regard the conference vote 
as irrelevant since your dissent implies that the five 
Justices who actually voted to deny cert are the ones 
who eagerly have reached out to decide a constitutional 
question unnecessarily, when the exact opposite is 
true. 
If, as you state in your note, you are agreeable 
to having the case come down on Friday, I must confess 
to some puzzlement as to why you criticize the Court 
for taking action of which you approve. In all events, 
I will of course withdraw my concurrence if you 
withdraw what I regard as a most unfair and misleading 
footnote. 
SiJZ' 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
- -
June 23, 1982 
80-2043 Pico 
Dear Chief: 
This refers to the postscript in your memorandum 
of this date. 
As I have indicated to you I am willing to let the 
case come down. I think it is fairly arguable that this 
issue is one that may "evade review". In more than one 
Circuit (e.g., CAS and CA9), civil cases often take more 
than four years to reach us. 
I appreciate, of course, that for the reasons you 
state in your proposed footnote 1, the question of mootness 
is not frivolous. But at this late date, and absent a more 
specific documentation in the record, I do not think we are 
compelled to view it is as moot. 
At the policy level, I also th ink i .. t best not to 
leave the Second Circuit opinion as "the law". My guess is 
that fewer children and their lawyers will bring suits of 
this kind in light of the sharp division of this Court, the 
absence of a Court opinion, and what I believe to be the 
strength of the dissenting opinions. _ 
For these reasons, include me "out" on footnote 1, 
but I will remain a "join" in the rest of your excellent 
opinion. 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 




THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
- -.;§u.prtntt Clfcurl cf tlft ~h .;§tat.es 
'J!tf as Iying-Ltn. 10. C!f. 20ffe ~ .;l 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
RE: No. 80-2043, Bd of Education v. Pico 
June 23, 1982 
My footnote 1 will be stylistically changed to read as 
follows: 
In oral argument counsel advised the Court that of 
the original plaintiffs, only "[o]ne of them is still 
in school ... until this June, and will assumedly 
graduate in June. There is a potential question of 
mootness." Transcript of Oral Argument 4-5 (Emphasis 
added.) The sole surviving plaintiff has therefore 
either recently been graduated from high school or is 
within days or even hours of graduation. Yet the 
plurality strains mightily to reach out to express its 
views on a very important constitutional issue. Here 
there is no problem of the issue "evading review." 
See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Vjrqinia, 448 
U.S. 555 (1980). Fortunately, there is no binding 
holding of the Court on the critical constitutional 
issue presented. 
In its haste the plurality forgets the admonition of 
Justice Frankfurter that "the most fundamental 
principle of constitutional adjudication is not to face 
constitutional questions but to avoid them, if at all 
possible." United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 320 
(1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring.) The plurality 
also ignores Justice Stone's warning that "the only 
check upon our own exercise of power is our own sense 
of self-restraint." United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 
1, 79 (1936) (Stone, J., dissenting.) Far from 
exercising the Frankfurter-Stone self-restraint, the 
plurality races to reach, although happily cannot 
resolve, the critical constitutional issues initially 
raised. 
Copies to the Conference 
~g 
P.S. (Justices Powell, Rehnquist and O'Connor only.) Absent 
dissent, I assume you will join . 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
- -~uprrntt (!Jllltrl of tqt ~h j\tattg 
'J!fas-fringron. gl. <q. 20ffe'!~ 
June 23, 1982 
Re: No. 80-2043 - Board of Education, Island 
Dear Bill: 
Trees Union Free School District, 
No. 26 v. Pico --
I am not sure I "track" your memo on June 23. 
On a Constitutional issue, I had thought, we search for 
reasons to avoid decision. The statements made by counsel at the 
opening of his argument are hardly "vague references", i.e. 
"There is a potential question of mootness." (Transcript of Oral 
Argument 4-5). 
What brought the possible mootness back into my own 
consciousness was your concern that we get the case out before 
Monday in case the respondent was graduated on Saturday or 
Sunday. Mootness, like jurisdiction generally, "never goes away" 
as someone once said; the sole exception is if the issue is 
"capable of repetition yet evading review." This case is quite 
unlike today's Globe mootness issue where we all agree that case 
is not moot. 
I did not expect to persuade you to my view. I simply 
want to assert my own. 
The significance of your point that four voted for cert is 
not clear to me. You can't be saying this was an irrevocable 
vote on the existence of a live controversy. 
As to your other points, I remain in doubt as to what you 
mean. Are you suggesting that I am inhibited in some way from 
expressing my view that the ancient doctrine of avoiding 
Constitutional decisions whenever possible still retains a "mite" 
of validity? -
I repeat, I did not assume anyone would be persuaded, but 
we now have all points of view stated. 
lrid 
Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBE RS OF 
THE CH I EF JUSTICE 
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~agfringhtn. ~. c.q. 21lffe~~ 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
RE: No. 80-2043, Bd of Education v. Pico 
June 23, 1982 
My footnote 1 will be stylistically changed to read as 
follows: 
In oral argument counsel advised the Court that of 
the original plaintiffs, only "[o]ne of them is still 
in school ••. until this June, and will assumedly 
graduate in June. There is a potential question of 
mootness." Transcript of Oral Argument 4-5 (Emphasis 
added.) The sole surviving plaintiff has therefore 
either recently been graduated from high school or is 
within days or even hours of graduation. Yet the 
plurality strains mightily to reach out to express its 
views on a very important constitutional issue. Here 
there is no problem of the issue "evading review." 
See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virqinia, 448 
U.S. 555 (1980). Fortunately, there is no binding 
holding of the Court on the critical constitutional 
issue presented. 
In its haste the plurality forgets the admonition of 
Justice Frankfurter that "the most fundamental 
principle of constitutional adjudication is not to face 
constitutional questions but to avoid them, if at all 
possible." United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 320 
(1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring.) The plurality 
also ignores Justice Stone's warning that "the only 
check upon our own exercise of power is our own sense 
of self-restraint." United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 
1, 79 (1936) (Stone, J., dissenting.) Far from 
exercising the Frankfurter-Stone self-restraint, the 
plurality races to reach, although happily cannot 
resolve, the critical constitutional issues initially 
raised. 
Copies to the Conference 
~g 
P.S. (Justices Powell, Rehnquist and O'Connor only.) Absent 
dissent, I assume you will join. --..... ~ ! 
- ~tetttt C!Iomt llf tftr'Jllnihlt ~tau, 
~asfyingfon. tB. cq. 2llffeJ.l-,;l 
C HAMBE RS OF 
JUSTICE LEWIS F POWELL , JR. 
June 23, 1982 
80-2043 Pico 
Dear Chief: 
This refers to the postscript in your memorandum 
of this date. 
As I have indicated to you I am willing to let the 
case come down. I think it is fairly arguable that this 
issue is one that may "evade review". In more than one 
Circuit (e.g., CA5 and CA9), civil cases often take more 
than four years to reach us. 
I appreciate, of course, that for the reasons you 
state in your proposed footnote 1, the question of mootness 
is not frivolous. But at this late date, and absent a more 
specific documentation in the record, I do not think we are 
compelled to view it is as moot. 
At the policy level, I also think it best not to 
leave the Second Circuit opinion as "the law". My guess is 
that fewer children and their lawyers will bring suits of 
this kind in light of the sharp division of this Court, the 
absence of a Court opinion, and what I believe to be the 
strength of the dissenting opinions. 
For these reasons, include me "out" on footnote 
but I will remain a "join" in the rest of your excellent 
opinion. 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
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✓ 
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CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
Re: No. 80-2043 -
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
June 24, 1982 
Education, Island Trees 
e School District, N~-26 
The "potential mootness" footnote has been made 
footnote 2 and placed at the end of the introductory 
paragraph. The sentence "Here there is no problem of the 
issue 'evading review.' See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, 
Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) ." is omitted. 
Regards, 
UA-rJ 
80-2043 - Board of Education, Island Trees 
School District No. 26 v. Pico 
JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring. 
Tor The Chief Justice 
Justice Brennan 









J ustice 0 1 Conaor 
From: J ust ice Stevens 
Ci rculated : t / .:::__:, /P .. ~ 
When the Court acted on the petition for certiorari in this 
case, it was apparent that two reasons, both unrelated to the 
merits, would have justified a denial of the petition. First, 
the case was in an interlocutory posture, since it had not yet 
been tried; second, there was a possibility that it might become 
moot before final decision. One of those reasons prompted me to 
/ vote to deny certiorari. 1 I find it ironic that the four members 
~ of : he Court who voted to grant~ iorari now elect to criticize 
~ the Court for discharging its responsibilities after taking 
jurisdiction of the case. 
1one of "the most fundamental principles of constitutional 
adjudication is not to face constitutional questions but to avoid 
them, if at all possible." United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 
303, 320 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). One method of 
avoiding such questions that is not considered acceptable is 
simply to delay decision until a case becomes moot. 
1 
~ 








From: Justice Stevens 
1st PRINTED DRAFT 
Circulated: _ 
Recirculated: 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 80-2043 
BOARD OF EDUCATION, ISLAND TREES UNION 
FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 26, ET AL., PETI-
TIONERS, u. STEVEN A. PICO, BY ms 
NEXT FRIEND, FRANCES PICO ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UN ITED STATES COU RT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
[June-, 19821 
J USTICE STEVENS, concurring. 
J 
When the Court acted on the petition for certiorari in t his 
case, it was apparent that two reasons, both unrelated to the 
merits, would have justified a denial of the petition. First, 
the case was in an interlocutory posture, since it had not yet 
been tried; second, there was a possibility that it might be-
come moot before final decision. One of those reasons 
prompted me to vote to deny certiorari. * I find it ironic 
that the fou r members of the Cour t who voted to grant cer-
tiorari now elect to criticize the Court for discharging its 
1·esponsibi li t ies after taking jurisdidion of the case. Po13t, at 
1, n. 1 (BURGER, C.J., dissenting). 
lut4; 
* "[T)he most fundamental principle of constitutional adjud ication is not 
to face constitutional questions but to avoid them, if at all possible." 
United Slates v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 320 (Frankfurter, J ., concurring) . 
One method of avoiding such questions that is not considered acceptable is 
simply to delay decision until a case becomes moot. 
~ - ~1, Iv ~;..,,~~To: The Chief Justice 
Justice Brennan 
J ~ ~ - Justice White 
""- - Justice Marshall 
~ ~ I.A>-'Vftv, ~ ~ Justice Blackmun 
Justice Rehnquist 
.J ~ ~~ . Justice Stevens 
, Justice O'Connor 
t_r/l. 
From: Justice Powell 
Circulated: 3JN 2 3 1982 




SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 80-2043 
BOARD OF EDUCATION, ISLAND TREES UNION 
FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 26 ET AL., PETI-
TIONERS, v. STEVEN A. PICO, BY HIS 
NEXT FRIEND, FRANCES PICO ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
[June-, 1982) 
JUSTICE POWELL, dissentin ~ 
The plurality oday rejects a basic concept of public school 
education in our country: that the States and locally elected 
school boards should have the responsibility for determining 
the educational policy of the public schools. After today's 
decision any junior high school student, by instituting a suit 
against a school board or teacher, may invite a judge to over-
rule an educational decision by the official body designated by 
the people to operate the schools. 
I 
School boards are uniquely local and democratic institu-
tions. Unlike the governing bodies of cities and counties, 
school boards have only one responsibility: the education of 
the youth of our country during their most formative and im-
pressionable years. Apart from health, no subject is closer 
to the hearts of parents than their children's education during 
those years. For these reasons, the governance of elemen-
tary and secondary education traditionally has been placed in 
the hands of a local board, responsible locally to the parents 
and citizens of school districts. Through parent-teacher as-
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vary with schools, parents are informed and often may influ-
ence decisions of the board. Frequently, parents know the 
teachers and visit classes. It is fair to say that no single 
agency of government at any level is closer to the people 
whom it serves than the typical school board . 
I therefore view today's decision with genuine dismay. 
Whatever the final outcome of this suit and suits like it, the 
resolution of educational policy decisions through litigation, 
and the exposure of school board members to liability for 
such decisions, can be expected to corrode the school board's 
authority and effectiveness. As is evident from the general-
ity of the plurality's "standard" for judicial review, the deci-
sion as to the educational worth of a book is a highly subjec-
tive one. Judges rarely are as competent as school 
authorities to make this decision; nor are judges responsive 
to the parents and people of the school district. 1 
The new constitutional right, announced by the plurality, is 
described as "a right to receive ideas" in a school. Ante, at 
12. As the dissenting opinions of THE CHIEF JUSTICE and 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST so powerfully demonstrate, however, 
this new found right finds no support in the First Amend-
ment precedents of this f)h:i~ . Arid even apart from the 
inappropriateness of judicial oversight of educational policy, 
the new constitutional right is framed in terms that approach 
a meaningless generalization. It affords little guidance to 
courts, if they-as the plurality now authorizes them-are to 
oversee the inculcation of ideas. The plurality does an-
nounce the following standard: A school board's "discretion 
may not be exercised in a narrowly partisan or political man-
' The plurality speaks of the need for "sensitive" decisiorunaking, pursu-
ant to ''regular" procedures. See ante, at --. One wonders what in-
deed does this mean. In this case, for example, the board did not act pre-
cipitously. It simply did not agree with the recommendations of a 
committee it had apointed. Would the plurality require-as a constitu-
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ner." Ante, at--. But this is a standardless standard 
that affords no more than subjective guidance to school 
boards, their counsel, and to courts that now will be required 
to decide whether a particular decision was made in a "nar-
rowly partisan or political manner." Even the "chancellor's 
foot" standard in ancient equity jurisdiction was never this 
fuzzy. 
As JUSTICE REHNQUIST tellingly observes, how does one 
limit-on a principled basis-today's new constitutional 
right? If a 14 year old child may challenge a school board's 
decision to remove a book from the library, upon what theory 
is a court to prevent a like challenge to a school board's deci-
sion not to purchase that identical book? And at the even 
more "sensitive" level of "receiving ideas," does today's deci-
sion entitle student oversight of which courses may be added 
or removed from the curriculum, or even of what a particular 
teacher elects to teach or not teach in the classroom? Is not 
the "right to receive ideas" as much--or indeed even more--
implicated in these educational questions? 2 
II 
The plurality's reasoning is marked by contradiction. ~ r f /-
~ purports to acknowledge the traditional role of 
school boards and parents in deciding what should be taught 
in the schools. It states the truism that the schools are "vi-
tally important 'in the preparation of individuals for partici-
pation as citizens,' and as vehicles for 'inculcating funda-
2 The plurality suggests that the books in a school library derive special 
protection under the constitution because the school library is a place in 
which students exercise unlimited choice. See ante, at --. This sug-
gestion is without support in law or fact. It is contradicted by this very 
case. The school board in this case does not view the school library as a 
place in which students pick from an unlimited range of books-some of 
which may be inappropriate for young people. Rather, the school libary is 
analogous to an assigned reading list within which students may exercise a 
degree of choice. 
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mental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic 
political system.'" Ante, at--. Yet when a school board, ------as in this case, takes its responsibilities seriously and seeks t L 
1 
_ 
11 decide what the y va ues are t at shou e im- t f _..,,~ .e~ ~
parted, the plurality fin s a constitutional violation. _ 
Just this term the Court held, in an opinion I joined, that 
the children of illegal aliens must be permitted to attend the 
public schools. See Plyler v. Doe, -- U. S. -- (1982). 
Quoting from earlier opinions, the Court noted that "the pub-
lic school [is] a most vital civic institution for the preservation 
of a democratic system of government" and that the public 
schools are "the primary vehicle for transmitting 'the values 
on which our society rests.'" Id., at --. By denying to 
illegal aliens the opportunity "to absorb the values and skills 
upon which our social order rests" the law under review 
placed a lifelong disability upon these illegal alien children. 
Ibid. 
Today the plurality drains much of the content from these 
apt phrases. A school board's attempt to instill in its stu-
dents the ideas and values on which a democratic system de-
pends is viewed as an impermissible suppression of other 
ideas and values on which other systems of government and 
other societies thrive. Books may not be removed because~ 
tliey)extoll violence, intolerance and racism~ 
dignity of the individual. Human history, not the least of 
the twentieth century, records the power and political life of 
these very ideas. But they are not our ideas or values. Al-
though I would leave this educational decision to the duly 
constituted board, I certainly would not require a school ~ ~. ./-o 
board to promote ide.y{; and values repugnant toj a democratic ~<:e~ 1 
society or to teach such values to children.&? =:- ;? c..z ~ 
In different contexts and in different times,'the destruction ~""fr • ~ , 
of written materials has been the symbol of despotism and in-
tolerance. But the removal of nine ~ abl.y vulgar and rac-
ist books from a high school librafyoy a concerned local 
school board does not raise this specter. For me, today's de-
80-2043-DISSENT 
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cision symbolizes a debilitating encroachment upon the insti-
tutions of a free people. 
Attached as an Appendix hereto is Judge Mansfield's sum-
mary of excerpts from the books at issue in this case. 
6 
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APPENDIX 
''The excerpts which led the Board to look into the educa-
tional suitability of the books in question are set out (with mi-
nor corrections after comparison with the text of the books 
themselves) below. The pagination and the underlinings are 
retained from the original report used by the board. In 
newer editions of some of the books, the quotes appear at dif-
ferent pages. 
"1) SOUL ON ICE by Eldridge Cleaver 
PAGE QUOTE 
157-158'. . . There are white men who will pay you to fuck 
their wives. They approach you and say, 'How would you 
like to fuck a white woman?' 'What is this?' you ask. 'On 
the up-and-up,' he assures you. 'It's all right. She's my 
wife. She needs black rod, is all. She has to have it. It's 
like a medicine or drug to her. She has to have it. I'll pay 
you. It's all on the level, no trick involved. Interested?' 
You go with him and he drives you to their home. The three 
of you go into the bedroom. There is a certain type who will 
leave you and his wife alone and tell you to pile her real good. 
After it is all over, he will pay you and drive you to wherever 
you want to go. Then there are some who like to peep at you 
through a keyhole and watch you have his woman, or peep at 
you through a window, or lie under the bed and listen to the 
creaking of the bed as you work out. There is another type 
who likes to masturbate while he stands beside the bed and 
watches you pile her. There is the type who likes to eat his 
woman up after you get through piling her. And there is the 
type who only wants you to pile her for a little while, just 
long enough to thaw her out and kick her motor over and 
arouse her to heat, then he wants you to jump off real quick 
and he will jump onto her and together they can make it from 
there by themselves.' 
"2) A HERO AIN'T NOTHING BUT A SANDWICH 
by Alice Childress 
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PAGE QUOTE 
10 'Hell, no! Fuck the society.' 
7 
64-65 'The hell with the junkie, the wino, the capitalist, the 
welfare checks, the world ... yeah, and fuck you too!' 
75-76 'They can have back the spread and curtains, I'm too 
old for themfuckin bunnies anyway.' 
"3) THE FIXER by Bernard Malamud 
PAGE QUOTE 
52 'What do you think goes on in the wagon at night: Are the 
drivers on their knees fucking their rrwthers?' 
90 'Fuck yourself, said the blinker, etc.' 
92 'Who else would do anything like that but a 
rrwtherfucking Zhid?' 
146 'No more noise out of you or I'll shoot your Jew cock off' 
189 'Also there's a lot of fucking in the Old Testament, so 
how is that religious?' 
192 'You better go fuck yourself, Bok, said Kogin, I'm onto 
your Jew tricks.' 
215 'Ding-dong giddyap. A Jew's cock's in the devils's 
hock.' 
216 'You cocksucker Zhid, I ought make you lick it up off the 
floor.' 
"4) GO ASK ALICE by Anonymous 
PAGE QUOTE 
31 'I wonder if sex without acid could be so exciting, so won-
derful, so indescribable. I always thought it just took a 
minute, or that it would be like dogs mating.' 
47 'Chris and I walked into Richie and Ted's apartment to 
find the bastards stoned and making love to each other . . . 
low class queer.' 
81 'shitty, goddamned, pissing, ass, goddamned be Jesus, 
screwing life's, ass, shit. Doris was ten and had humped 
with who knows how many men in between ... her current 
stepfather started having sex with her but good ... 
sonofabitch balling her 
8 
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83 'but now when I face a girl its like facing a boy. I get all 
excited and turned on. I want to screw with the girl ... ' 
84 'I'd rather screw with a guy ... sometimes I want one of 
the girls to kiss me. I want her to touch me, to have her 
sleep under me.' 
84 'Another day, another blow job . . . If I don't give Big 
Ass a blow he'll cut off my supply ... and LittleJ aeon is yell-
ing, 'Mama, Daddy can't come rww. He's humping Carla.' 
85 'Shit, goddamn, goddamn prick, son-of-a-bitch, ass, 
pissed, bastard, goddamn, bullshit 
94 'I hope you have a nice orgasim with your dog tonight.' 
110 'Youfucking Miss Polly pure 
117 'Then he said that all I needed was a good fuck.' 
146 'It might be great because I'm practically a virgin in the 
sense that I've never had sex except when I've been stoned. 
' 
"5) SLAUGHTERHOUSE FIVE by Kurt Vonnegut, Jr. 
PAGE QUOTE 
29 "Get out of the road, you dumb rrwtheifucker.' The last 
word was still a novelty in the speech of white people in 1944. 
It was fresh and astonising to Billy, who had never fucked 
anybody ... ' 
32 'You stake a guy out on an anthill in the desert-see? He's 
facing upward, and you put honey all over his balls and 
pecker, and you cut off his eyelids so he has to stare at the 
sun till he dies.' 
34 'He had a prophylactic kit containing two tough condoms 
'For the prevention of disease only!' . . . He had a dirty pic-
ture of a woman attempting sexual intercourse with a shet-
land pony.' 
95 & 95 'But the Gospels actually taught this: Before you kill 
somebody, make absolutely sure he isn't well connected . . . 
The flaw in the Christ stories, said the visitor from outer 
space, was that Christ who didn't look like much, was actu-
ally the son of the Most Powerful Being in the Universe. 
" 
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Readers understood that, so, when they came to the cruci-
fixion, they naturally thought . . . Oh boy-they sure picked 
the wrong guy to lynch this time! And that thought had a 
brother: There are right people to lynch. People not well 
connected . . . . The visitor from outer space made a gift to 
Earth of a new Gospel. In it, Jesus really WAS a nobody, 
and a pain in the neck to a lot of people with better connec-
tions then he had . . . . So the people amused themselves 
one day by nailing him to a cross and planting the cross in the 
ground. There couldn't possibly be any repercussions, the 
lynchers thought ... since the new Gospel hammered home 
again and again what a nobody Jesus was. And then just be-
fore the nobody dies . . . . The voice of God came crashing 
down. He told the people that he was adopting the bum as 
his son . . . God said this: From this moment on, He will 
punish horribly anybody who torments a bum who has no 
connections.' 
99 'They told him that there could be no Earthling babies 
without male homosexuals. There could be babies without 
female homosexuals.' 
120 'Why don't you go fuck yourself? Don't think I haven't 
tried . . . he was going to have revenge, and that revenge 
was sweet . . . It's the sweetest thing there is, said Lazaro. 
People fuck with me, he said, and Jesus Christ are they ever 
fucking sorry.' 
122 'And he'll pull out a gun and shoot his pecker off. The 
stranger'll let him think a couple of seconds about who Paul 
Lazzaro is and what life's gonna be like without a pecker. 
Then he'll shoot him once in the guts and walk away .... 
He died on account of this silly cocksucker here. So I prom-
ised him I'd have this silly cocksucker shot after the war.' 
134 'In my prison cell I sit . . . With my britches full of shit, 
And my balls are bouncing gently on the floor. And I see 
the bloody snag when she bit me in the bag . . . Oh, I'll 
never fuck a Polack any more.' 
173 'And the peckers of the young men would still be semi-
10 
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erect, and their muscles would be bul,ging like cannonballs.' 
175 'They didn't have hard-ons . . . Everybody else did.' 
177 'The magazine, which was published for lonesome men to 
jerk off to.' 
178 'and one critic said. . . . 'To describe blow-jobs 
artistically." 
"6) THE BEST SHORT STORIES BY NEGRO WRITERS 
Ed. by Langston Hughes 
PAGE QUOTE 
176 'like bat's shit and camel piss,' 
228 'that no-count bitch of a daughter of yours is up there up 
North making a whore of herself.' 
237 'they made her get out and stand in front of the head-
lights of the car and pull down her pants and raise her 
dress-they said that was the only way they could be sure. 
And you can imagine what they said and what they did-.' 
303 'You need some pussy. Come on, let's go up to the 
whore house on the hill.' 
'Oh, these bastards, these bastards, this God damned Army 
and the bastards in it. The sons of bitches!' 
436 'he produced a brown rag doll, looked at her again, then 
grabbed the doll by its legs and tore it part way up the mid-
dle. Then he jammed his finger into the rip between the 
doll's legs. The other men laughed .... ' 
444 'The pimps, hustlers, lesbians, and others trying to mis-
use me.' 
462 'But she had straight firm legs and her breasts were 
small and upright. No doubt if she'd had children her 
breasts would be hanging like little empty purses. ' 
464 'She first became aware of the warm tense nipples on her 
breasts. Her hands went up gently to clam them.' 'In pro-
file , his penis hung like a stout tassle. She could even tell 
that he was circumcised.' 
406 'Cadillac Bill was busy following Luheaster around, rub-
bing her stomach and saying, 'Magic Stomach, Magic Stom-
\, 
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ach, bring me a little baby cadillac." 'One of the girls went 
upstairs with Red Top and stayed for about forty five 
minutes.' 
"7) BLACK BOY by Richard Wright 
PAGE QUOTE 
70-71 'We black children-seven or eight or nine years of age-
used to run to the Jew's store and shout: 
. . . Bloddy Christ Killers 
Never trust a Jew 
Bloody Christ Killers 
What won't a Jew do ... 
Red, white and blue 
Your pa was a Jew 
Your ma a dirty dago 
What the hell is you?' 
265 'Crush that nigger's nuts, nigger!' 'Hit that nigger!' 
'Aw, fight, you goddam niggers!' 'Sock 'im, in his f-k-g-
piece!' 'Make 'im bleed!' 
"8) LAUGHING BOY by Oliver LaFarge 
PAGE QUOTE 
38 'I'll tell you, she is all bad; for two bits she will do the 
worst thing.' 
256-9 'I was frightened when he wanted me to lie with him, 
but he made me feel all right. He knew all about how to 
make women forget themselves, that man.' 
"9) THE NAKED APE by Desmond Morris 
PAGE QUOTE 
73-74 "Also, the frontal approach provides the maximum 
possibility for stimulation of the female's clitoris during the 
pelvic thrusting of the male. It is true that it will be pas-
sively, stimulated by the pulling effect of the male's thrusts, 
regardless of his body position in relation to the female, but 
in a face-to-face mating there will in addition be the direct 
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area, and this will considerably heighten the stimulation 
' 'So it seems plausible to consider that face-to-face 
copulation is basic to our species. There are, of course, a 
number of variations that do not eliminate the frontal ele-
ment: male above, female above, side by side, squatting, 
standing, and so on, but the most efficient and commonly 
used one is with both partners horizontal, the male above the 
female .... ' 
80 ' . . . This broadening of the penis results in the female's 
external genitals being subjected to much more pulling and 
pushing during the performance of pelvic thrusts. With 
each inward thrust of the penis, the clitoral region is pulled 
downwards and then with each withdrawal, it moves up 
again. Add to this the rhythmic pressure being exerted on 
the clitoris region by the pubic region of the frontally copulat-
ing male, and you have a repeated massaging of the clitoris 
thatr-were she a male-would virtually be masturbatory.' 
94-99 ' . . . If either males or females cannot for some rea-
son obtain sexual access to their opposite numbers, they will 
find sexual outlets in other ways. They may use other mem-
bers of their own sex, or they may even use members of 
other species, or they may masturbate .... ' 
10) READER FOR WRITERS ... " 
638 F. 2d 404, 419-422 n. 1 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). 
.. 












Recirculated~ -,UH 2 "" 1982 
'JUN 2 4 1982 
PRINTED DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 80-2043 
BOARD OF EDUCATION, ISLAND TREES UNION 
FRE~ SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 26 ET AL., PETI-
TIONERS, v. STEVEN A. PICO, BY HIS 
NEXT FRIEND, FRANCES PICO ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
[June -, 1982] 
JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
The plurality opinion today rejects a basic concept of public 
school education in our country: that the States and locally 
elected school boards should have the responsibility for 
determining the educational policy of the public schools. 
After today's decision any junior high school student, by in-
stituting a suit against a school board or teacher, may invite a 
judge to overrule an educational decisron by the official body 
designated by the people to operate the schools. 
~ 
I 
School boards are uniquely local and democratic institu-
tions. Unlike the governing bodies of cities and counties, 
school boards have only one responsibility: the education of 
the youth of our country during their most formative and im-
pressionable years. Apart from health, no subject is closer 
to the hearts of parents than their children's education during 
those years. For these reasons, the governance of elemen-
tary and secondary education traditionally has been placed in 
the hands of a local board, responsible locally to the parents 
and citizens of school districts. Through parent-teacher as-
sociations (PTAs), and even less formal arrangements that 
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vary with schools, parents are informed and often may influ-
ence decisions of the board. Frequently, parents know the 
teachers and visit classes. It is fair to say that no single 
agency of government at any level is closer to the people 
whom it serves than the typical school board. 
I therefore view today's decision with genuine dismay. 
Whatever the final outcome of this suit and suits like it, the 
resolution of educational policy decisions through litigation, 
and the exposure of school board members to liability for 
such decisions, can be expected to corrode the school board's 
authority and effectiveness. As is evident from the general-
ity of the plurality's "standard" for judicial review, the deci-
sion as to the educational worth of a book is a highly subjec-
tive one. Judges rarely ate as competent as school 
authorities to make this decision; nor are judges responsive 
to the parents and people of the school district. 1 
The new constitutional right, announced by the plurality, is 
described as "a right to receive ideas" in a school. Ante, at 
12. As the dissenting opinions of THE CHIEF JUSTICE and 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST so powerfully demonstrate, however, 
this new found right finds no support in the First Amend-
ment precedents of this Court. And eve:ri apart from the in-
appropriateness of judicial oversight of educational policy, 
the new constitutional right is framed in terms that approach 
a meaningless generalization. It affords little guidance to 
courts, if they-as the plurality now authorizes them-are to 
oversee the inculcation of ideas. The plurality does an-
nounce the following standard: A school board's "discretion 
may not be exercised in a narrowly partisan or political man-
1 The plurality speaks of the need for "sensitive" decisionmaking, pursu-
ant to "regular" procedures. See ante, at --. One wonders what in-
deed does this mean. In this case, for example, the board did not act pre-
cipitously. It simply did not agree with the recommendations of a 
committee it had apointed. Would the plurality require-as a constitu-
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ner." Ante, at --. But this is a standardless standard 
that affords no more than subjective guidance to school 
boards, their counsel, and to courts that now will be required 
to decide whether a particular decision was made in a "nar-
rowly partisan or political manner." Even the "chancellor's 
foot" standard in ancient equity jurisdiction was never this 
fuzzy. 
As JUSTICE REHNQUIST tellingly observes, how does one 
limit-on a principled basis-today's new constitutional 
right? If a 14 year old child may challenge a school board's 
decision to remove a book from the library, upon what theory 
is a court to prevent a like challenge to a school board's deci-
sion not to purchase that identical book? And at the even 
more· "sensitive" level of "receiving jd_g.as," does today's deci-
sion entitle student oversight of which courses may be added 
or removed from the curriculum, or even of what a particular 
teacher elects to teach or not teach in the classroom? Is not 
the "right to receive ideas" as much-or indeed even more-
implicated in these educational questions? 2 
II 
The plurality's reasoning is marked by contradiction. It 
purports to acknowledge the traditional role of school boards 
and parents in deciding what should be taught in the schools. 
It states the truism that the schools are "vitally important 'in 
the preparation of individuals for participation as citizens,' 
and as vehicles for 'inculcating fundamental values necessary 
2 The plurality suggests that the books in a school library derive special 
protection under the constitution because the school library is a place in 
which students exercise unlimited choice. See ante, at --. This sug-
gestion is without support in law or fact. It is contradicted by this very 
case. The school board in this case does not view the school library as a 
place in which students pick from an unlimited range of books-some of 
which may be inappropriate for young people. Rather, the school libary is 
analogous to an assigned reading list within which students may exercise a 
degree of choice. 
4 
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to the maintenance of a democratic political system.'" Ante, 
at --. Yet when a school board, as in this case, takes its 
responsibilities seriously and seeks to decide what the funda-
mental values are that should be imparted, the plurality finds 
a constitutional violation. 
Just this term the Court held, in an opinion I joined, that 
the children of illegal aliens must be permitted to attend the 
public schools. See Plyler v. Doe, -- U. S. -- (1982). 
Quoting from earlier opinions, the Court noted that "the pub-
lic school [is] a most vital civic institution for the preservation 
of a democratic system of government" and that the public 
schools are "the primary vehicle for transmitting 'the values 
on which our society rests."' Id., at--. By denying to 
illegal aliens the opportunity "to absorb the values and skills 
upon which our social order rests" the law under review 
placed a lifelong disability upon these illegal alien children. 
Ibid. 
Today the plurality drains much of the content from these 
apt phrases. A school board's attempt to instill in its stu-
dents the ideas and values on which a democratic system de-
pends is viewed as an impermissible suppression of other 
ideas and values on which other systems of government and 
other societies thrive. Books may not be removed because 
they are indecent; extoll violence, intolerance and racism; or 
degrade the dignity of the individual. Human history, not 
the least of the twentieth century, records the power and po-
litical life of these very ideas. But they are not our ideas or 
values. Although I would leave this educational decision to 
the duly constituted board, I certainly would not require a 
school board to promote ideas and values repugnant to a dem-
ocratic society or to teach such values to children. 
In different contexts and in different times, the destruction 
of written materials has been the symbol of despotism and in-
tolerance. But the removal of nine vulgar or racist books 
from a high school library by a concerned local school board 
does not raise this specter. For me, today's decision sym-
80--2043-DISSENT 
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bolizes a debilitating encroachment upon the institutions of a 
free people. 
Attached as an Appendix hereto is Judge Mansfield's sum-
mary of excerpts from the books at issue in this case. 
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APPENDIX 
"The excerpts which led the Board to look into the educa-
tional suitability of the books in question are set out (with mi-
nor corrections after comparison with the text of the books 
themselves) below. The pagination and the underlinings are 
retained from the original report used by the board. In 
newer editions of some of the books, the quotes appear at dif-
ferent pages. 
"l) SOUL ON ICE by Eldridge Cleaver 
PAGE QUOTE 
157-158' . . . There are white men who will pay you to fuck 
their wives. They approach you and say, 'How would you 
like to fuck a white woman? ' 'What is this?' you ask. 'On 
the up-and-up,' he assures you. 'It's all right. She's my 
wife. She needs black rod, is ·an. She has to have it. It's 
like a medicine or drug to her. She has to have it. I'll pay 
you. It's all on the level, no trick involved. Interested? ' 
You go with him and he drives you to their home. The three 
of you go into the bedroom. There is a certain type who will 
leave you and his wife alone and tell you to pile her real good. 
After it is all over, he will pay you and drive you to wherever 
you want to go. Then there are some who like to peep at you 
through a keyhole and watch you have his woman, or peep at 
you through a window, or lie under the bed and listen to the 
creaking of the bed as you work out. There is another type 
who likes to masturbate while he stands beside the bed and 
watches you pile her. There is the type who likes to eat his 
woman up after you get through piling her. And there is the 
type who only wants you to pile her for a little while, just 
long enough to thaw her out and kick her motor over and 
arouse her to heat, then he wants you to jump off real quick 
and he will jump onto her and together they can make it from 
there by themselves. ' 
"2) A HERO AIN'T NOTHING BUT A SANDWICH 
by Alice Childress 
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PAGE QUOTE 
10 'Hell, no! Fuck the society.' 
7 
64-65 'The hell with the junkie, the wino, the capitalist, the 
welfare checks, the world ... yeah, and fuck you too!' 
75-76 'They can have back the spread and curtains, I'm too 
old for themfuckin bunnies anyway.' 
.... "3) THE FIXER by Bernard Malamud 
PAGE QUOTE 
52 'What do you think goes on in the wagon at night: Are the 
drivers on their knees fucking their mothers?' 
90 ,'Fuck yourself, said the blinker, etc.' 
92 'Who else would do anything like that but a 
motherfucking Zhid?' 
146 'No more noise out of you or I'll shoot your Jew cock off.' 
189 'Also there's a lot of fucking in the Old Testament, so 
how is that religious?' 
192 'You better go fuck yourself, Bok, said Kogin, I'm onto 
your Jew tricks.' 
215 'Ding-dong giddyap. A Jew's cock's in the devils's 
hock.' 
216 'You cocksucker Zhid, I ought make you lick it up off the 
floor.' · 
"4) GO ASK ALICE by Anonymous 
PAGE QUOTE 
31 'I wonder if sex without acid could be so exciting, so won-
derful, so indescribable. I always thought it just took a 
minute, or that it would be like dogs mating.' 
47 'Chris and I walked into Richie and Ted's apartment to 
find the bastards stoned and making love to each other . . . 
low class queer.' r 
81 'shitty, goddamned, pissing, ass, goddamned beJesus, 
screwing life's, ass, shit. Doris was ten and had humped 
with who knows how many men in between . . . her current 
stepfather started having sex with her but good ... 
sonof a bitch balling her 
8 
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83 'but now when I face a girl its like facing a boy. I get all 
excited and turned on. I want to screw with the girl . . . ' 
84 'I'd rather screw with a guy ... sometimes I want one of 
the girls to kiss me. I want her to touch me, to have her 
sleep under me.' 
84 'Another day, another blow job . . . If I don't give Big 
Ass a blow he'll cut off my supply ... and Little.I aeon is yell-
ing, 'Mama, Daddy can't come now. He's humping Carla.' 
85 'Shit, goddamn, goddamn prick, son-of-a-bitch, ass, 
pissed, bastard, goddamn, bullshit 
94 'I hope you have a nice orgasim with your dog tonight.' 
110 'You fucking Miss Polly pure 
117 'Then he said that all I needed was a good fuck.' 
146 'It might be great because I'm practically a virgin in the 
sense that I've never had sex except when I've been stoned. , 
"5) SLAUGHTERHOUSE FIVE by Kurt Vonnegut, Jr. 
PAGE QUOTE 
29 "Get out of the road, you dumb motherfucker.' The last 
word was still a novelty in the speech of white people in 1944. 
It was fresh and astonishing to Billy, who had never fucked 
anybody ... ' 
32 'You stake a guy out on an anthill in the desert-see? He's 
facing upward, and you put honey all over his balls and 
pecker, and you cut off his eyelids so he has to stare at the 
sun till he dies.' 
34 'He had a prophylactic kit containing two tough condoms 
'For the prevention of disease only! ' . . . He had a dirty pic-
ture of a woman attempting sexual intercourse with a shet-
land pony.' 
94 & 95 'But the Gospels actually taught this: Before you kill 
somebody, make absolutely sure he isn't well connected ... 
The flaw in the Christ stories, said the visitor from outer 
space, was that Christ who didn't look like much, was actu-
ally the son of the Most Powerful Being in the Universe. 
80-2043-DISSENT 
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Readers understood that, so, when they came to the cruci-
fixion, they naturally thought . . . Oh boy-they sure picked 
the wrong guy to lynch this time! And that thought had a 
brother: There are right people to lynch. People not well 
connected . . . . The visitor from outer space made a gift to 
Earth of a new Gospel. In it, Jesus really WAS a nobody, 
and a pain in the neck to a lot of people with better connec-
tions then he had . . . . So the people amused themselves 
one day by nailing him to a cross and planting the cross in the 
ground. There couldn't possibly be any repercussions, the 
lynchers thought ... since the new Gospel hammered home 
again and again what a nobody Jesus was. And then just be-
fore the nobody dies . . . . The voice of God came crashing 
down. He told the people that he was adopting the bum as 
his son . . . God said this: From this moment on, He wil.l 
punish horribly anybody who torments a bum who has no 
connections.' 
99 'They told him that there could be no Earthling babies 
without male homosexuals. There could be babies without 
female homosexuals.' 
120 'Why don't you go fuck yourself? Don't think I haven't 
tried ... he was going to have revenge, and that revenge 
was sweet. . . It's the sweetest thing there is, said Lazaro. 
Peoplefuck with me, he said, and Jesus Christ are they ever 
fucking sorry.' 
122 'And he'll pull out a gun and shoot his pecker off. The 
stranger'll let him think a couple of seconds about who Paul 
Lazzaro is and what life's gonna be like without a pecker. 
Then he'll shoot him once in the guts and walk away .... 
He died on account of this silly cocksucker here. So I prom-
ised him I'd have this silly cocksucker shot after the war.' 
134 'In my prison cell I sit . . . With my britches full of shit, 
And my balls are bouncing gently on the floor. And I see 
the bloody snag when she bit me in the bag . . . Oh, I'll 
never fuck a Polack any more.' 
173 'And the peckers of the young men would still be semi-
10 
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erect, and their muscles would be bulging like cannonballs.' 
175 'They didn't have hard-ans . . . Everybody else did.' 
177 'The magazine, which was published for lonesome men to 
jerk off to.' 
178 'and one critic said. . . . 'To describe blow-jobs 
artistically." 
"6) THE BEST SHORT STORIES BY NEGRO WRITERS 
Ed. by Langston Hughes 
PAGE QUOTE 
176 'like bat's shit and camel piss,' 
228 'that no-count bitch of a daughter of yours is up there up 
North making a whore of herself.' 
237 'they made her get out and stand in front of the head-
lights of the car and pull down her pants and raise her 
dress-they said that was the only way they could be sure. 
And you can imagine what they said and what they did-.' 
303 'You need some pussy. Come on, let's go up to the 
whore house on the hill.' 
'Oh, these bastards, these bastards, this God damned Army 
and the bastards in it. The sons of bitches!' 
436 'he produced a brown rag doll, looked at her again, then 
grabbed the doll by its legs and tore it part way up the mid-
dle. Then he jammed his finger into the rip between the 
doll's legs. The other men laughed .... ' 
444 'The pimps, hustlers, lesbians, and others trying to mis-
use me.' 
462 'But she had straight firm legs and her breasts were 
smail and upright. No doubt if she'd had children her 
breasts would be hanging like little empty purses.' 
464 'She first became aware of the warm tense nipples on her 
breasts. Her hands went up gently to clam them.' 'In pro-
file, his penis hung like a stout tassle. She could even tell 
that he was circumcised.' 
406 'Cadillac Bill was busy following Luheaster around, rub-
bing her stomach and saying, 'Magic Stomach, Magic Stom-
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ach, bring me a little baby cadillac." 'One of the girls went 
upstairs with Red Top and stayed for about forty five 
minutes.' 
"7) BLACK BOY by Richard Wright 
PAGE QUOTE 
7~ 71 'We black children-seven or eight or nine years of age-
used to run to the Jew's store and shout: 
. . . Bloddy Christ Killers 
Never trust a Jew 
Bloody Christ Killers 
What won't a Jew do . . . 
Red, white and blue 
Your pa was a Jew 
Your ma a dirty dago 
What the hell is you~ ' 
265 'Crush that nigger's nuts, nigger!' 'Hit that nigger!' 
'Aw, fight, you goddam niggers!' 'Sock 'im, in his f-k-g-
piece!' 'Make 'im bleed! ' 
"8) LAUGHING BOY by Oliver LaFarge 
PAGE QUOTE 
38 'I'll tell you, she is all bad; for two bits she will do the 
worst thing.' 
25~9 'I was frightened when he wanted me to lie with him, 
but he made me feel all right. He knew all about how to 
make women forget themselves, that man.' 
"9) THE NAKED APE by Desmond Morris 
PAGE QUOTE 
73-74 "Also, the frontal approach provides the maximum 
possibility for stimulation of the female's clitoris during the 
pelvic thrusting of the male. It is true that it will be pas-
sively, stimulated by the pulling effect of the male's thrusts, 
regardless of his body position in relation to the fem~e, but 
in a face-to-face mating there will in addition be the direct 
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area, and this will considerably heighten the stimulation 
' 'So it seems plausible to consider that face-to-face 
copulation is basic to our species. There are, of course, a 
number of variations that do not eliminate the frontal ele-
ment: male above, female above, side by side, squatting, 
standing, and so on, but the most efficient and commonly 
used one is with both partners horizontal, the male above the 
female .... ' 
80 ' . . . This broadening of the penis results in the female's 
external genitals being subjected to much more pulling and 
pushing during the performance of pelvic thrusts. With 
each inward thrust of the penjs, the clitoral region is pulled 
downwards and then with each withdrawal, it moves up 
again. Add to this the rhythmic pressure being exerted on 
the clitoris region by the pubic region of the frontally copulat-
ing male, and you have ~ repeated massaging of the clitoris 
that-were she a male-would virtually be masturbatory.' 
94-99 ' . . . If either males or females cannot for some rea-
son obtain sexual access to their opposite numbers, they will 
find sexual outlets in other ways. They may use other mem-
bers of their own sex, or they may even use members of 
other species, or they may masturbate .... ' 
10) READER FOR WRITERS ... " 
638 F. 2d 404, 419--422 n. 1 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). 
'---:, 
C HAM B E RS O F 
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~asfringhtn. J. <q. 21Jffe~, 
June 24, 1982 
80 - 2043 - Board of Education, Island Trees Union 
Free School District, No. 26 v . Pico 
With the "downstairs" pressures in remission 
for a moment, I ' ll go to a typed memo in response to yours. 
I take your note to mean you join what is now note 2 
( formerly part of note 1 ) with the omission of "Here there is 
no problem, etc . .. ," which certainly meets all the problems 
you raised . Absent further word, I will proceed . 
Regards, 
Justice Powell UJ2i (j 
~ 
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